Opinion
Civil Action 19-220J ECF 156
03-27-2023
THORNE TROKON THOMAS, Plaintiff, v. CAPT. JEREMY W. JONES, THOMAS BICKFORD, COI SHAFFER, COI RANSDORF, COI RUMMEL, COI R. BAILEY, COI SNEDDEN, RN DODSON, and the PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MAUREEN P. KELLY, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Thome Trokon Thomas (“Plaintiff'), an inmate incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Albion (“SCI-Albion”), brings this counseled civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ECF No. 157. Plaintiff brings claims under the First Amendment, Eighth Amendment, and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) arising out of events that occurred while he was incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Houtzdale (“SCI-Houtzdale”).
The Court notes that Plaintiff styles the caption of his Fourth Amended Complaint as filed “on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,” but he only brings individual claims in this action. This is not a class action lawsuit.
Presently before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Counts I and III of Plaintiff s Fourth Amended Complaint. ECF No. 156. For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss be granted in part and denied part.
II. REPORT
A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff began this action on December 20, 2019, by filing a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP Motion”), together with a proposed Complaint. ECF No. 1. The Court granted Plaintiff's IFP Motion on March 16, 2020, and his original Complaint was filed on the same date. ECF Nos. 9 and 10.
Over two years, Plaintiff attempted to amend his pleadings on multiple occasions. ECF Nos. 47, 69, 73, 75, 88 and 104. Because the Court found that Plaintiff demonstrated a lack of understanding or ability to comply with the Court's direction in the course of preparing pleadings, motions, and discovery requests, it appointed pro bono counsel. ECF Nos. 120,121,122, and 135. After counsel entered their appearance, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to file an amended Complaint. ECF No. 148. The operative Fourth Amended Complaint was filed on December 12, 2022. ECF No. 149.
1. Plaintiffs Fourth Amended Complaint
In his Fourth Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he is a devout Muslim. Id. ¶ 12. As part of his religious practice, he fasted and prayed, wore a kufi, and read the Quran. Id.
Plaintiff was previously incarcerated at SCI-Houtzdale. On April 8, 2019, Plaintiff was transferred from the D housing block to the F housing block at SCI-Houtzdale. Id. ¶ 14. After his transfer, Plaintiff asked a correctional officer about his clothing and other property that had gone missing. Id. ¶ 15. This conversation escalated to a verbal altercation. Id. ¶ 16. As a result, Defendant Thomas Bickford (“Bickford”) handcuffed Plaintiff, transferred him to the restricted housing unit (“RHU”), and strip searched him. Id. ¶ 17. Bickford confiscated Plaintiff s kufi and Quran in the process. Id.
After he was searched, Plaintiff repeatedly requested that Bickford return his kufi and Quran. Id. ¶ 18. But Bickford refused-instead tightening the handcuffs on Plaintiffs wrists every time he asked. Id. Bickford ignored Plaintiffs complaints that the handcuffs were too tight. Id. ¶ 19.
After this incident, Plaintiff went to the medical department to document his injuries. Id. ¶ 19. He also filed an incident report. Id. ¶ 20. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Captain Jeremy W. Jones (“Jones”) was notified of Plaintiff s report. Id.
That evening, Plaintiff became light-headed and collapsed as a result of low blood sugar and other unspecified health conditions. Id. ¶ 22. At 10:50 p.m., Jones received an alert that Plaintiff was unresponsive and lying on the floor of his cell. Id. ¶ 23. About 10 minutes later, Jones arrived at Plaintiffs cell with Defendants Shaffer, Ransdorf, Rummel, Bailey, and Snedden, where they found Plaintiff lying face down. Id. ¶¶ 4, 24.
Plaintiff pleads that Jones and the “Policy Defendants” arrived at his cell, which also includes Defendant RN Dodson as defined by Plaintiff. ECF No. 149 ¶¶ 4, 24. However, Plaintiff clarifies in his Brief in Support of the Motion for Preliminary Injunction, ECF No. 162 at 3, that only correctional officers Shaffer, Ransdorf, Rummel, Bailey and Snedden were present at this time.
Defendants did not check on Plaintiffs health. Id. ¶ 25. Instead, Jones directed Plaintiff to come to his cell door-which Plaintiff was physically unable to do. Id. Jones then ordered that Defendants administer pepper spray into Plaintiffs cell, in accordance with an alleged “unconstitutional Policy of pepper spraying unresponsive inmates” (the “Policy”). Id. ¶¶ 13, 26.
While Plaintiff was still unresponsive, and over the protests of nearby inmates, Defendants sprayed him with pepper spray. Id. ¶¶ 26-27. Jones subsequently entered Plaintiff s cell around 11:03 p.m. Id. ¶ 28. Defendants then pinned Plaintiffs head to the floor using a body shield, handcuffed him, lifted him to his feet, and took him to a sink to wash the pepper spray from his eyes. Id. ¶¶ 29-30.
Because of the Policy, Plaintiff claims, his ability to receive medical care was significantly delayed. Id. ¶ 31. He was not examined by a medical professional, RN Dodson (“Dodson”), until 11:10p.m. Id. Dodson determined that Plaintiff was “cold” and had low blood sugar-a condition that can cause lethargy, unresponsiveness, and an unconscious episode. Id. Defendants then removed Plaintiff to another area for a strip and cavity search. Id.
At some point after this incident, Plaintiff was transferred to SCI-Albion.
Based on the docket, Plaintiff originally was transferred to SCI-Pine Grove in September 2020. ECF No. 66. It is unclear when he was later relocated to SCI-Albion, where he is currently incarcerated.
Based on these allegations, Plaintiff brings four claims in three counts under the First Amendment, Eighth Amendment, and RLUIPA. Id. ¶¶ 34-60. He seeks injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 11.
2. Motion to Dismiss
On February 1,2023, Defendants filed this Motion to Dismiss Counts I and III of Plaintiff s Fourth Amended Complaint and Brief in Support. ECF Nos. 156 and 157. Plaintiff filed a Brief in Opposition. ECF No. 164. The Motion to Dismiss is now ripe for consideration.
B. LEGAL STANDARD
In assessing the sufficiency of a complaint pursuant to a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint and all reasonable factual inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). The Court, however, need not accept bald assertions or inferences drawn by the plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts set forth in the complaint. See Cal. Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys, v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126,143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations. Bell Atl. Corp, v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, “[factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held that a complaint is properly dismissed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) where it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” id. at 570, or where the factual content does not allow the court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding that, under Twombly, “labels, conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” do not suffice but, rather, the complaint “must allege facts suggestive of [the proscribed] conduct” and that are sufficient “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element[s] of his claim”).
C. DISCUSSION
1. Count I
Defendants move for summary judgment as to Count I. In Count I, Plaintiff brings a claim under the Eighth Amendment for “Violation by Implementing an Unconstitutional Policy” against Defendants Shaffer, Ransdorf, Rummel, Bailey, Snedden, and Dodson (collectively referred to by Plaintiff as the “Policy Defendants”) and Jones in their official capacities. ECF No. 149 ¶¶ 34-42. Defendants Schaffer, Ransdorf, Rummel, Bailey and Snedden are corrections officers. Id. ¶ 4. Defendant Dodson is a registered nurse. Id. Defendant Jones is a Captain. Id. ¶ 3. The Policy Defendants and Jones all work at SCI-Houtzdale. Id. at 2.
Plaintiff claims that Jones and the Policy Defendants “have established and/or implemented the unconstitutional Policy to administer pepper spray to unresponsive inmates, including unconscious inmates and those suffering from serious medical emergencies.” Id. ¶ 35. As relief, he asks the Court to order Jones and the Policy Defendants to stop implementing the Policy.
Plaintiff has also filed a pending Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief on this basis. ECF No. 159.
In support of the Motion to Dismiss, Defendants argue that Count I should be dismissed for three reasons. First, Defendants argue they have immunity from claims for money damages against them in their official capacities, and any request for injunctive relief is moot because Plaintiff has since been transferred from SCI-Houtzdale to SCI-Albion. Second, Defendants argue the existence of an alleged “Policy” of pepper spraying unresponsive inmates is unsupported, given that Plaintiff only points to one time this purportedly occurred. Third, Defendants argue that Count I is insufficiently specific, and Plaintiff does not plead facts showing each defendant's personal involvement in the underlying wrong. ECF No. 157 at 3-6.
In response, Plaintiff argues that Eleventh Amendment immunity does not bar this claim because he is seeking injunctive relief. Although he has since been transferred to SCI-Albion, Plaintiff argues, his request is not moot because it relates to a DOC policy, he is still incarcerated at a DOC facility where can be harmed again, and his official-capacity claims implicate the DOC. In addition, Plaintiff argues that he sufficiently pleads the existence of a de facto policy or custom, and he shows that Jones and each Policy Defendant participated in carrying out that policy. ECF No. 164 at 4-12.
Upon review, the Court should dismiss Count I. Plaintiff brings Count I against prison officials in their official capacities. The Eleventh Amendment provides states immunity from suits brought by their citizens. See U.S. Const, amend. XI; A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schools, 341 F.3d 234, 238 (3d Cir. 2003). In an official-capacity suit, as here, the entity of which the officer is an agent is the real party in interest. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985). As a result, * claims against state officials in their official capacities for damages are treated as suits against the state and are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Christ the King Manor, Inc, v. Sec'y U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 730 F.3d 291, 318 (3d Cir. 2013); Nelson v. Com, of Pa. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 244 F.Supp.2d 382, 391 (E.D. Pa. 2002). Thus, Jones and the Policy Defendants enjoy immunity if Plaintiff seeks monetary damages.
While the Eleventh Amendment does not generally bar prospective injunctive relief, Plaintiff does not plausibly claim a right to any such relief against Jones and the Policy Defendants in Count I. Defendants work at SCI-Houtzdale and Plaintiff has since been transferred to SCI-Albion. Because Plaintiff cannot be subject to the same Policy at SCI-Houtzdale, any request for injunctive relief as to SCI-Houtzdale is now moot. Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2003) (“An inmate's transfer from the facility complained of generally moots the equitable and declaratory claims.”).
To the extent Plaintiff requests injunctive relief as to other DOC facilities, including SCI-Albion, he does not state a viable claim against Jones and the Policy Defendants. “In seeking a prospective injunction against the implementation of an unconstitutional state policy,” Plaintiff “is required to name an official or officials ‘who can appropriately respond to injunctive relief.'” Parkell v, Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 332 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Hartman v. Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1127 (9th Cir. 2013); Gonzalez v. Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 2011) (proper defendant is one “responsible for ensuring that any injunctive relief is carried out”)). Jones and the Policy Defendants work at SCI-Houtzdale. Because there is no indication these individuals have any role in creating or enforcing policy at SCI-Albion, they are not properly sued to obtain this relief. For these reasons, the Motion to Dismiss should be granted as to Count I.
2. Count III
Defendants also move for summary judgment relative to Plaintiff s RLUIPA claim in Count III. In Count III, Plaintiff claims that the DOC, Jones, and Bickford imposed a substantial burden on the exercise of his religion by failing to return his kufi, Quran, and other unspecified religious materials. He brings this claim against Jones and Bickford in their individual capacities. ECF No. 149 ¶¶ 56-60.
In support of the Motion to Dismiss, Defendants argue that RLUIPA does not permit actions against state officials in their individual capacities. While a plaintiff can bring an officialcapacity claim for declaratory and injunctive relief, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has no viable claim for injunctive relief because his transfer to SCI-Albion makes any such request moot. ECF No. 157 at 6-7.
In the Motion to Dismiss, Defendants state that the “DOC was added as a defendant in the Fourth Amended Complaint but no service was initiated under Rule 4.” ECF No. 156 ¶ 1. However, Defendants do not ask the Court to dismiss the DOC based on lack of service. The Court also notes that counsel has entered his appearance on behalf of the DOC and represented to the Court that “[t]he Pennsylvania Department of Corrections waived service under Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(d) on December 27, 2022.” ECF No. 150; ECF No. 151 ¶ 7.
In response, Plaintiff argues that he can seek injunctive relief against the named individuals under RLUIPA. Plaintiff also argues that his request for injunctive relief is not moot because he is still deprived of access to his religious items, despite the fact that he has since been transferred to SCI-Albion. ECF No. 164 at 12-14.
In particular, Plaintiff argues that a party may seek injunctive relief under RLUIPA “against defendants in their individual capacities.” ECF No. 164 at 12. But the authority he cites in support states that RLUIPA does not permit actions against state officials in their individual capacities and, instead, “[a] RLUIPA cause of action is an officialcapacity claim for declaratory and injunctive relief.” ECF No. 164 at 12; Morris v. Scheuer, No.l:22-cv-00082, 2023 WL 2088169, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2023) (quoting Barros v. Wetzel, No. 2015 WL 5785746, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2015)); Scott v. Beard, 252 Fed.Appx. 491, 493 (3d Cir. 2007) (affirming dismissal of RLUIPA claim for money damages against defendant in his official capacity). As such, the Court construes Plaintiff s argument as simply stating that individuals can be named as defendants, rather than indicating those defendants can be sued in their individual or personal capacities.
Plaintiff also argues that his RLUIPA claim is not barred by the statute of limitations. ECF No. 164 at 12-13. Because Defendants do not raise that affirmative defense in support of their Motion to Dismiss, the Court does not address it here.
The RLUIPA “protects institutionalized persons who are unable to freely attend to their religious needs and are therefore dependent on the government's permission and accommodation for exercise of their religion.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 710 (2005). The statute provides:
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution ... even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person-
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest.42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(a).
Courts in the Third Circuit apply a two-step, burden-shifting analysis for RLUIPA claims. Initially, “[a] plaintiff-inmate bears the burden to show that a prison institution's policy or official practice has substantially burdened the practice of that inmate's religion.” Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 277-78 (3d Cir. 2007). A substantial burden exists when:
(1) a follower is forced to choose between following the precepts of his religion and forfeiting benefits otherwise generally available to other inmates versus abandoning one of the precepts of his religion in order to receive a benefit; OR (2) the government puts a substantial pressure on an adherent to substantially modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.Id. at 280.
If plaintiff satisfies his burden to show that a practice substantially burdens his religious exercise, the burden then shifts to the government to show that the challenged policy “is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and is the least restricting means” to enforce that interest. Id. at 283 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(a)).
Upon review, the Court should dismiss Count III against Jones and Bickford. Plaintiff only brings this claim against Jones and Bickford in their individual capacities. ECF No. 149 at 10. However, RLUIPA does not apply to government employees in their individual capacities. Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 154-55 (3d Cir. 2012). Plaintiff thus does not state a plausible claim for relief against Jones and Bickford in Count III.
As for the DOC, however, this claim should not be dismissed. While Defendants argue that any request for injunctive relief is moot, Plaintiff claims he is still being denied access to his kufi and Quran by the DOC or its representatives. Accordingly, the Court should grant the Motion to Dismiss Count III as to Jones and Bickford, but it should deny the Motion to Dismiss Count III relative to the DOC.
D. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss Counts I and III of Plaintiff s Fourth Amended Complaint, ECF No. 156, be granted in part and denied in part. The Court should grant the Motion to Dismiss as to Count I, and it should also grant the Motion to Dismiss as to Count III against Defendants Jones and Bickford. The Motion to Dismiss should be denied as to Count III against the DOC.
Plaintiff also should be granted leave to amend his Complaint as appropriate. “If a complaint is vulnerable to Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Phillips v. Cnty of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 236 (3d Cir. 2008). While the Court recognizes that Plaintiff previously attempted to amend his Complaint many times, he did so in his capacity as a pro se plaintiff. Given the appointment of pro bono counsel to assist, the Court should grant leave to amend to the extent that the deficiencies identified herein can be cured.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 72.D.2, the parties are permitted to file written objections in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Objections are to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may file their response to the objections within fourteen (14) days thereafter in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.D.2.
Honorable Kim R. Gibson, United States District Judge