Two of our earlier decisions give us helpful guidance in the current case. The first was Thomas v. General Services Administration, 756 F.2d 86 (Fed. Cir. 1985), and the second was Mercer v. Department of Health and Human Services, 772 F.2d 856 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Though appealable suspensions of more than 14 days must be "disciplinary," Thomas expressly held ( 756 F.2d at 89):

This court previously analyzed the meaning of this definition and held that suspensions that were authorized and reviewable include those ordered "because the agency believes that the employee's retention on active duty could . . . be detrimental to governmental interests, or be injurious to the employee, his fellow workers, or the public." Thomas v. General Servs. Admin., 756 F.2d 86, 89 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 843, 106 S.Ct. 129, 88 L.Ed.2d 106 (1985). We further stressed in Thomas that "disciplinary" was intended "in the broader sense of maintaining the orderly working of the Government against possible disruption by the suspended employee . . . ."

I. This removal case is closely related to petitioner's separate suspension case which we decided in Thomas v. General Services Administration, 756 F.2d 86 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 129, 88 L.Ed.2d 106 (1985) ( Thomas I). In that opinion — which dealt with petitioner's suspension pending consideration of a potential disability retirement application filed for him by GSA — we summarized the factual background of both that case and this one: Petitioner was a training specialist with the Federal Protective Service (FPS), the division of GSA responsible for law enforcement on government property.

We have sustained indefinite suspensions for that reason, Dunnington v. Department of Justice, 956 F.2d 1151 (Fed. Cir. 1992), and also, pending the results of psychiatric fitness-for-duty examinations. Mercer v. Department of Health Human Servs., 772 F.2d 856 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Thomas v. General Servs. Admin., 756 F.2d 86 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 843, 106 S.Ct. 129, 88 L.Ed.2d 106 (1985). The same principle supports an indefinite suspension pending an agency's determination of whether it should revoke an employee's security clearance.

Id. Although the statute defines a “suspension” as “the placing of an employee, for disciplinary reasons , in a temporary status without duties and pay,” 5 U.S.C. § 7501(2) (emphasis added), Pittman held that enforced leaves qualify, because such suspensions “are ‘disciplinary’ in the broader sense of maintaining the orderly working of the Government against possible disruption by the suspended employee,” 832 F.2d at 599 (quoting Thomas v. Gen. Servs. Admin. , 756 F.2d 86, 89 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ).As in Pittman, Mr. Rosario's leave was “a suspension for more than 14 days.” 5 U.S.C. § 7512(2).

There is nothing in our opinion that prevents any employee who believes that his indefinite suspension was arbitrary from obtaining review of such agency action. Since such a suspension would be "for more than 14 days," the employee could challenge it before the Board under 5 U.S.C. § 7513(d), see Thomas v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 756 F.2d 86, 89 (Fed. Cir. 1985), and obtain appropriate relief. The flaw the court finds in Perez's argument is not, as the dissent suggests, that he cited the wrong statutory provision, but that the provision on which he relies is not applicable here. Section 7513(b) is solely a notice provision, and it provides an exception to the 30-day notice requirement for all the types of adverse actions specified in § 7512(2) if the agency has reasonable cause to believe an employee has committed a crime for which imprisonment may be imposed.

The actions covered by subchapter II are listed in 5 U.S.C. § 7512, and one of the actions listed is a suspension of more than fourteen days. See Thomas v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 756 F.2d 86, 88 (Fed. Cir.1985) (indefinite suspension is a covered action); 5 C.F.R. § 752.401. When an employee is the subject of an action under section 7513, he or she is entitled to

See, e.g., Pararas-Carayannis v. Department of Commerce, 9 F.3d 955 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Dunnington v. Department of Justice, 956 F.2d 1151 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Engdahl v. Department of the Navy, 900 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1990). See also Thomas v. General Servs. Admin., 756 F.2d 86 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 843, 106 S.Ct. 129, 88 L.Ed.2d 106 (1985). While such a summary suspension may be indefinite, it is not unlimited.

A summary suspension (one taken on less than 30 days notice) is an administrative decision taken to protect the public and agency personnel. Thomas v. General Services Admin., 756 F.2d 86, 89 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 843, 106 S.Ct. 129, 88 L.Ed.2d 106 (1985). It is available only when there has been an allegation of a serious crime, and only when the misconduct alleged bears a sufficient relationship to the employee's duties in the agency to warrant the action as promoting the efficiency of the service.

We disagree. Relying on Thomas v. General Services Admin., 756 F.2d 86 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 843, 106 S.Ct. 129, 88 L.Ed.2d 106 (1985), and Mercer v. Department of Health and Human Servs., 772 F.2d 856 (Fed. Cir. 1985), we rejected the government's argument that the enforced leave was not disciplinary. Perez, unlike the petitioner in Pittman, was never placed on an enforced leave of absence.