Opinion
3:24-cv-1235 (DNH/TWD)
12-18-2024
CHARLES M. THOMAS, Plaintiff, v. JUDGE BRETT S. NOONAN, Defendant.
CHARLES M. THOMAS Plaintiff, pro se
CHARLES M. THOMAS Plaintiff, pro se
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER
THERESE WILEY DANCKS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. INTRODUCTION
The Clerk has sent to the Court for review a complaint filed by pro se plaintiff Charles M. Thomas (“Plaintiff”), together with an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Dkt. Nos. 1, 2. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends Plaintiff's complaint be dismissed.
II. IFP APPLICATION
Plaintiff has not paid the statutory filing fee for this action and seeks leave to proceed IFP. See generally, Dkt. No. 2. “28 U.S.C. § 1915 permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in a federal court without prepayment of the filing fee that would ordinarily be charged.” Cash v. Bernstein, No. 1:09-CV-1922, 2010 WL 5185047, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2010). Upon review, Plaintiff's IFP application demonstrates economic need, Dkt. No. 2, therefore, he is granted permission to proceed IFP.
III. COMPLAINT
Plaintiff alleges on June 23, 2023, during a pre-trial teleconference before Defendant Broome County Family Court Judge Brett S. Noonan, he terminated his court appointed attorney. See Dkt. No. 1 at 3. Judge Noonan informed Plaintiff the court would not appoint another attorney to represent him, therefore, Plaintiff would be required to either hire another attorney or represent himself. See id. Judge Noonan further stated the pre-trial conference would proceed as scheduled, irrespective of Plaintiff's lack of representation. See id. He further states Judge Noonan “had ex parte testimonial email communication with the opposing Attorney Kelly Fischer” the same day. Id. Plaintiff avers “I am indigent and unable to hire a[n] Attorney and was forced by Judge Brett S. Noonan to continue the legal proceeding without legal representation.” Id.
Citations to Plaintiff's submissions will refer to the pagination generated by CM/ECF, the Court's electronic filing system. Unless otherwise indicated, excerpts from the record are reproduced exactly as they appear in the original and errors in spelling, punctuation, and grammar have not been corrected.
The pre-trial conference concerned a “family offense criminal allegations and custody of [Plaintiff's] daughter . . . witnessed by Emily Thomas ....” Dkt. No. 1 at 3.
On September 27, 2023, Plaintiff sent evidence supporting his defense to both Judge Noonan and Attorney Fischer by email under the court's discovery rules. See id. The evidence included a voice recording wherein “the Petitioner Emily Thomas self admittedly filed the Petitions with False allegations under Fraudulent intent.” Id.
On October 15, 2023, Plaintiff sent Judge Noonan an email request for a continuance of the trial scheduled for October 17, 2023, in the state of New York, due to a medical emergency in the state of South Carolina. See id. at 4. Judge Noonan denied Plaintiff's request “and held the trial in [Plaintiff's] absence which falls under excusable Default of medical emergency and financial unable to get to the State of New York for trial.” Id.
On October 17, 2023, Judge Noonan imposed a default judgment against Plaintiff which included “a No contact order . . . for Emily Thomas on a family offense,” and “loss of custody, suspended visitation and No contact order of protection for a custody petition of the” Plaintiff's child. Id. The judgment was imposed “with only testimony of Emily Thomas to support his Judgement which was with excessive sentence and without legal representation.” Id.
The complaint identifies six causes of action against the Defendant, Judge Brett S. Noonan, for: (1) the deprivation of Plaintiff's rights under U.S. law by denying a court appointed attorney to an indigent person facing loss of child custody and criminal charge allegations; (2) gross negligence for not reviewing the evidence in Plaintiff's defense before issuing a judgment against him; (3) violating the rights to adequate representation and legal counsel for defendants unable to afford counsel; (4) abuse of discretion by denying Plaintiff's request for a continuance of the trial; (5) imposition of an unjust and excessive sentence including loss of custody, suspended visitation, and no contact order against a defendant without legal representation, based solely on the opposing party's testimony; and (6) accepting ex parte testimonial communication. See id. at 5-6. Plaintiff seeks the following relief: “Vacate Default Judgement. Order of Protection of no contact against Judge Brett S. Noonan. $5,000,000 dollars cash in damages, punitive and compensatory and general damages. Also, any criminal charges under Federal law for the Constitutional Violations.” Id. at 7.
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Section 1915 of Title 28 requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted, emphasis in original). A claim is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), abrogated on other grounds Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (“[A] finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible”); Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437 (“[A]n action is ‘frivolous' when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless . . . or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.”).
In determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted, “the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
Moreover, a court should not dismiss a pro se complaint “without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). However, an opportunity to amend is not required where “the problem with [the plaintiff's] causes of action is substantive” such that “better pleading will not cure it.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000).
V. ANALYSIS
As an initial matter, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims against the sole Defendant, Judge Noonan, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See generally, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
“Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a federal district court lacks authority to review a final state court order or judgment where a litigant seeks relief that invites the federal district court to reject or overturn such a final state court order or judgment.” Porter v. Nasci, No. 5:24-CV-0033 (GTS/TWD), 2024 WL 1142144, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2024) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291-92 (2005)) (additional citation omitted), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 3158645 (N.D.N.Y. June 25, 2024).
