Although the State waived its immunity from liability in 1929 in Court of Claims Act § 8, this waiver was not found to be applicable to the local subdivisions of the State until 1945 (see Thomas v Consol. Fire Dist. No. 1, 50 N.Y.2d 143, 146 [1980]). Fire districts remained immune until 1934, when the Legislature enacted General Municipal Law § 205-b (L 1934, ch 489). As relevant here, that statute (i) broadly relieved volunteer firefighters from civil liability for negligent acts committed in the performance of their duties, which was considered "unfair and unjust" given their lack of compensation (Assembly Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 1934, ch 489, at 3), and (ii) harmonized the vicarious liability of fire districts with that of municipalities by providing that a fire district shall be liable "for the negligence of [its] volunteer firefighters" when they operate fire district-owned vehicles in the discharge of their duties (General Municipal Law § 205-b; see Letter from Fireman's Assn. of State of NY, Apr 28, 1934, id. at 4).

Their reliance on the second sentence of General Municipal Law § 205-b in support of that contention is misplaced. In Thomas v Consolidated Fire Dist. No. 1 of Town of Niskayuna ( 50 NY2d 143), the Court of Appeals rejected a similar contention, namely, that section 205-b impliedly exempts fire districts from liability except as specifically provided by that section. The Court explained the historical context of section 205-b: "Although the State waived its immunity from liability in 1929 with the enactment of section 8 of the Court of Claims Act, this waiver of immunity was not found to be applicable to the local subdivisions of the State until 1945, when [the Court of Appeals] issued its decision in Bernardine v City of New York ( 294 NY 361).

Because municipal immunity is an extension of State immunity, the State's waiver of sovereign immunity makes municipalities “answerable equally with individuals and private corporations for wrongs of officers and employees.” Bernardine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 365, 62 N.E.2d 604 (1945); accord Thomas v. Consol. Fire Dist. No. 1 of Town of Niskayuna, 50 N.Y.2d 143, 146–47, 428 N.Y.S.2d 443, 405 N.E.2d 1009 (1980) (noting that the dicta in Bernardine “has been frequently cited with approval by th[e] court in cases finding municipalities liable for the acts of their agents and is now generally understood to permit municipal liability even in the absence of particular statutory enactments”); Green v. City of New York, 465 F.3d 65, 86 (2d Cir.2006) (“A New York employer, such as the City, is liable for intentional torts, such as assault and battery, committed by its employees provided that the tort is committed within the scope of the [employees'] employment.” (citing Carnegie v. J.P. Phillips, Inc., 28 A.D.3d 599, 815 N.Y.S.2d 107 (2d Dep't 2006))).

The use of the words "for the negligence of" in General Municipal Law § 205-b merely describes the condition for the imposition of vicarious liability upon the fire districts, i.e., ordinary negligence of its volunteer firefighters. The purpose of the statute is to "immunize volunteer firefighters from civil liability for ordinary negligence" (Lynch v Waters, 82 AD3d 1719, 1722), and to "shift liability for such negligence to the fire districts that employ them" (id. at 1722; see Thomas v Consolidated Fire Dist. No. 1 of Town of Niskayuna, 50 NY2d 143). Thus, General Municipal Law § 205-b functions merely as a liability shifting statute, and does not purport to define the rules of the road or the standard of care to be applied in any particular circumstance.

The use of the words "for the negligence of" in General Municipal Law § 205-b merely describes the condition for the imposition of vicarious liability upon the fire districts, i.e., ordinary negligence of its volunteer firefighters. The purpose of the statute is to "immunize volunteer firefighters from civil liability for ordinary negligence" (Lynch v Waters, 82 A.D.3d 1719, 1722), and to "shift liability for such negligence to the fire districts that employ them" (id. at 1722; see Thomas v Consolidated Fire Dist. No. 1 of Town of Niskayuna, 50 N.Y.2d 143). Thus, General Municipal Law § 205-b functions merely as a liability shifting statute, and does not purport to define the rules of the road or the standard of care to be applied in any particular circumstance.

