Opinion
Civil Action 22-cv-00341-RMR-KLM
07-11-2022
BRIANA THOMAS, Plaintiff, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.
RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
KRISTEN L. MIX UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint [#8] (the “Motion”). Plaintiff filed a Response [#11] in opposition to the Motion [#8], and Defendant filed a Reply [#12]. The Motion [#8] has been referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and D.C.COLO.LCivR 72.1. See [#16]. The Court has reviewed the Motion, the Response, the Reply, the entire case file, and the applicable law, and is sufficiently advised in the premises. For the reasons set forth below, the Court respectfully RECOMMENDS that the Motion [#8] be DENIED.
For the purposes of resolving the Motion [#8], the Court accepts as true all well-pled, as opposed to conclusory, allegations made in Plaintiff's Complaint [#3]. See Shero v. City of Grove, Okla., 510 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
Plaintiff is an individual who resides in Colorado. Compl. [#3] ¶¶ 16, 20. Defendant is an Illinois Corporation that has offices and conducts business in Colorado. Id. ¶ 21. It is a mutual insurance company licensed to underwrite automobile insurance policies in 1 Colorado. Id. ¶ 22. The Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) because the parties reside in different states and diversity exists. See Notice of Removal [#1].
On May 6, 2016, Plaintiff suffered injuries as a result of a car accident. Compl. [#3] ¶¶ 32, 40-63. Plaintiff alleges that the accident was caused by a driver who fell asleep while driving. Id. ¶¶ 31-39. At the time of the accident, Plaintiff and her vehicle were insured through an uninsured/underinsured motorist (“UIM”) policy issued by Defendant. Id. ¶ 5. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has failed to fully compensate her for her injuries as required by the relevant insurance policies. Id. ¶¶ 7, 13, 141.
Plaintiff erroneously refers to the at fault driver as “Defendant” in the Complaint [#3]. Response [#11] at 3; see Compl. [#3] ¶¶ 29-41.
On November 15, 2021, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in the District Court for Boulder County. Compl. [#3] at 1. On February 7, 2022, the case was removed from state court. See [#1]. In the Complaint [#3], Plaintiff alleges her medical history, id. ¶¶ 42-60, and her interactions with Defendant following the accident, id. ¶¶ 72-141. The Complaint [#3] is seventeen single-spaced pages long and contains 123 paragraphs of general allegations. Id. ¶¶ 19-141. Plaintiff asserts three claims against Defendant: (1) breach of contract; (2) bad faith breach of contract; and (3) violation of Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 10-3-1115(1)(a) and 10-3-1116(1). Id. ¶¶ 142-217. On February 14, 2022, Defendant filed the present Motion [#8] seeking dismissal of the Complaint [#3] pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. Motion [#8] at 10. 2
The parties dispute whether Defendant made good faith efforts to confer, pursuant to D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.1(a), prior to filing the present Motion [#8], which was filed on Monday, February 14, 2022 at 5:30 pm - the deadline for filing a responsive pleading. Response [#11] at 1-2; Reply [#12] at 1-2. The Local Rule requires conferral regarding motions brought under Rule 8. The Court questions whether contact from Defendant on Friday, February 11, 2022 at 3:28 pm, one business day before the Motion [#8] was due, Response [#11] at 1, and an email sent on Monday, February 14 at noon that attached the proposed motion, Reply [#12] at 2, gave Plaintiff a reasonable opportunity to respond to the dispute, and thus whether Defendant made reasonable, good faith efforts to confer. Nevertheless, the Court will consider the merits of the Motion [#8]. The Court notes, however, if Plaintiff had been given more time to respond, the issue raised in the Motion [#8] may have been “resolved through meaningful conferral instead of motion practice.” Mason v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., No. 19-cv-01537-PAB-SKC, 2020 WL 1138472, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 9, 2020).
II. Standard of Review
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 requires a pleading to contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The rule requires each allegation to “be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2). “Rule 8 serves the important purpose of requiring plaintiffs to state their claims intelligibly so as to inform the defendants of the legal claims being asserted.” Mann v. Boatright, 477 F.3d 1140, 1148 (10th Cir. 2007). Complaints that contain “no intelligible claims against any particular defendant” violate Rule 8. Mitchell v. City of Colo. Springs, 194 Fed.Appx. 497, 498 (10th Cir. 2006); see also Ausherman v. Stump, 643 F.2d 715, 716 (10th Cir. 1981) (finding that a prolix complaint violated Rule 8(a)). “[D]ismissal without prejudice under Rule 8 is within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Carbajal v. City & Cnty. Of Denver, 502 Fed.Appx. 715, 716 (10th Cir. 2012).
