Thomas v. Shooting Club

9 Citing cases

  1. Lumber Co. v. Lumber Co.

    137 N.C. 431 (N.C. 1905)   Cited 23 times
    In Lumber Co. v. Lumber Co., 137 N.C. 431, 49 S.E. 946, this Court considered judicial admissions, and Walker, J., speaking for the Court, stated: "Such agreements and admissions are of frequent occurrence and of great value, as they dispense with proof and save time in the trial of causes.

    In Bailey v. Rutjes, 86 N.C. 520, it is held that however reasonably one of the parties to an agreement may be induced to act with reference thereto in a particular way by the conduct of the other, the latter is not bound by such conduct as evincing the measure of his contractual duty or obligation, unless there is some equitable element or an estoppel involved, which in law binds him (437) by his conduct to assume that duty or responsibility as if he had expressly promised to do so. To the like effect is Thomas v. Shooting Club, 121 N.C. 238. The same idea is differently expressed in Gregory v. Bullock, 120 N.C. 262, namely, when the terms of an agreement are ascertained its effect is determined by the law, and does not depend upon the uncertain or undisclosed notion or belief of either party.

  2. Burton v. Mfg. Co.

    43 S.E. 480 (N.C. 1903)   Cited 12 times
    In Burton v. Mfg. Co., 132 N.C. 17, 43 S.E. 480, and in Nance v. Telegraph Co., 177 N.C. 313, 98 S.E. 838, only a general issue as to what amount, if any, defendant owed plaintiff, was submitted.

    The instruction, properly (21) construed, amounted to saying to the jury that if the minds of the parties did not come to an agreement, there was no special contract, and is sustained both by the elementary principles of the law of contract and the decisions of this Court. Brunhild v. Freeman, 77 N.C. 128; Thomas v. Shooting Club, 121 N.C. 238. The exception cannot be sustained.

  3. Hamilton v. Icard

    19 S.E. 607 (N.C. 1894)   Cited 7 times

    Affirmed. Cited: S. v. Suttle, 115 N.C. 788; Shaffer v. Gaynor, 117 N.C. 21; Duncan v. Hall, ib., 446; Hamilton v. Icard, ib., 477; Everett v. Newton, 118 N.C. 923; Walden v. Ray, 121 N.C. 238; Prevatt v. Harrelson, 132 N.C. 252; Lindsay v. Austin, 139 N.C. 469; Berry v. McPherson, 153 N.C. 6; Coxe v. Carpenter, 157 N.C. 560; Locklear v. Savage, 159 N.C. 238; Land Co. v. Cloyd, 165 N.C. 597; Reynolds v. Palmer, 167 N.C. 455; Cross v. R. R., 172 N.C. 120; Waldo v. Wilson, 174 N.C. 628; Alexander v. Cedar Works, 177 N.C. 147. (543)

  4. Bryan v. Spivey

    13 S.E. 766 (N.C. 1891)   Cited 25 times

    Affirmed. Cited: Bryan v. Alexander, 111 N.C. 142, 145; Hamilton v. Icard, 114 N.C. 536; Alexander v. Gibbons, 118 N.C. 802; Walden v. Ray, 121 N.C. 238; Hawkins v. Cedar Works, 122 N.C. 89; Wilson v. Wilson, 125 N.C. 528; Bullock v. Canal Co., 132 N.C. 180; Wilson v. Brown, 134 N.C. 404; Monk v. Wilmington, 137 N.C. 327; Jennings v. White, 139 N.C. 27; Campbell v. Everhart, ib., 513; Dobbins v. Dobbins, 141 N.C. 220; Vanderbilt v. Johnson, ib., 373; Chatham v. Lansford, 149 N.C. 365; Thornton v. R. R., 150 N.C. 692; Berry v. McPherson, 153 N.C. 5; Christman v. Hilliard, 167 N.C. 7; Land Co., v. Floyd, ib., 687; S. c., 171 N.C. 545; Cross v. R. R., 172 N.C. 124; Waldo v. Wilson, 174 N.C. 628; Patrick v. Ins. Co., 176 N.C. 665; S. v. Johnson, ib., 724; Alexander v. Cedar Works, 177 N.C. 147. (72)

  5. Mallett v. Simpson

    94 N.C. 37 (N.C. 1886)   Cited 13 times
    Noting that “even when the right to acquire real property is limited by charter, and the corporation transcends its power in that respect, ... a conveyance to it is not void, but only the Sovereign ... can object”

    No error. Affirmed. Cited: Hamilton v. Icard, 114 N.C. 536; Barcello v. Hapgood, 118 N.C. 729; Walden v. Ray, 121 N.C. 238; Cross v. R. R., 172 N.C. 122, 123.

