On original submission, this Court, in a plurality opinion, reversed the trial court's judgment and entered a judgment of acquittal.See Thomas v. State, No. 05-92-01844-CR, 1994 WL 605946 (Tex.App. โ Dallas Oct. 31, 1994) (not designated for publication), vacated; 919 S.W.2d 427 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). As author, I concluded that the trial court erred in charging the jury in a criminal case with the broad Searsy civil definition of "evidence of indebtedness."
We held that an "evidence of indebtedness" was "all contractual obligations to pay in the future for consideration presently received." Thomas v. State, 919 S.W.2d 427, 432 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996) ( Thomas II). We remanded the case to the Court of Appeals with instructions to consider whether an "evidence of indebtedness" requires a writing under the act.
Unless found in the Texas Penal Code, a penal statute must be strictly construed. United States v. Granado, 302 F.3d 421, 424 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that prior version of section 502.409 must be "strictly construe[d]"); see, e.g., Thomas v. State, 919 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996) (recognizing that "State Securities Act is highly penal in nature and requires that it be strictly construed") (quoting Bruner v. State, 463 S.W.2d 205, 215 (Tex.Crim.App. 1970)). Accordingly, "[a] forbidden act must come clearly within the prohibition of the statute and any doubt as to whether an offense has been committed should be resolved in favor of the accused."
Nevertheless, the timing and the plain language of the statutory amendment compel our conclusion. Thomas v. State, 919 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996); cf. ยง 1.05(a)("The rule that a penal statute is to be strictly construed does not apply to this code.")Johnson, 198 S.W.3d at 797.
And, even if strict construction was required as Reynolds asserts, strict construction of the statute does not mean isolating terms or phrases from the context in which they appear. Thomas v. State, 919 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); see also Bruner v. State, 463 S.W.2d 205, 215 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970) (concluding that the TSA's highly penal nature requires that the act be strictly construed). Neither does a strict construction mean that we ignore the plain meaning of terms.
See Harris v. State, 359 S.W.3d 625, 629 (Tex.Crim.App.2011) (We must โpresume that every word in a statute has been used for a purpose and that each word, phrase, clause, and sentence should be given effect if reasonably possibleโ) (quotations omitted); see also Nguyen v. State, 1 S.W.3d 694, 696 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (court โcannot interpret a phrase within a statute in isolationโ); Thomas v. State, 919 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (โWe always strive to give words and phrases meaning within the context of the larger provision.โ)
These considerations mirrored those in the Code Construction Act even before that Act was written. Thomas v. State, 919 S.W.2d 427 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996); Engelking v. State, 750 S.W.2d 213 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988); Bruner v. State, 463 S.W.2d 205 (Tex.Crim.App. 1970); Ex parte Wilmoth, 125 Tex.Crim. 274, 67 S.W.2d 289 (1933); Patillo v. State, 120 Tex.Crim. 568, 47 S.W.2d 847 (1932); Egan v. State, 68 S.W. 273 (Tex.Crim.App. 1902); Murray v. State, 21 Tex. App. 620[ 21 Tex.Crim. 620], 2 S.W. 757, 761 (1886) (op. on reh'g).Smith v. State, 108 Tex.Crim. 358, 300 S.W. 82 (1927).
Moreover, we cannot interpret a phrase within a statute in isolation; we must look at the phrase in situ. Thomas v. State, 919 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Tex.Cr.App. 1996). The context of the entire organized crime statute gives clues to the meaning of undefined words.
. . . [W]e cannot interpret a phrase [or word] within a statute in isolation[.]"); Thomas v. State, 919 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) ("We always strive to give words and phrases meaning within the context of the larger provision."). The statute refers to the actor committing the offense (the defendant) in the singular: "a person commits an offense" with no mention of other actors.
. . . [W]e cannot interpret a phrase [or word] within a statute in isolation[.]"); Thomas v. State, 919 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) ("We always strive to give words and phrases meaning within the context of the larger provision."). See, e.g.