III. Analysis
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's Complaint [#3] warrants dismissal because it fails to present allegations that are simple, coherent, and concise in violation of Rule 8(a)(2), and is prolix in light of the nature of the case. See, e.g., Motion [#8] at 5-9. For example, Defendant highlights that the Complaint [#3] contains 206 paragraphs regarding the UIM claim. Id. at 7-8. Defendant further argues that the Complaint [#3] “violates Rule 8 by virtue of its unnecessary recitation of extraneous, duplicative, and irrelevant allegations[,]” 3 and statements of law. Id. at 9. Thus, Defendant asserts that the Complaint [#3] has at least 100 paragraphs that make factual allegations about the history of the adjustment of her claim and improper statements of law, Defendant avers that “State Farm is legally obligated to evaluate Plaintiff's UM/UIM claim[.]” Id. (quoting Compl. [#3] ¶ 124).
Plaintiff argues in the Response [#11] that “[b]ad faith cases like this are fact specific and turn on the unique factual circumstances surrounding State Farm's conduct and its decision to deny her benefits[,]” and that the Complaint [#3] complies with Rule 8. Id. at 1-3. Plaintiff asserts, in fact, that she “went to great lengths to make the allegations of her complaint brief, simple, and clear while including facts to plausibly show she is entitled to the claims for relief.” Id. at 3. In her Motion [#8], Plaintiff points out that Defendant admits it is necessary for Plaintiff, in a bad faith action, to provide sufficient factual allegations to support the claim, which is exactly what Plaintiff says she did. Id. at 5. Plaintiff avers that the Complaint [#3], consisting of 17 pages of one sentence, doublespaced paragraphs, is not close to the length of the complaints in the cases cited by Defendant, and is instead “very similar” to a complaint that Chief Judge Philip A. Brimmer found did not violate Rule 8. Response [#11] at 6 (citing Mason v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company, No. 19-cv-01537-PAB-SKC, 2020 WL 1138472 (D. Colo. Mar. 9, 2020)). The Court agrees with Plaintiff's arguments, and finds Mason to be persuasive.
The similarities between Mason and the present case are apparent. As in the present case, the Mason plaintiff alleged that a defendant insurer failed to fully compensate her for injuries suffered in a car accident. Id., 2020 WL 1138472, at *1. The complaint in Mason, like the Complaint [#3] here, was 17 pages long and contained over 4 100 paragraphs of general allegations that included the plaintiff's medical history. Id. The Mason court's analysis in denying the motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 8 is entirely applicable here:
A complaint violates Rule 8 when it is “virtually impossible to understand” or “completely lacking in clarity and intelligibility.” See Mitchell v. City of Colo. Springs, Colo., 194 Fed.Appx. 497, 498 (10th Cir. 2006)....The complaint in this case is far from that standard. Defendant compares plaintiff's complaint to the complaint in Ausherman v. Stump, 643 F.2d 715 (10th Cir. 1981), but that comparison does not help its cause....The Ausherman complaint “consist[ed] of sixty-three pages, with nine pages of attachments,” and consisted of a “rambling narration” that was “difficult to follow,” and “commingled” the various causes of action. Ausherman, 643 F.2d at 716-17. By contrast, plaintiff's complaint is seventeen pages long, contains a coherent narrative, and clearly articulates its three causes of action....Defendant does not offer authority indicating that Rule 8 requires plaintiff to construct her complaint with only that factual detail that defendant believes is necessary. Cf. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (for purposes of establishing federal jurisdiction, plaintiff is the master of her complaint). Although the complaint may contain somewhat more detail than defendant believes is strictly necessary to sustain plaintiff's claims, the Court is satisfied that the complaint is compliant with Rule 8.Mason, 2020 WL 1138472, at *2.
