Thomas v. State

17 Citing cases

  1. Thomas v. State

    3 S.W.3d 89 (Tex. App. 1999)   Cited 19 times

    On original submission, this Court, in a plurality opinion, reversed the trial court's judgment and entered a judgment of acquittal.See Thomas v. State, No. 05-92-01844-CR, 1994 WL 605946 (Tex.App. โ€” Dallas Oct. 31, 1994) (not designated for publication), vacated; 919 S.W.2d 427 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). As author, I concluded that the trial court erred in charging the jury in a criminal case with the broad Searsy civil definition of "evidence of indebtedness."

  2. Thomas v. State

    65 S.W.3d 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)   Cited 29 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Analyzing whether the term "evidence of indebtness" as used in the definition of security in the Texas Securities Act requires a writing

    We held that an "evidence of indebtedness" was "all contractual obligations to pay in the future for consideration presently received." Thomas v. State, 919 S.W.2d 427, 432 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996) ( Thomas II). We remanded the case to the Court of Appeals with instructions to consider whether an "evidence of indebtedness" requires a writing under the act.

  3. State v. Johnson

    198 S.W.3d 795 (Tex. App. 2006)   Cited 2 times
    Stating the common-law rule of lenity for construing penal provisions does not apply to the Texas Penal Code

    Unless found in the Texas Penal Code, a penal statute must be strictly construed. United States v. Granado, 302 F.3d 421, 424 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that prior version of section 502.409 must be "strictly construe[d]"); see, e.g., Thomas v. State, 919 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996) (recognizing that "State Securities Act is highly penal in nature and requires that it be strictly construed") (quoting Bruner v. State, 463 S.W.2d 205, 215 (Tex.Crim.App. 1970)). Accordingly, "[a] forbidden act must come clearly within the prohibition of the statute and any doubt as to whether an offense has been committed should be resolved in favor of the accused."

  4. State v. Johnson

    219 S.W.3d 386 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)   Cited 26 times
    Recognizing that one purpose of the Code in making it an offense to drive with a obscured plate is to help facilitate the quick detection of counterfeit plates

    Nevertheless, the timing and the plain language of the statutory amendment compel our conclusion. Thomas v. State, 919 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996); cf. ยง 1.05(a)("The rule that a penal statute is to be strictly construed does not apply to this code.")Johnson, 198 S.W.3d at 797.

  5. Murphy v. Reynolds

    No. 02-10-00229-CV (Tex. App. Sep. 29, 2011)   Cited 2 times

    And, even if strict construction was required as Reynolds asserts, strict construction of the statute does not mean isolating terms or phrases from the context in which they appear. Thomas v. State, 919 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); see also Bruner v. State, 463 S.W.2d 205, 215 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970) (concluding that the TSA's highly penal nature requires that the act be strictly construed). Neither does a strict construction mean that we ignore the plain meaning of terms.

  6. Dobbs v. State

    434 S.W.3d 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)   Cited 462 times
    In Dobbs v. State, 434 S.W.3d 166 (Tex.Crim.App.2014), the majority concluded that the defendant's actions of displaying a gun, refusing to put the gun down, and threatening to shoot himself did not constitute โ€œforce againstโ€ a peace officer within the meaning of Texas Penal Code ยง 38.03.

    See Harris v. State, 359 S.W.3d 625, 629 (Tex.Crim.App.2011) (We must โ€œpresume that every word in a statute has been used for a purpose and that each word, phrase, clause, and sentence should be given effect if reasonably possibleโ€) (quotations omitted); see also Nguyen v. State, 1 S.W.3d 694, 696 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (court โ€œcannot interpret a phrase within a statute in isolationโ€); Thomas v. State, 919 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (โ€œWe always strive to give words and phrases meaning within the context of the larger provision.โ€)

  7. Cuellar v. State

    70 S.W.3d 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)   Cited 84 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that because Cuellar's underlying felony conviction was set aside pursuant to the judicial-clemency provision, he was "not a convicted felon " and thus "there was no predicate felony conviction to support a conviction under ยง 46.04"

    These considerations mirrored those in the Code Construction Act even before that Act was written. Thomas v. State, 919 S.W.2d 427 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996); Engelking v. State, 750 S.W.2d 213 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988); Bruner v. State, 463 S.W.2d 205 (Tex.Crim.App. 1970); Ex parte Wilmoth, 125 Tex.Crim. 274, 67 S.W.2d 289 (1933); Patillo v. State, 120 Tex.Crim. 568, 47 S.W.2d 847 (1932); Egan v. State, 68 S.W. 273 (Tex.Crim.App. 1902); Murray v. State, 21 Tex. App. 620[ 21 Tex.Crim. 620], 2 S.W. 757, 761 (1886) (op. on reh'g).Smith v. State, 108 Tex.Crim. 358, 300 S.W. 82 (1927).

  8. Nguyen v. State

    1 S.W.3d 694 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)   Cited 131 times
    Finding the record did not demonstrate a reasonable probability of influence on the jury's verdict though the defense asserted that spectators wore "large buttons portraying a color photograph of the deceased," because the appellate record did not show where those wearing the buttons were seated or that the "jurors did in fact see the buttons"

    Moreover, we cannot interpret a phrase within a statute in isolation; we must look at the phrase in situ. Thomas v. State, 919 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Tex.Cr.App. 1996). The context of the entire organized crime statute gives clues to the meaning of undefined words.

  9. Lang v. State

    NO. 03-15-00332-CR (Tex. App. May. 5, 2017)   Cited 4 times

    . . . [W]e cannot interpret a phrase [or word] within a statute in isolation[.]"); Thomas v. State, 919 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) ("We always strive to give words and phrases meaning within the context of the larger provision."). The statute refers to the actor committing the offense (the defendant) in the singular: "a person commits an offense" with no mention of other actors.

  10. Penning v. State

    NO. 03-14-00579-CR (Tex. App. Aug. 31, 2016)   Cited 3 times

    . . . [W]e cannot interpret a phrase [or word] within a statute in isolation[.]"); Thomas v. State, 919 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) ("We always strive to give words and phrases meaning within the context of the larger provision."). See, e.g.