  6. Davis v. McArthur

    78 N.C. 357 (N.C. 1878)   Cited 17 times
    In Davis v. McArthur, 78 N.C. 357, the facts were that plaintiff's ancestor and those under whom he claimed had had adverse possession for thirty-three years, and during the last nine years of the time the plaintiff's ancestor was in possession under a deed; and this Court held that the title was out of the State by presumption, and on the nine years' possession, part of the thirty-three, by the ancestor of the plaintiff, if vested in him (396) and became a perfect title by force of the statute of limitations.

    PER CURIAM. No error. Cited: Hill v. Overton, 81 N.C. 395; Freeman v. Sprague, 82 N.C. 368; Scott v. Elkins, 83 N.C. 427; Osborne v. Anderson, 89 N.C. 262; Cowles v. Hall, 90 N.C. 334; Phipps v. Pierce, 94 N.C. 518; Davidson v. Arledge, 97 N.C. 184; Pearson v. Simmons, 98 N.C. 283; Bryan v. Spivey, 109 N.C. 66; Hamilton v. Icard, 114 N.C. 536; Walden v. Ray, 121 N.C. 238; May v. Mfg. Co., 164 N.C. 265. (361)

  7. Candler v. Lunsford

    20 N.C. 542 (N.C. 1838)   Cited 14 times

    Judgment affirmed. Cited: Reed v. Earnhart, 32 N.C. 520; Mallett v. Simpson, 94 N.C. 43; Wallace v. Maxwell, 32 N.C. 112; Aycock v. R. R., 89 N.C. 324; S. v. Williams, 94 N.C. 895; Mason v. McLean, 35 N.C. 264; Melvin v. Waddell, 75 N.C. 366; Price v. Jackson, 91 N.C. 14; Cowles v. Hall, 90 N.C. 333; Pearson v. Simmons, 98 N.C. 283; Taylor v. Gooch, 48 N.C. 469; Asbury v. Fair, 111 N.C. 257; Hamilton v. Icard, 114 N.C. 536; Walden v. Ray, 121 N.C. 238. (545)

  8. Fitzrandolph v. Norman

    4 N.C. 563 (N.C. 1817)   Cited 12 times

    As to possession of part being possession of the whole of a tract of land under certain circumstances, see Larkins v. Miller, 3 N.C. 345. Cited: Graham v. Houston, 15 N.C. 235; Carson v. Burnett, 18 N.C. 553; Harris v. Maxwell, 20 N.C. 384; Candler v. Lunsford, ib., 544; Wallace v. Maxwell, 29 N.C. 137; S. c., 32 N.C. 112; Reed v. Earnhardt, ib., 528; Taylor v. Gooch, 48 N.C. 469; Davis v. McArthur, 78 N.C. 359; Price v. Jackson, 91 N.C. 14; Dills v. Hampton, 92 N.C. 570; Bryan v. Spivey, 109 N.C. 66; Walden v. Ray, 121 N.C. 238. (578)

  9. Matter of Agnew

    132 Misc. 466 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1928)   Cited 8 times
    In Matter of Agnew (132 Misc. 466, 474), relied on by the appellants, the case was decided on the theory of quasi contract.

    In other words, the presumption of contract, arising from acceptance of services, can be rebutted, not by evidence that the plaintiff did not intend to contract, but only by evidence of an agreement or understanding that no contractual obligation was to result. "When the law implies a promise to pay for work done and accepted, and there is no agreed price, the laborer may recover the reasonable value of his services, unless there be some agreement or understanding that nothing is to be paid." ( Thomas v. Thomasville Shooting Club, 121 N.C. 238.) Conversely, where the patient did not expect to pay, it was held in Shelton v. Johnson (1874, 40 Iowa 84) that a physician who is called to a consultation by an attending physician for his own benefit, in accordance with an agreement between the latter and his employer that the attending physician shall pay the expense of consultation, can recover for his services from the employer under an implied contract, notwithstanding the agreement.