Thomas v. State

5 Citing cases

  1. Taylor v. State

    175 Md. App. 153 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007)   Cited 23 times

    Id. at 444-45, 639 A.2d 675 (citations omitted). Taylor renews his argument that this Court considered and rejected the State's interpretation of the same phrase in Thomas v. State, 104 Md.App. 461, 656 A.2d 799 (1995). In that case, we interpreted the predecessor to the current enhanced penalty provisions, Art. 27, section 286, which established benchmarks for the 10, 25, and 40 year enhancements based, inter alia, on whether the defendant was being "sentenced, on being convicted a second time[,]" "third time," or "fourth time."

  2. Nelson v. State

    187 Md. App. 1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009)   Cited 13 times
    In Nelson, the defendant was sentenced as a third-time drug offender to a term of twenty-five years without parole pursuant to Art. 27, § 286(d) of the Md. Code (1996 Repl. Vol., 2001 Supp.) (later codified as Crim. Law, § 5-608).

    At that time, however, appellant did not qualify as a second offender, because the Frederick County offense occurred before the conviction in the Carroll County case. See Gargliano, 334 Md. at 446, 639 A.2d 675 (stating that second offender enhancement may not be imposed for an offense that occurred prior to the first conviction); see also Thomas v. State, 104 Md.App. 461, 468-69, 656 A.2d 799 (1995). On March 4, 1999, while the Frederick County drug charges were still pending, appellant was arrested in Washington County on felony drug charges.

  3. Veney v. State

    130 Md. App. 135 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000)   Cited 17 times
    Stating that an intent to distribute "is seldom proved directly, but is more often found by drawing inferences from facts proved which reasonably indicate under all the circumstances the existence of the required intent."

    Appellant was convicted of violating a controlled dangerous substance law in 1991. Appellant contends that under Thomas v. State, 104 Md. App. 461 (1995), he could be sentenced to an enhanced penalty for his second conviction only and, thus, only one 10-year non-parolable sentence could be imposed. The State claims that imposition of an enhanced sentence for each of the possession with intent to distribute convictions is permissible under the dictates of Whack v. State, 338 Md. 665 (1995), and that Thomas is factually distinguishable from appellant's case.

  4. Wong-Wing v. State

    156 Md. App. 597 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004)   Cited 5 times

    Ashford v. State, 147 Md. App. 1, 65, 807 A.2d 732, cert. denied, 372 Md. 430, 813 A.2d 257 (2002). See also Klauenberg v. State, 355 Md. 528, 541, 735 A.2d 1061 (1999) ("It is well-settled that when specific grounds are given at trial for an objection, the party objecting will be held to those grounds and ordinarily waives any grounds not specified that are later raised on appeal."); Thomas v. State, 104 Md. App. 461, 465, 656 A.2d 799 (1995) (where party asserts specific grounds for an objection, all other grounds not specified are waived); Maryland Rule 8-131(a). In the alternative, appellant urges us to review the matter under the plain error doctrine.

  5. Bell v. State

    118 Md. App. 64 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997)   Cited 8 times
    Holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding defendant from asking the victim if she had engaged in sexual relations in the 72 hours preceding the alleged rape where defendant "failed to lay any foundation" as to prior sexual contact that could account for the presence of sperm in the victim's endocervix

    With respect to the car, he objected because the prosecutor was "fishing around and leading" Erica. When a party specifies particular grounds for an objection, the party is deemed to have waived all other grounds not mentioned. Brecker v. State, 304 Md. 36, 39-40, 497 A.2d 479 (1985); Jeffries v. State, 113 Md. App. 322, 341, 688 A.2d 16, cert. denied, 345 Md. 457, 693 A.2d 355 (1997); Thomas v. State, 104 Md. App. 461, 465, 656 A.2d 799 (1995). On the basis of the reasons advanced by Bell, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling the objection.