Opinion
Civil Action No. H-18-1735
06-12-2018
ANTHONY DEMARCO THOMAS, Plaintiff, v. EVELYN KEYES, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Anthony Demarco Thomas, a state inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this section 1983 lawsuit seeking monetary damages for the alleged violation of his constitutional rights by a state appellate court justice.
Having reviewed plaintiff's complaint pursuant to section 1915A, the Court DISMISSES this lawsuit for the reasons that follow.
I. BACKGROUND AND CLAIMS
Plaintiff was convicted of aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon in 2011. He appealed the conviction to the First Court of Appeals in Houston, Texas. The conviction was affirmed in 2012 in an opinion written by defendant Justice Evelyn Keyes, sitting on the First Court of Appeals. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals subsequently refused discretionary review.
Plaintiff complains in this lawsuit that Justice Keyes violated his constitutional rights by allegedly misstating or fabricating facts in the appellate opinion, making erroneous legal determinations, and denying him a new trial. He seeks $1 million against Justice Keyes in her individual capacity for malicious prosecution and constitutional violations.
II. ANALYSIS
This Court is required to scrutinize the pleadings and dismiss the complaint in whole or in part if it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A, 1915(e)(2)(B).
Under section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), the court may dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint as frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Hutchins v. McDaniels, 512 F.3d 193, 195 (5th Cir. 2007). A complaint lacks an arguable basis in law if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory. Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998).
Plaintiff's lawsuit must be dismissed for the following reasons.
A. Judicial Immunity
Plaintiff's claims against Justice Keyes in her individual capacity are barred by judicial immunity.
Under the common law doctrine of absolute judicial immunity, an individual acting within her judicial capacity has absolute immunity in a suit for money damages. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978). An individual acts within her judicial capacity when she performs functions that are normally performed by a judge. Id. Further, a judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action she took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of her authority. Id.
Plaintiff's claims against Justice Keyes concerns actions taken by her in her judicial capacity, and derive from a function normally performed by an appellate court justice. His claims arise from actions that occurred in a courtroom or appropriate adjunct space, and that centered around a case or other judicial matter pending before her. See Ballard v. Wall, 413 F.3d 510, 515 (5th Cir. 2005); Burns v. Mayes, 369 F. App'x 526, 526 (5th Cir. 2010).
Plaintiff's claims for monetary compensation against Justice Keyes must be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim based on judicial immunity.
B. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Even assuming plaintiff's claims were not barred by judicial immunity, they would be barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
It is clear that all of plaintiff's claims in this lawsuit arise from or are related to the state appellate court decision affirming plaintiff's criminal conviction in 2012. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a common law doctrine that bars federal district courts from asserting subject matter jurisdiction in "cases brought by state court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 281 (2005); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). In other words, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district courts from collaterally attacking or interfering with state court judgments and proceedings. Saudi Basic, 544 U.S. at 284; Price v. Porter, 251 F. App'x, 925, 926 (5th Cir. 2009).
Although plaintiff states that the opinion was authored by defendant Justice Keyes, he overlooks the fact that the opinion was a panel decision approved by two other sitting justices. --------
A state court judgment is considered attacked for purposes of Rooker-Feldman when the losing party in a state court action seeks what in substance would be appellate review of a state judgment. Weaver v. Tex. Capital Bank NA., 660 F.3d 900,904 (5th Cir. 2011). The governing issue is whether the claims are inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment and thereby barred by Rooker-Feldman or whether there is an independent claim where the injury does not arise from the state court judgment. Turner v. Cade, 354 F. App'x 108, 110-11 (5th Cir. 2009). The Fifth Circuit has made clear "that litigants may not obtain review of state court actions by filing complaints about those actions in lower federal courts cast in the form of civil rights suits." Hale v. Harney, 786 F.2d 688,690-91 (5th Cir. 1986).
It would not be possible for this Court to review plaintiff's claims and consider his requested relief without reviewing the merits of the state appellate court decision. Thus, the Court's review of plaintiff's claims is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
C. Heck Bar
Under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), the court must dismiss a civil rights complaint filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if its success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a plaintiff's conviction or sentence, unless the plaintiff demonstrates that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
The crux of plaintiff's complaint in this lawsuit is that the state appellate court, through Justice Keyes, allegedly fabricated facts, applied incorrect law, and unlawfully denied him a new trial. His complaint challenges the validity of his conviction, and a ruling in his favor in this lawsuit would necessarily implicate the validity of his conviction and affect the duration of his confinement.
Before plaintiff can proceed with this lawsuit, he must demonstrate that his conviction and sentence have been reversed, invalidated, or otherwise set aside. Heck at 486-87. He has not met this burden. Until plaintiff receives a ruling declaring his conviction invalid, he cannot file or pursue this claim under section 1983, and his lawsuit is legally frivolous under sections 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). See Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99, 102-103 (5th Cir. 1996) ("A § 1983 claim which falls under the rule in Heck is legally frivolous unless the conviction or sentence at issue has been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or otherwise called into question.").
Consequently, assuming plaintiff's claims were not barred by judicial immunity or the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, his claims would be barred until such time as the conditions imposed by Heck were met.
III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court ORDERS as follows:
(1) Plaintiff's claims against defendant Evelyn Keyes are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as barred by judicial immunity.
(2) Any and all pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT.
(3) This dismissal constitutes a "strike" for purposes of section 1915(g).
The Clerk is to provide a copy of this order to all parties, to TDCJ-Office of the General Counsel, Capitol Station, P.O. Box 13084, Austin, Texas 78711, and to the Clerk of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division, 515 Rusk Street, Houston, Texas, 77002, Attention: Three-Strikes List Manager, at the following email: Three_Strikes@txs.uscourts.gov.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this the 12th day of June, 2018.
/s/_________
KEITH P. ELLISON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE