Thus, unless the error affirmatively appears to have affected the result, the error is considered harmless and this Panel is compelled to affirm the trial court's judgment. Bass v. Barksdale, 671 S.W.2d 476, 486 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1984); Thomas v. Harper, 53 Tenn. App. 549; 385 S.W.2d 130 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1964). Before rendering its final judgment, the trial court reviewed the testimony of Wood and her husband, then considered the medical evidence of Drs. Nord and Boals in determining the application of the last injurious exposure rule in this case.
We express no opinion as to whether the defendant can establish, to the satisfaction of the trier of fact, that the posted speed limit on State Route 62 was not properly established. As far as the City's burden of proof is concerned, it can rely upon the presumption of validity referred to in Thomas [ v. Harper, 385 S.W.2d 130 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1964)]. It will be the defendant's obligation to rebut the presumption by proving that the posted speed limit was not properly established. If she fails to satisfy this obligation, the presumption prevails and proof of the posted speed limit establishes the speed limit.
Apropos of the first issue, the Deskinses contend the Trial Court was in error in charging the jury that the area in question was subject to a 45-mile speed limit and that if Mr. Deskins was traveling in excess of 45 miles per hour he was guilty of negligence per se. They base their contention on the proof developed in their motion in limine which showed that insofar as the records were available no action was taken by the proper county or state officials to reduce the general state-wide speed limit which, at the time of the accident, was 55 miles per hour. Both parties cite the case of Thomas v. Harper, 53 Tenn. App. 549, 564, 385 S.W.2d 130, 138 (1964), which, as pertinent to this appeal stated the following: T.C.A. ยง 59-853 [now 55-8-153], among other things authorizes the legislative authority of towns and cities to prescribe speed limits within certain areas or zones or on designated highways, avenues, streets in their respective jurisdictions, and to erect appropriate signs and traffic signals.
Defendant argues that this case did not present a situation requiring the use of expert testimony, and that the introduction of these opinions invaded the province of the jury. We state preliminarily that a trial judge is vested with a wide discretion in determining whether or not expert testimony is admissible. Salem v. U.S. Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31, 82 S.Ct. 1119, 8 L.Ed.2d 313 (1962); Joseph A. Bass Co. v. United States, etc., 340 F.2d 842 (8th Cir. 1965); Berolzheimer v. Heil Co., 340 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1965); Jones v. Goodlove, 334 F.2d 90 (8th Cir. 1964); Thomas v. Harper, 385 S.W.2d 130 (Tenn.App. 1964). The trial judge's discretion is necessarily broad for he sits in the arena of litigation.
The weight is left to the jury. Graham v. Rolandson, 1967, 150 Mont. 270, 285, 435 P.2d 263, 271; Thomas v. Harper, 1964, 53 Tenn. App. 549, 385 S.W.2d 130, 136; Central Container Corp. v. Westbrook, 1962, 105 Ga. App. 855, 126 S.E.2d 264, 268. A jury has considerable latitude in its acceptance or rejection of expert testimony. The following instruction would be appropriate, once admissibility is established and illustrates the part of the jury in such situations, excellently states the rule and is given as an example, though there are others of a similar nature in general use.
They all involve assumptions of fact similar to the evidence in this case. Jackson v. Vaughn (1920), 204 Ala. 543, 86 So. 469; Rouse v. Fussell (1962), 106 Ga. App. 259, 126 S.E.2d 830, 833; Edwards v. Rudowicz (1963, Mo.App.), 368 S.W.2d 503, 507; Dillenschneider v. Campbell (1961, Mo.App.), 350 S.W.2d 260, 267; Wood v. Ezell (1961, Mo.App.), 342 S.W.2d 503, 507; Graham v. Rolandson (1967), 150 Mont. 320, 435 P.2d 263, 270-271; Nisi v. Checker Cab Co. (1960), 171 Neb. 49, 105 N.W.2d 523, 527, 529; Tate v. Borgman (1958), 167 Neb. 299, 92 N.W.2d 697; Davis v. Zucker (1951, Ohio App.), 106 N.E.2d 169, 172; Ruther v. Tyra (1952), 207 Okla. 112, 247 P.2d 964, 966; Thomas v. Harper (1964), 53 Tenn. App. 549, 385 S.W.2d 130, 136-137; Billingsley v. Southern Pacific Co. (1966, Tex.Civ.App.), 400 S.W.2d 789, 793. See also Huguley v. State (1957), 39 Ala. App. 104, 96 So.2d 315, 318.
If there is a posted speed limit, and no question is raised as to whether that posted speed limit was properly established, there is a presumption of regularity and validity; in such cases, proof of the posted speed limit gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of validity. Thomas v. Harper, 385 S.W.2d 130, 138 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1964). However, we have recognized that the posting of a speed limit must be pursuant to "statutory authority":
State v. Kaatrude, 21 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2000). Reversal of the trial court's discretion is appropriate where the trial court's action is clearly erroneous or where there has been an abuse of discretion. Thomas v. Harper, 385 S.W.2d 130 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1964). While we will set aside a discretionary decision if it lacks an adequate evidentiary foundation, or it is contrary to governing law, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court merely because we would have chosen a different alternative.
Although the trial court has broad discretion in determining the qualifications of expert witnesses and the admissibility of their testimony, Shelby Countyv. Barden, 527 S.W.2d 124 (Tenn. 1975), reversal of the trial court's discretion is appropriate where the trial court's action is clearly erroneous or where there has been an abuse of discretion. Thomas v. Harper, 53 Tenn. App. 549, 385 S.W.2d 130 (1964). The trial court found that Plaintiffs were not able to establish the requirements of T.C.A. ยง 29-26-115(a)(1) insofar as the locality rule is concerned as interpreted in Mabon v.Jackson-Madison County General Hospital, 968 S.W.2d 826.
Accordingly, we will not overturn a trial court's decision either to admit or to exclude expert testimony unless it was arbitrary or an abuse of discretion. See Buchanan v. Harris, 902 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1995); Thomas v. Harper, 53 Tenn. App. 549, 561, 385 S.W.2d 130, 136 (1964). An expert witness qualified by "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education" may testify to scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge if it "will substantially assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."