U.C.C. § 2-725 (Reissue 1980). The plaintiffs appealed to the Nebraska Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court's judgment in Thomas v. Countryside of Hastings, 2 Neb. App. 590, 512 N.W.2d 660 (1994). This court granted the plaintiffs' petition for further review.

Neenan further argues that Gerhold's reliance on Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-223 is misplaced as it applies only to homebuilders. SeeThomas v. Countryside of Hastings, Inc., 2 Neb. App. 590, 593, 512 N.W.2d 660, 664, rev'd, 246 Neb. 907, 524 N.W.2d 311 (1994); Georgetowne Ltd. P'ship v. Geotechnical Servs., Inc., 230 Neb. 22, 430 N.W.2d 34 (1988). For the same reasons discussed above, Gerhold argues the breach of warranty claims are time-barred.

The cases cited deal with characterizing a cause of action for the purpose of determining the applicability of a particular statute of limitation or other statute. Even so, characterizing an action for a conflicts analysis is no different. Our approach is consistent with how other courts typically characterize actions. See, e.g., Thomas v. Goudreault, 163 Ariz. 159, 786 P.2d 1010, 1014-15 (App. 1989) (in determining nature of action, court must look to substance of allegations, not the labels attached to them); Schulz v. Honsador, Inc., 67 Haw. 433, 690 P.2d 279, 282 (1984) (nature of right or claim is determined from facts stated, issues raised, and allegations contained in pleadings); Li v. Feldt, 187 Mich. App. 475, 468 N.W.2d 268, 269 (1991) (court not strictly bound by label affixed to claim, but may look beyond label to determine exact nature of allegation made); Thomas v. Countryside of Hastings, Inc., 2 Neb. App. 590, 512 N.W.2d 660, 664 (1994) (character of action is determined by nature of grievance, not by form of pleadings, with consideration being given to facts which constitute cause of action); Gazija v. Nicholas Jerns Co., 86 Wn.2d 215, 543 P.2d 338, 340 (1975) (nature of action is determined from pleadings and complaint as a whole and from the evidence relied upon, not by particular words and allegations, form adopted by pleader, or understanding of counsel or trial court). Essentially, Gallent alleges the breach of promises orally agreed to by the parties.

2002). The records to which you refer could come under this exemption, except for the fact that Section 20-330 is a specific statute regarding the Fair Housing Act. Koterzina v. Copple Chevrolet, Inc., 3 Neb.App 695, 531 N.W.2d 1 (Neb.App. 1995) (statutes are ordinarily construed in manner such that the specific controls the general); Reiter v. Wimes, 263 Neb. 277, 640 N.W.2d 19 (2002) (statutes dealing specifically with driver's license revocation hearings control over the general statute dealing with administrative hearings); Thomas v. Countryside of Hastings, Inc., 2 Neb. App. 590, 512 N.W.2d 660 (1994) (a special statute of limitations controls and takes precedence over a general statute of limitations because the special statute is a specific expression of legislative will concerning a particular subject). As indicated above, the legislative history shows that the legislature made a special provision for review of the records by the complainant and the respondent.