Clearly, the identity of J.B.'s assailant was in issue. See Thomas v. State, 409 So.2d 955, 957 (Ala.Cr.App. 1981). This was not an occasion where the defendant merely denies that the incident ever occurred.

See 2 Wigmore on Evidence § 304 (Chadbourn rev. 1979). Judge McElroy's treatise on evidence referred to the test as one of "plan, design, scheme or system," see C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence §§ 69.01 (6), 70.01 (12)(d) (3d ed. 1977), while Alabama appellate opinions have variously termed the rule the exception for "pattern," see Mayberry v. State, 419 So.2d 262, 268 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982); McDonald v. State, 57 Ala. App. 529, 329 So.2d 583 (1975) cert. quashed, 295 Ala. 410, 329 So.2d 596 (1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834, 97 S.Ct. 99, 50 L.Ed.2d 99 (1976), for "modus operandi," see Smith v. State, 409 So.2d 455, 458 (Ala.Cr.App. 1981); Hayes v. State, 384 So.2d 623, 626 (Ala.Cr.App. 1979), cert. quashed, 384 So.2d 627 (Ala. 1980), or for "mark" or "signature" crimes, see Thomas v. State, 409 So.2d 955, 956 (Ala.Cr.App. 1981). Regardless of the label for the exception, we intend our discussion here to include the same principles enunciated by the foregoing authorities, and to describe that rule which allows evidence of a prior crime whenever the circumstances of the charged and non-charged crimes exhibit such a great degree of similarity that anyone viewing the two offenses would naturally assume them to have been committed by the same person.

This evidence was admissible as falling within the "identity exception" to the general rule precluding evidence of collateral crimes. See Lawrence v. State, 441 So.2d 1021 (Ala.Crim.App. 1983); Thomas v. State, 409 So.2d 955 (Ala.Crim.App. 1981); Primm v. State, 473 So.2d 547 (Ala.Crim.App. 1984); Smith v. State, 409 So.2d 455 (Ala.Crim.App. 1981). In Lawrence, this court noted:

Identity of the perpetrator is placed in issue when counsel for the defendant cross-examines a witness so as to challenge the witness's identification of the perpetrator. Brumfield v. State, supra; Thomas v. State, 409 So.2d 955 (Ala.Crim.App. 1981), cert. denied, 409 So.2d 955 (1982). As to the relevancy of Jernigan's testimony about the incident in Tennessee to prove identity, the appellant's identity as one of Johnson's robbers was in issue.

In some cases, the degree of similarity eliminates the requirement that there be an unusual modus operandi. In Thomas v. State, 409 So.2d 955 (Ala.Crim.App. 1981), we held that the robberies at issue were not "novel and peculiar" in the usual sense, but so resembled each other as to fall within the identity exception. There, the totality of the circumstances indicated "[t]he defendant had placed his mark or signature on each offense."

In my opinion, this is the classic situation of when the decision to allow or not to allow evidence of collateral crimes or acts as part of the State's case rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. Thomas v. State, 409 So.2d 955 (Ala.Crim.App. 1981); Jones v. State, 460 So.2d 1384 (Ala.Crim.App. 1984). I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals; therefore, I dissent.

"This exception to the ` "general exclusionary rule only becomes applicable when the identity of the person who committed the now-charged crime is in issue.'" Thomas v. State, 409 So.2d 955, 957 (Ala.Cr.App. 1981), quoting C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence, Section 69.01(8) (4th Ed. 1991). During cross-examination of several state witnesses, defense counsel placed the appellant's identity in issue by questioning those witnesses as to possible mistaken identity, specifically regarding the clothes that the appellant was wearing and his overall appearance. Based on Thomas and Nickerson [v. State, 523 So.2d 504 (Ala.Crim.App. 1987)], evidence of each of these crimes would be admissible in the trial of the other; therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err in consolidating the two robbery charges.

C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence, § 69.01(8) (3rd ed. 1977); Smith v. State, 409 So.2d 455 (Ala.Crim.App. 1981); Breen v. State, supra. Also, the "identity exception to the general exclusionary rule only becomes applicable when the identity of the person who committed the now-charged crime is in issue." C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence, § 69.01(8) (3rd ed. 1977); Thomas v. State, 409 So.2d 955 (Ala.Crim.App. 1981). There have been a plethora of cases in Alabama dealing with the identity exception, many of which have held that crimes were so similar that they can be said to be the work of a single individual, thus serving the purpose of identifying the accused.

Also, the `identity exception to the general exclusionary rule only becomes applicable when the identity of the person who committed the now-charged crime is in issue.' C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence, § 69.01(8) (3rd ed. 1977); Thomas v. State, 409 So.2d 955 (Ala.Crim.App. 1981). There have been a plethora of cases in Alabama dealing with the identity exception, many of which have held that crimes were so similar that they can be used to be the work of a single individual, thus serving the purpose of identifying the accused.

This exception to the " 'general exclusionary rule only becomes applicable when the identity of the person who committed the now-charged crime is in issue.' " Thomas v. State, 409 So.2d 955, 957 (Ala.Cr.App. 1981), quoting C.Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence, Section 69.01(8) (4th Ed. 1991). During crossexamination of several state witnesses, defense counsel placed the appellant's identity in issue by questioning those witnesses as to possible mistaken identity, specifically regarding the clothes that the appellant was wearing and his overall appearance. Based on Thomas and Nickerson, evidence of each of these crimes would be admissible in the trial of the other; therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err in consolidating the two robbery charges.