Opinion
22A-CR-330
07-06-2022
Alonzo Fenton Thomas III, Appellant-Defe ndant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Timothy J. Burns Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General for Indiana Kelly A. Loy Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Sheila Ann Carlisle, Judge The Honorable Matthew E. Symons, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 49D29-2111-CM-35635
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Timothy J. Burns Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General for Indiana
Kelly A. Loy Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Bailey, Judge.
Case Summary
[¶1] Alonzo F. Thomas, III ("Thomas"), challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his two convictions for invasion of privacy, as Class A misdemeanors. We affirm.
Ind. Code § 35-46-1-15.1(a)(11); I.C. § 35-33-8-2(4).
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] On or around March of 2020, Adriona Coleman ("Coleman") lived with her daughter and her mother. On or around the end of November of 2020, Thomas, Coleman's boyfriend, also moved into the house with his young son.
[¶3] On September 14, 2021, the trial court in a pending criminal matter ordered Thomas not to have contact with Coleman as a condition of his release on bail. However, Thomas continued to live with Coleman and was planning to go on a trip with her to Mexico for her birthday. On September 15, Thomas moved to vacate the no-contact order in the pending criminal case; however, the trial court did not rule on the motion and instead took the matter under advisement until the State was able to depose a witness. Nevertheless, Thomas went to Mexico with Coleman and continued to live with her until November of 2021.
[¶4] The State charged Thomas with four counts of invasion of privacy, as Class A misdemeanors, for violations of the no-contact order regarding Coleman. The trial court dismissed the first two counts per the State's request. At Thomas's January 27, 2022, bench trial, the State presented evidence including the testimony of police officers from the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department's Digital Forensics Unit who had analyzed data from Coleman's cellular phone and discovered several photographs taken while Coleman was in Mexico with Thomas. One of those photographs depicted Thomas together with Colman in Mexico on September 19, 2021.
[¶5] The trial court found Thomas guilty of the two counts of invasion of privacy and sentenced him to consecutive sentences with an aggregate term of 270 days of incarceration. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[¶6] Thomas challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions of Invasion of Privacy.
When reviewing a claim that the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Harrison v. State, 32 N.E.3d 240, 247 (Ind.Ct.App. 2015), trans. denied. We instead respect the exclusive province of the trier of fact to weigh any conflicting evidence. Id. We consider only the probative evidence supporting the verdict and any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from this evidence. Id. We will affirm if the probative evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence could have allowed a reasonable trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
Merriweather v. State, 128 N.E.3d 503, 514-15 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019), trans. denied; see also McCarthy v. State, 749 N.E.2d 528, 538 (Ind. 2001) ("If the testimony believed by the trier of fact is enough to support the verdict, then the reviewing court should not disturb it.").
[¶7] To support a conviction of invasion of privacy, as a Class A misdemeanor, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) Thomas; (2) knowingly or intentionally; (3) violated a no-contact order. I.C. § 35-46-1-15.1(a)(11); I.C. § 35-33-8-2(4). The State presented evidence-and Thomas does not dispute-that, on September 14, 2021, a criminal court issued a no-contact order prohibiting him from contact with Coleman and that he did have repeated contact with Coleman after that date. However, Thomas asserts that he did not "knowingly or intentionally" violate that no-contact order because he mistakenly believed that the no-contact order was "voided" when Coleman initiated contact with Thomas. Appellant's Br. at 11. Thomas asserts that this was a "mistake of fact" that negated his culpability per Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-7.
[¶8] A "mistake of fact" is a defense to a crime if "the person who engaged in the prohibited conduct was reasonably mistaken about a matter of fact," and "the mistake negates the culpability required for commission of the offense." Id. "A person invoking this defense must satisfy three elements: 1) the mistake was honest and reasonable; 2) the mistake was about a matter of fact; and 3) the mistake negates the culpability required to commit the crime." Cowans v. State, 53 N.E.3d 540, 543 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016) (citing Potter v. State, 684 N.E.2d 1127, 1135 (Ind. 1997)), disapproved on other grounds by Batchelor v. State, 119 N.E.3d 550 (Ind. 2019).
[¶9] Thomas's claimed defense fails on the second of the above elements; that is, his mistake was not a mistake of fact but of law. Thomas asserts that he mistakenly believed that the no contact order "would be voided when [Coleman] initiated contacts on [sic] [Thomas]." Appellant's Br. at 11. However, that is not a mistake of fact. It would have been a mistake of fact if, for example, Thomas mistakenly believed that Coleman voluntarily had contact with him. He does not allege he was mistaken about that fact but about the legal effect of that fact. See Cowans, 53 N.E.3d at 543 (noting, where the defendant thought there was a legal principle that allowed his otherwise-criminal actions, "[a] mistaken fact regarding what the law says is still a mistake of law").
[¶10] Thomas did not mistake a fact; he misunderstood the law. And "[i]t is well settled that ignorance of the law is no excuse for criminal behavior." Id. (citing Yoder v. State, 208 Ind. 50, 194 N.E. 645, 648 (1935)); see also Bellwether Prop., LLC v. Duke Energy Ind., Inc., 87 N.E.3d 462, 467 (Ind. 2017) (noting a "longstanding legal principle presumes that citizens know the law and must obey it-on pain of losing their lives, liberty, or property for noncompliance").
[¶11] The State provided probative evidence from which the trial court could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Thomas knowingly or intentionally violated a no-contact order. The trial court did not err when it convicted Thomas of invasion of privacy.
[¶12] Affirmed.
Najam, J., and Bradford, C.J., concur.