The Court finds nothing to distinguish Mason from the present case. As in Mason, the present Complaint [#3] is not a “lengthy, poorly drafted complaint” that would result in Defendant suffering financial or procedural prejudice. See Reply [#12] at 6 (quoting Schupper v. Edie, 193 Fed.Appx. 744, 746 (10th Cir. 2006). Moreover, while there may be some redundancy in the Complaint [#3] relating to detail Defendant believes is not necessary, the Court finds that Plaintiff has stated her “claims intelligibly so as to inform the defendant[ ] of the legal claims being asserted.” Mann, 477 F.3d at 1148. The claims 5 consist of short and plain statements, and the allegations are simple, concise, and direct. Therefore, the Court finds that the Complaint [#3] is compliant with Rule 8.
The Court finds that the cases cited by Defendant are distinguishable. For example, Defendant cites the Ausherman case, Motion [#8] at 4, which was aptly distinguished in Mason, id., 2020 WL 1138472, at *2. Defendant also cites Ripple & Howe, Inc. v. Fensten, 399 P.2d 97, 98 (Colo. 1965), in which the Colorado Supreme Court found that a 15-page complaint was not compliant with C.R.C.P. 8. Reply [#12] at 3. The Court notes that Ripple is not binding authority, and the Court does not find it persuasive under Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 - the controlling standard in this case. Similarly, Defendant cites Jenkins v. Patrick, No. 08-cv-01048-BNB, 2008 WL 2699853, at *1 (D. Colo. July 8, 2008), which stated that complaints longer than ten pages violated D.C.COLO.LCivR 5.1. Reply [#12] at 3. The Court notes that the current local rules for this District, applicable in the present case, contain no such limitation. See D.C.COLO.LCivR 5.1 (2021). Finally, the Court finds that Defendant's reliance on Luciano v. Perez, 2007 WL 1306476, No. 06-cv-01284-PSF-PAC, at *2-4 (D. Colo. May 3, 2007), is misplaced, as the complaint in that case contained many problems not applicable here, such as “excessively long” sentences and “many hyperbolic allegations against State Farm that seem to bear no relation to the underlying cause of action they purportedly support.” Id. at 2, 4; see Motion [#8] at 5, 8.
Defendant argues, however, that the Complaint [#3] is composed of impermissible “shotgun pleadings” that force the Court to “independently extract the particular factual averments that are relevant to each individual claim.” Motion [#8] at 6 (quotation omitted). Defendant asserts in that regard that the Complaint [#3] “state[s] numerous claims by simply reciting the formulaic elements of the claim and referring holistically to the preceding narrative as support.” Reply [#12] at 5 (quotation omitted).
Defendant seems to argue that Plaintiff's use of undisputed facts in the Complaint [#3] constitutes shotgun pleading. See Motion [#8] at 6. However, Defendant provides no supporting authority for this argument. See id. Therefore, the Court considers whether Plaintiff engaged in shotgun pleading pursuant to the authorities provided by Defendant.
Defendant cites, for example, Glenn v. First National Bank in Grand Junction, 868 F.2d 368, 371 (10th Cir. 1989), to illustrate “shotgun pleading.” Reply [#12] at 5. In Glenn, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found a complaint to contain “shotgun pleading” where factual allegations were not matched with claims for relief. Id., 868 F.2d at 371-72; see also Jacobs v. Credit Suisse First Bos., No. 11-cv-00042-CMA-KLM, 2011 WL 4537007, 6 at *6 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2011) (finding a violation of Rule 8 where the complaint “g[ave] no hint whatsoever as to what particular conduct by [the defendant] constituted the alleged violation” at issue). In contrast, the present Complaint [#3] clearly matches factual allegations with every asserted claim for relief. See id. ¶¶ 142-217. While the Complaint [#3] could have been written more concisely, the Court cannot find that it contains “shotgun pleadings” or otherwise violates the requirements of Rule 8.
IV. Conclusion
In conclusion, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Motion [#8] be DENIED.
IT IS ORDERED that pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days after service of this Recommendation to serve and file any written objections in order to obtain reconsideration by the District Judge to whom this case is assigned. A party's failure to serve and file specific, written objections waives de novo review of the Recommendation by the District Judge, Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147-48 (1985), and also waives appellate review of both factual and legal questions. Makin v. Colo. Dep't of Corr., 183 F.3d 1205, 1210 (10th Cir. 1999); Talley v. Hesse, 91 F.3d 1411, 1412-13 (10th Cir. 1996). A party's objections to this Recommendation must be both timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo review by the District Court or for appellate review. United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop., 73 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996). 7 8