Thomas v. Keeney

4 Citing cases

  1. State v. Burss

    848 P.2d 596 (Or. 1993)   Cited 6 times
    Following Fex's holding that "`the 180-day time period in Article III of the IAD does not commence until the prisoner's request for final disposition of the charges against him has actually been delivered to the court and prosecuting officer'"

    Interpretation of this language raises a question of federal, rather than state, law. Thomas v. Keeney, 307 Or. 526, 528 n 1, 771 P.2d 249 (1989) ("The IAD `is a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact the interpretation of which presents a question of federal law.'") (quoting Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 442, 101 S Ct 703, 66 L Ed 2d 641 (1981)).

  2. Naisbitt v. Raichl

    917 P.2d 59 (Or. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 1 times

    " Id. at 289.See also Thomas v. Keeney, 307 Or. 526, 530 n 4, 771 P.2d 249 (1989). The statement in the warrant as to a plaintiff's fugitive status is presumed true and the plaintiff has the burden to overcome that presumption by conclusive evidence.

  3. State v. Estes

    131 Or. App. 188 (Or. Ct. App. 1995)   Cited 2 times
    In Estes, we held that the IAD did not provide a remedy for violations of the IAD notification requirements, and we would not "insert a remedy of dismissal where none is provided."

    The IAD, codified in Oregon at ORS 135.775, is " 'a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact the interpretation of which presents a question of federal law.' " Thomas v. Keeney, 307 Or. 526, 528 n 1, 771 P.2d 249 (1989) (quoting Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 442, 101 S Ct 703, 66 L Ed 2d 641 (1981)). We review for errors of law.

  4. State v. Champ

    631 N.W.2d 557 (Neb. Ct. App. 2001)

    See Sloss v. Sheriff of Leavenworth County, 7 Kan. App. 2d 702, 648 P.2d 255 (1982). The procedure under the Agreement on Detainers is intended to be a summary procedure and is not intended to determine guilt or innocence. Thomas v. Keeney, 307 Or. 526, 771 P.2d 249 (1989). We hold that the district court properly denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus by rejecting the claim that fugitive status had not been proved: Champ clearly left the State of Iowa and is now incarcerated in Nebraska, and there was a determination that probable cause existed to charge him with the crimes in Scott County when the district court judge in that jurisdiction issued the warrant.