Their reliance on the second sentence of General Municipal Law § 205-b in support of that contention is misplaced. In Thomas v Consolidated Fire Dist. No. 1 of Town of Niskayuna ( 50 NY2d 143), the Court of Appeals rejected a similar contention, namely, that section 205-b impliedly exempts fire districts from liability except as specifically provided by that section. The Court explained the historical context of section 205-b: "Although the State waived its immunity from liability in 1929 with the enactment of section 8 of the Court of Claims Act, this waiver of immunity was not found to be applicable to the local subdivisions of the State until 1945, when [the Court of Appeals] issued its decision in Bernardine v City of New York ( 294 NY 361).

Thus, they argue, the proposed amendment should have been denied as being devoid of merit (see, Brown v Samalin Bock, 155 A.D.2d 407). However, the use of a private vehicle does not vitiate the application of General Municipal Law § 205-b (see, Thomas v Consolidated Fire Dist. No. 1, 50 N.Y.2d 143). Further, the plaintiffs argue, they were prejudiced by the amendment because they now must prove wilful negligence or malfeasance rather than "ordinary" negligence, and because the practical effect of the amended answer was to shorten the Statute of Limitations period against the relevant fire district to six months, the time remaining to commence suit against the district when the amendment was granted.

An act is deemed to have occurred during the scope of employment if it was in furtherance of duties owed to an employer and the latter could control the activities or if it was a natural incident of employment ( Riviello v Waldron, 47 N.Y.2d 297; Bazan v Bohne, 144 A.D.2d 168 [3d Dept, 1988]). The doctrine of vicarious liability applies to municipalities for firefighter misconduct (see Thomas v Consolidated Fire Dist. No. 1, 50 N.Y.2d 143; Swerdzewski v Unincorporated Village of Westhampton Beach, 30 A.D.2d 694 [2d Dept, 1968]). That a firefighter is an unpaid volunteer does not affect his status as an employee of the municipal entity that controls him (see Knapp v Union Vale Fire Co., Inc., 141 A.D.2d 509 [2d Dept, 1988]; see also, Volunteer Firefighters' Benefit Law, § 2; Restatement [Second] of Agency, §§ 221, 225).

We begin by observing that the concept of immunity from suit is antithetical to the public policy of this State which, in the furtherance of justice and fair play, favors the availability of redress to an injured party. As the Court of Appeals has observed in assessing the application of this very same immunity provision, "the policy of this State has been to reduce rather than increase the obstacles to the recovery of damages for negligently caused injury or death, whether the defendant be a private person * * * or a public body" (Abbott v Page Airways, 23 N.Y.2d 502, 507; cf., Caceci v Di Canio Constr. Corp., 72 N.Y.2d 52, 60; Thomas v Consolidated Fire Dist. No. 1, 50 N.Y.2d 143, 146-147; Gelbman v Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434; Court of Claims Act § 8; General Municipal Law §§ 50 — 50-d). Further emphasizing the foregoing policy, the court stated in a footnote that, "[a]s we said in the Bing [v Thunig] case (2 N.Y.2d, at pp. 666, 667), in a different but relevant context, `[l]iability is the rule, immunity the exception.

We agree with this conclusion and accordingly affirm. While the doctrine of vicarious liability applies to municipal entities in the area of firefighting (see, e.g., Thomas v Consolidated Fire Dist. No. 1, 50 N.Y.2d 143; Cuddy v Town of Amsterdam, 62 A.D.2d 119), the theory underlying the application of such liability is that the individual firefighter is an employee or agent of, or is otherwise under the control and supervision of, the entity sued. In this case, the Fire Company cannot be said to exercise any degree of control as would subject it to liability for the negligent acts committed by a firefighter during the execution of his or her duties, as it is the Fire District rather than the Fire Company which employs, supervises and controls the individual firefighters. Indeed, Town Law § 174 (7) expressly sets forth this employer-employee relationship as follows: "The officers and employees of a fire district, including the paid and volunteer members of the fire department thereof, are officers and employees of such fire district and are not officers and employees of any other political subdivision."