Opinion
June 3, 1932.
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Liberal Construction. Section 28, Article 4, of the State Constitution, requiring a bill to contain only one subject clearly expressed in its title is liberally construed.
2. ____: ____. An act which provides that a county court may borrow money on tax anticipation notes and also provides for the purchase of supplies and printing for county offices is not double in violation of Section 28, Article 4, the Constitution; both provisions fairly relate to the same subject.
3. ____: ____. Such law is not in violation of that section of the Constitution on the ground that though the object of the law is single the subject is double. While an underlying motive, not expressed, cannot be treated as the subject of a legislative act, the act under consideration states the ultimate purpose and it is single, to improve the financial condition of counties affected.
4. ____: ____. The law does not require each separate legislative thought, which has a natural connection with another, to be embodied in a different bill.
5. ____: Title of Act: Population. Where the title of an act makes it apply to counties of certain population shown by "the last preceding decennial census" and the body of the act makes no reference to the census in setting out the population limits, the title of the act must be considered in construing the act.
6. ____: ____: ____. A law applicable to counties between 95,000 and 150,000 population is not local and in violation of subdivisions 2, 15 and 32 of Section 53, Article 4, of the Constitution because only one county has that population; the act applies as well to all counties which may hereafter have that population.
7. ____: Limit of Indebtedness. Section 12, Article 10, of the Constitution, limiting the indebtedness of a county, is self-enforcing and must be read into an act authorizing a county court to issue tax anticipation notes: such an act is permissive, not mandatory and fixes a maximum per cent of the anticipated revenue.
8. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Limit of Indebtedness. Nothing in Section 12, Article 10, of the Constitution, forbids the enactment of state laws authorizing counties to borrow money so long as the indebtedness does not exceed the constitutional limit.
Appeal from Buchanan Circuit Court. — Hon. Sam Wilcox, Judge.
REVERSED.
Mayer, Conkling Sprague for appellants.
(1) Every reasonable intendment should be made to sustain legislative enactment. No act should be declared unconstitutional unless it appears very clearly so. State v. Ward, 40 S.W.2d 1076. (2) The act contains a single subject which is clearly expressed in the title of the act. (a) The object and purpose of Section 28 of Article IV of the Missouri Constitution was to kill "log-rolling" and to prevent incongruous, disconnected matters which had no relation to each other from being joined in one bill. However, it has always been recognized that all matters that are germane to the principal subject might properly be incorporated in the same bill. State v. Brodnax, 228 Mo. 54; O'Connor v. Transit Co., 198 Mo. 633; State v. Miller, 45 Mo. 495. It is a fixed rule that where all the provisions of a statute fairly relate to the same subject, have a natural connection with it, are the incidents or means of accomplishing it then the subject is single, and if it is sufficiently expressed in the title, the statute is valid. Ewing v. Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo. 71; State v. Ward, 40 S.W.2d 1076. The Supreme Court of Missouri has uniformly given a broad and liberal construction to said section of our Constitution relating to the subject-matter and title of an act. State v. Ward, 40 S.W.2d 1076; Star Square Auto Supply Co. v. Gerk, 30 S.W.2d 453; State ex rel. v. Terte, 324 Mo. 405; State v. Mullinix, 301 Mo. 390; State ex rel. v. Miller, 100 Mo. 444. (b) The "subject" of an act, in the constitutional sense, is the matter to which the act relates and which forms the groundwork of the act. 25 R.C.L. sec. 90, p. 844; 25 R.C.L. sec. 88, p. 842; 36 Cyc. 1022; Lewis, Sutherland on Statutory Construction (2 Ed.) sec. 116; McNeely v. Oil Co., 52 W. Va. 616, 44 S.E. 508, 62 L.R.A. 576. The matter to which the act at bar relates and which forms the groundwork of said act is the "management of the fiscal affairs of counties," and the act wholly relates to that one subject. While its provisions set up the machinery for county courts to borrow money necessary to carry on the functions of the county government by means of tax anticipation notes, and the machinery for county courts to control the expenditures of county officers in the purchase of