Summary
holding any error in admitting extraneous offense testimony from psychological therapist harmless because complainant's testimony was "more detailed and graphic" and State presented overwhelming evidence of guilt, aside from complained-of evidence
Summary of this case from Hall v. StateOpinion
No. 01-07-00742-CR
Opinion issued October 30, 2008. DO NOT PUBLISH. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
On Appeal from the 182nd District Court, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 1094964.
Panel consists of Chief Justice RADACK and Justices NUCHIA and HIGLEY.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury found appellant, Nathaniel Thomas, guilty of the offense of sexual assault against his daughter, P.C., and assessed his punishment at 20 years in prison and a $10,000 fine. In two issues, appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence the testimony of P.C.'s therapist and the therapist's treatment records. We affirm.
See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.011 (Vernon 2003).
Background
In September 2005, when she was 17 years old, P.C. made an outcry to her aunt that appellant had been sexually abusing her since she was 12 years old. The aunt contacted P.C.'s mother, who reported the abuse to P.C.'s school. The school reported the abuse to the Baytown Police Department. Appellant was later indicted for sexually assaulting P.C. At trial, P.C. described appellant's abuse over the years in graphic detail. Appellant also testified at trial. He denied that he had ever sexually abused P.C. Appellant defended himself at trial by contending that P.C. had fabricated the abuse allegations to retaliate against him for being unfaithful to P.C.'s mother, for his strict discipline, and for his punishment of P.C. for running up a large cellular telephone bill. The jury ultimately believed P.C. and found appellant guilty of sexual assault. The jury then assessed the maximum penalty for sexual assault: 20 years in prison and a $10,000 fine.Admission of Therapist's Testimony and Records
In his first issue, appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the testimony of P.C.'s psychological therapist, Linda Thompson, whom the State offered as an expert witness. Appellant objected that Thompson lacks the qualifications to testify as an expert in this case. Appellant also raised a hearsay objection to Thompson's testimony. Appellant argued, contrary to the State's assertion, that the medical treatment and diagnoses exception to the hearsay rule does not apply to Thompson's testimony. See Tex. R. Evid. 803(4). Thompson's objectionable testimony can be divided into two categories: (1) expert testimony that P.C.'s symptoms of sleep disturbances, social withdrawal, flashbacks, and feelings of low self-worth are "classic symptoms" of sexual abuse and (2) hearsay testimony in which Thompson repeated to the jury the details of what P.C. had told her during therapy about the sexual abuse. In his second issue, appellant challenges the admission of certain of Thompson's treatment records, comprised of worksheets completed by P.C. The records reveal P.C.'s inner feelings and thoughts regarding herself and appellant. Even if we assume that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Thompson's testimony and the treatment records, we will not reverse the judgment if the error was harmless. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b). More precisely, we will not reverse a trial court's judgment based on the erroneous admission of evidence unless the error affects a substantial right. Id.; Johnson v. State, 967 S.W.2d 410, 417 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998). A substantial right is affected when the error has a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. See King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). Stated conversely, a substantial right is not affected by the erroneous admission of evidence "if the appellate court, after examining the record as a whole, has fair assurance that the error did not influence the jury, or had but a slight effect." Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 355 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). An improper admission of evidence is not reversible error if the same or similar evidence is admitted without objection at another point in the trial. Leday v. State, 983 S.W.2d 713, 717 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998); see Duncan v. State, 95 S.W.3d 669, 672 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd) (holding improper admission of outcry testimony was harmless error because similar testimony was admitted through complainant, pediatrician, and medical records). Appellant contends that he was harmed by the admission of Thompson's testimony and the treatment records because they served to bolster P.C.'s credibility — the key issue in this case. Appellant points out the State referenced the treatment records in its closing argument to show that P.C. had been attending therapy since her outcry and to reveal, as argued by the State, "the life of a victim." The State also argued that the records show that P.C. has "a good heart and morals" and that she is a person of religious faith. In its summation, the State also referred to Thompson as "a really great witness." The record further shows that the State mentioned in its opening statement that Thompson would testify that P.C. exhibited classic symptoms of an abuse victim. In conducting our harm analysis, we note the following:• P.C. testified without objection regarding the sexual abuse she endured over the years. P.C.'s testimony was much more detailed and graphic than Thompson's testimony and provided a chronological history of the abuse. In contrast, Thompson's testimony regarding what P.C. had told her omitted many of the details that P.C. related during her testimony.
• P.C. testified regarding her therapy with Thompson. She told the jury at the July 2007 trial that she had been seeing Thompson every two weeks since October 2005. P.C. also testified that she had suffered from low-self esteem, but that Thompson was helping her recover.
• P.C. also related to the jury her feelings regarding appellant and the abuse.
• Detective C. Rymer of the Baytown Police Department, testified that he interviewed P.C. about the abuse allegations. Detective Rymer stated that P.C. told him that the abuse had occurred over a five-year period and provided him with a detailed, chronological account of the abuse.
• Dr. Ferria Pereira, a physician at the Texas Children's Hospital and the Children's Assessment Center also testified. Dr. Pereira told the jury that she had examined P.C. following the outcry. Dr. Pereira testified, without objection, regarding what P.C. had told her during the exam. According to Dr. Pereira, P.C. reported that appellant began sexually abusing her when she was 12 years old and had last abused her a few days before the exam. Dr. Pereira told the jury that P.C. reported that appellant had touched her "outside her vagina" with "his penis, his finger, and his tongue." Dr. Pereira related that P.C. had told her that appellant had sexually abused her more than 400 times.
• Dr. Pereira also testified that her examination of P.C. revealed abrasions around P.C.'s hymenal ring that were consistent with the reported abuse.
• Testimony was introduced that, one year before she made her outcry to her aunt, P.C. had told her younger cousin that appellant had been sexually abusing her.
• P.C.'s mother, Felicia, testified that before the outcry, she had observed appellant staring at P.C. in a sexual manner. Felicia told the jury that she recalled that appellant made P.C. fetch him a beer while P.C. was only wearing a towel. Felicia also testified that, at the time of the outcry, she had looked at P.C.'s genitalia and observed that one area looked red and swollen. Felicia further testified that P.C. slept a lot and seemed depressed. Felicia stated that she and P.C. both attend therapy with Thompson every two weeks. She testified that it is difficult for her to pay Thompson. At the time of trial, she owed Thompson $400. Nonetheless, they continue therapy because it has helped P.C.
• The defense cross-examined P.C. and the State's witnesses extensively.
• Both P.C. and appellant testified at trial, allowing the jury to observe each and make a credibility assessment.
• Although it mentioned Thompson and discussed the treatment records in its closing argument, the State also relied on the evidence discussed above and emphasized evidence showing appellant's lack of moral character in general.In sum, a review of the record shows that the effect of the complained-of evidence was muted by other evidence introduced by the State that was either similar to the complained-of evidence or which served to corroborate P.C.'s testimony. Stated more simply, the State presented overwhelming evidence of appellant's guilt, aside from the complained-of evidence. After examining the record as a whole, we have a fair assurance that the alleged errors did not influence the jury, or had but a slight effect. See Motilla, 78 S.W.3d at 355. Accordingly, we hold that any error in admitting the complained-of evidence was harmless. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b). We overrule appellant's first and second issues.