Opinion
2 CA-HC 2021-0003
12-28-2021
Christopher Eugene Thomas, Petitioner/Appellant, v. David Shinn, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections, Respondent/Appellee.
Christopher Thomas, Florence In Propria Persona Laura Conover, Pima County Attorney By Maile Belongie, Deputy County Attorney, Tucson Counsel for Respondent/Appellee
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County No. CR20021298 The Honorable Kathleen Quigley, Judge
Christopher Thomas, Florence In Propria Persona
Laura Conover, Pima County Attorney By Maile Belongie, Deputy County Attorney, Tucson Counsel for Respondent/Appellee
Judge Eckerstrom authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Espinosa and Vice Chief Judge Staring concurred.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
ECKERSTROM, JUDGE
¶1 Petitioner Christopher Thomas challenges the trial court's order dismissing his application for a writ of habeas corpus. We affirm.
¶2 Thomas, an inmate with the Arizona Department of Corrections, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in March 2021. He argued that he was "illegally confined" because he "was denied fundamental fairness under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution." Specifically he argued he had not been advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda, nor had he been brought before a magistrate in California, where the stop of the vehicle he was driving took place, to determine if officers there had probable cause to stop the vehicle and detain him. After the stop, Thomas was convicted of first-degree murder, burglary, and theft of a means of transportation, as the vehicle he was driving had been stolen from the victim. In a March 18, 2021 order, the trial court summarily dismissed Thomas's application. This appeal followed.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
¶3 On appeal, Thomas repeats his claims relating to probable cause and the legality of the search of the vehicle. He contends essentially that because no traffic citation was issued after the stop, the officers' "invasion of [his] privacy" was "impermissible under the Fourth Amendment." And, to the extent we understand his argument, he maintains that his consent for an officer to look for his identification, which resulted in the discovery of a weapon, was "the product of an illegal arrest" and therefore invalid. But, as this court determined in affirming the trial court's denial of Thomas's motion to suppress the evidence found in the vehicle, "Thomas had no standing to assert a Fourth Amendment claim, as he had no legitimate expectation of privacy in a stolen vehicle." State v. Thomas, No. 2 CA-CR 2004-0208, ¶ 8 (Ariz. App. Apr. 25, 2005) (mem. decision).
¶4 In any event, generally, "[i]n Arizona, the writ of habeas corpus may be used only to review matters affecting a court's jurisdiction." In re Oppenheimer, 95 Ariz. 292, 297 (1964). Thomas has not shown that the trial court here lacked jurisdiction based on his previously rejected claim of a Fourth Amendment violation. The court therefore did not err in concluding Thomas was not entitled to relief. See State v. Cowles, 207 Ariz. 8, ¶ 3 (App. 2004) (appellate court reviews denial of petition for writ of habeas corpus for abuse of discretion).
¶5 Accordingly, we affirm the order dismissing Thomas's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.