District court review of claims is barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine when four requirements are met: (1) the litigant lost in state court; (2) the litigant complains of injuries caused by a final state court order or judgment; (3) the litigant invites district court review and rejection of the final state court order or judgment; and (4) the
final state court order or judgment was rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.Id. (citing Dorce v. City of New York, 2 F.4th 82, 100 (2d Cir. 2021)); see also, e.g., Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2005).
Here, Plaintiff's request to vacate the 2023 default judgment entered against him by Broome County Family Court satisfies all four elements. Therefore, this Court is barred from reviewing Plaintiff's complaint against Defendant Judge Noonan by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See, e.g., Phifer v. City of New York, 289 F.3d 49, 57 (2d Cir. 2002) (“There is no question that Rooker-Feldman bars [plaintiff]'s challenges to the family court's decisions regarding custody, neglect, and visitation.”); see also, e.g., Shibley v. Bixlerond, No. 6:24-CV-0722 (BKS/TWD), 2024 WL 3460788, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. July 16, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 4203975 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2024). Because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims, however, his complaint must be dismissed without prejudice. Fraccola v. Grow, 670 Fed.Appx. 34, 35 (2d Cir. 2016) (explaining, “[t]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes district court review as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction ....When a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it lacks the power to dismiss with prejudice ....”) (citing The Mitchell v. Fishbein, 377 F.3d 157, 165 (2d Cir. 2004); Hernandez v. Conriv Realty Assocs., 182 F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 1999)).
Additionally, Judge Noonan is immune from suit. See, e.g., Scott v. Crossway, No. 1:22-CV-0500 (BKS/CFH), 2022 WL 16646531, at *7-8 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2022) (“As an alternative to the applicability of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, were the Court to have subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims against [a New York State Judge], Judge Milano would be immune from suit.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 34543 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2023).
“Absolute immunity for judges is ‘firmly established' for acts ‘committed within their judicial jurisdiction.'” Peoples v. Leon, 63 F.4th 132, 138 (2d Cir. 2023) (citing Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199-200 (1985)). Generally, “acts arising out of, or related to, individual cases before the judge are considered judicial in nature.” Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2009). This absolute immunity for judges “is conferred in order to insure ‘that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.'” Id. at 209 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1871)). Accordingly, “even allegations of bad faith or malice cannot overcome judicial immunity.” Id. (citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967); Tucker v. Outwater, 118 F.3d 930, 932 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 997 (1997)).
Here, Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Noonan arise from the Defendant's actions in his capacity as a family court judge in Broome County. See Dkt. No. 1 at 5-6. As such, Defendant Noonan is entitled to absolute judicial immunity. See, e.g., Dudley v. Hochul, No. 5:24-CV-0048 (DNH/ML), 2024 WL 1906594, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. May 1, 2024) (recommending claims against the defendant which appeared to arise from the defendant's efforts “in his capacity as a family court judge ....be dismissed based on the doctrine of judicial immunity.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 2399913 (N.D.N.Y. May 23, 2024). Therefore, insofar as Plaintiff seeks relief against Defendant Noonan in his individual capacity, dismissal on the basis of judicial immunity is proper. See, e.g., Amato v. McGinty, No. 1:21-CV-0860 (GLS/TWD), 2022 WL 226798, at *7 n.7 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2022) (explaining, “[j]udicial immunity shields judges from suit to the extent that they are sued in their individual capacities.”).
Furthermore, “States are immune from suit under the terms of the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity.” Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson, 595 U.S. 30, 39 (2021) (citation omitted). “The immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment extends beyond the states themselves to ‘state agents and state instrumentalities' that are, effectively, arms of a state.” Woods v. Rondout Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd of Educ., 466 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997)) (additional citation omitted). Accordingly, “Eleventh Amendment immunity has been extended to judges of the New York State Unified Court System.” Scott, 2022 WL 16646531, at *7 (citing Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 368 (2d Cir. 2009) (“the New York State Unified Court System is unquestionably an arm of the State . . . and is entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.”).
The Broome County Family Court is a part of the New York State Unified Court System. See, e.g., Brooks v. Onondaga Cnty. Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs., No. 5:17-CV-1186 (GLS/TWD), 2018 WL 2108282, at *3 n.5 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2018) (explaining the Onondaga County Family Court is a part of the New York State Unified Court System), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 2108187 (N.D.N.Y. May 7, 2018). Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to proceed against Defendant Noonan in his official capacity, dismissal of such claims as barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity is warranted. See, e.g., Treistman v. McGinty, No. 1:16-CV-1403, 2018 WL 4078262, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2018) (concluding the plaintiff's claims against the defendants in their official capacity as Family Court employees were barred by the Eleventh Amendment).
VI. CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, it is hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. No. 2) is GRANTED, and it is further
RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be DISMISSED, and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk provide to Plaintiff a copy of this Report-Recommendation and Order, along with copies of the unpublished decisions cited herein in accordance with the Second Circuit decision in Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW . Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72.
If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Report-Recommendation and Order by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the Report-Recommendation and Order was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a)(1)(C).
IT IS SO ORDERED.