Crosby held that the identity of a decoy was not privileged and must be revealed, and in Hodges v. State, 98 Ga. App. 97, 105 ( 104 S.E.2d 704) (1958), the identity of an informer was held to be absolutely privileged. These absolute rules had generally been followed ( Pass v. State, 227 Ga. 730 (4) ( 182 S.E.2d 779) (1971); Morgan v. State, 211 Ga. 172, 177 ( 84 S.E.2d 365) (1954); Stanford v. State, 134 Ga. App. 61 (1) ( 213 S.E.2d 519) (1975); Thomas v. State, 134 Ga. App. 18 (1) ( 213 S.E.2d 129) (1975); Welch v. State, 130 Ga. App. 18, 19 (3) ( 202 S.E.2d 223) (1973); Morrison v. State, 129 Ga. App. 558 (5) ( 200 S.E.2d 286) (1973); Butler v. State, 127 Ga. App. 539 (2) ( 194 S.E.2d 261) (1972); Staggers v. State, 101 Ga. App. 463, 465 ( 114 S.E.2d 142) (1960); Smallwood v. State, 95 Ga. App. 766 (1) ( 98 S.E.2d 602) (1957); Roddenberry v. State, 90 Ga. App. 66 ( 82 S.E.2d 40) (1954)), until the United States Supreme Court held, in a case involving a decoy, that the due process concept of fundamental fairness required that the public interest in protecting the flow of information to law enforcement officials be balanced against the right of the accused to a full and fair opportunity to defend himself. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 ( 77 S.C. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639) (1956).
[Cits.]" Likewise, in Thomas v. State, 134 Ga. App. 18, 22 (2) ( 213 SE2d 129) (1975), we held "`[e]ntrapment is the seduction or improper inducement to commit a crime and not the testing by trap, trickiness, or deceit of one suspected.' [Cit.] The discovery of crime and the procurement of evidence by deception are not prohibited. A trap may be set. [Cits.]" (Punctuation omitted.)
Three distinct elements embody the entrapment defense under OCGA § 16-3-25: (1) the idea for the commission of the crime must originate with the state agent; (2) the crime must be induced by the agent's undue persuasion, incitement, or deceit; and (3) the defendant must not be predisposed to commit the crime. Keaton v. State, 253 Ga. 70, 72 ( 316 S.E.2d 452) (1984); Thomas v. State, 134 Ga. App. 18, 22 ( 213 S.E.2d 129) (1975). If a defendant presents a prima facie case of entrapment, the burden shifts to the State to disprove entrapment beyond a reasonable doubt as one of the elements of the crime that must be proven. Harpe v. State, 134 Ga. App. 493, 495 ( 214 S.E.2d 738) (1975); Hill v. State, 261 Ga. 377, 405 S.E.2d 258 (1991).
So considering the charge, it fully and accurately informed the jury of the elements of the defense of entrapment. Responding to an inquiry from the jury with an accurate legal statement, which the quoted language was, see Thomas v. State, 134 Ga. App. 18, 22 (2) ( 213 S.E.2d 129) (1975); Sutton v. State, 59 Ga. App. 198, 199 ( 200 S.E. 225) (1938), is not a violation of OCGA § 17-8-57. There was no error.
However, since they completely failed to present any evidence showing Tisdol to be a government officer or employee, or an agent thereof, the trial court did not err in refusing to charge on the defense of entrapment. Accord, Thomas v. State, 134 Ga. App. 18 (2) ( 213 S.E.2d 129) (1975), and cases cited. 2.
Absent other circumstances, it is generally held that where an officer simply makes a request, as to purchase contraband, and there is ready compliance, the defense of entrapment is not available. Thomas v. State, 134 Ga. App. 18 ( 213 S.E.2d 129) (1975). Here, the record reveals that the contraband was not in appellant's possession.
Criminal Code § 25-905; [Cits.]" Thomas v. State, 134 Ga. App. 18, 23 ( 213 S.E.2d 129). 4. Appellant contends that the court erred in denying his motion for mistrial.
Brooks presented no entrapment defense. Thomas v. State, 134 Ga. App. 18, 23 ( 213 S.E.2d 129) (1975), cert. den. "The defendant who interposes an entrapment defense may not controvert the allegations of the indictment... In asserting an entrapment defense,... [the] accused admits the commission of the offense while denying that he was inclined to commit the offense before the intervention of the law enforcement agent.
" United States v. Kirk, 44 USLW 2464 (CA5, decided March 19, 1976). Cf., Thomas v. State, 134 Ga. App. 18, 21 (2) ( 213 S.E.2d 129). 2.
" The jury resolved this issue against defendant, there was ample evidence to support the finding, and the general grounds are without merit. See Criminal Code § 26-905; Hill v. State, 225 Ga. 117 ( 166 S.E.2d 338); Sutton v. State, 59 Ga. App. 198 ( 200 S.E. 225); McKibben v. State, 115 Ga. App. 598, 599 (1) ( 155 S.E.2d 449) and cases cited; Moon v. State, 120 Ga. App. 141, 142 (4) ( 169 S.E.2d 632); Allen v. State, 120 Ga. App. 533, 535 (4) ( 171 S.E.2d 380); Brooks v. State, 125 Ga. App. 867 (2) ( 189 S.E.2d 448); Brown v. State, 132 Ga. App. 399 (1) ( 208 S.E.2d 183); Garrett v. State, 133 Ga. App. 564 (3) ( 211 S.E.2d 584); Thomas v. State, 134 Ga. App. 18. 2.