supplies by prescribing and clarifying the manner in which counties' supplies shall be procured — these matters are but two aspects or phases of the one general subject of the management of the fiscal affairs of counties. This fact constitutes no constitutional objection to the act, when it as an entirety relates to but one subject. State ex rel. v. Miller, 33 S.W.2d 124; State ex rel. v. Gordon, 281 Mo. 639; Ex parte Loving, 178 Mo. 204. (c) The requirement that the subject must be "clearly expressed" in the title of an act, does not mean that the subject must be specifically stated, but it is sufficient if the subject is stated in general terms, and the title fairly embraces the subject-matter covered by the act. In re Burris, 66 Mo. 446; State v. Burgdoerfer, 107 Mo. 29; State ex rel. v. Miller, 100 Mo. 445; State ex rel. v. Terte, 324 Mo. 406. The courts, in determining what is the subject of an act, are bound to accept what either is expressly stated or is spelled out by the details expressed. The title is sufficient if the general subject can be inferred from the details set out therein. While the general subject of the management of the fiscal affairs of counties is not specifically stated in the title of the act at bar, the details which are expressed therein clearly spell out such a general subject. State v. Smith, 233 Mo. 255. (3) The act is a general and not a special or local law. (a) The act at bar does not apply exclusively to Buchanan County, but it is general in its terms and applies to all counties in the State having or hereafter acquiring a population of between 95,000 and 150,000 inhabitants. It is well established in this State that the classification of counties by population, so that other counties may come within the terms of the law in the future, does not make the act a special law in violation of Section 53 of Article IV of our Constitution, although such act only applies to one county in the State at the time of its enactment, because the population thereof is the only one within the limits fixed by the act at the time of its passage. State ex rel. v. Knight, 323 Mo. 1245; State ex inf. v. Armstrong, 315 Mo. 310; Forgrave v. Buchanan County, 282 Mo. 607; State ex inf. v. Southern, 265 Mo. 286; State ex rel. v. County Court, 128 Mo. 442. (b) A reasonable classification of counties can be made by the Legislature. State ex inf. v. Armstrong, 315 Mo. 312. The Legislature has power to furnish to densely populated counties legislation as conditions require, which would be unnecessary or impracticable to the smaller counties of the State. Ex parte Loving, 178 Mo. 216; State ex inf. v. Southern, 265 Mo. 287; State ex rel. v. Miller, 100 Mo. 450. The act at bar relates to counties having a certain population as a class, and not to particular counties of a class; the classification is made upon a reasonable basis, and not upon a mere arbitrary division made for legislative purposes, and hence is a general law and not special legislation. Davis v. Jasper County, 318 Mo. 253; State ex rel. v. Lee, 319 Mo. 993; State ex rel. v. Knight, 323 Mo. 1249. (4) The act does not violate Section 12 of Article X of the Constitution. This provision of our Constitution permits the county court to anticipate the revenue for any given year and to contract indebtedness within such anticipated revenue. Trask v. Livingston County, 210 Mo. 592; Andrew County v. Schell, 135 Mo. 39; Bank v. Earl, 87 Mo. 252. An indebtedness is valid if, at the time of its creation, it is within the income which may reasonably be anticipated. Watson v. Kerr, 312 Mo. 549. The act at bar forbids the issuance of any tax anticipation notes until after the anticipated revenue for the year shall have been estimated, and then limits their issuance to ten per cent of the total estimated revenue in any one month, and to ninety per cent of the total anticipated revenue in any one year. The act clearly does not violate the constitutional limitation of a county's indebtedness, but, on the contrary, expressly provides that the indebtedness authorized by it shall be within the limit imposed by our State Constitution. (5) The act does not violate Section 47 of Article IV of the Constitution. It does not authorize the county to lend its credit or to grant any public money in aid of any one, or to become a stockholder in any corporation, and clearly does not come within either the purview or the inhibition of this provision of our organic law.
W.J. Boyd for respondents.
(1) The sole question presented for determination on this appeal is the constitutionality of House Bill No. 514, enacted by the Fifty-sixth General Assembly of the State of Missouri (Laws 1931, pp. 292 to 296, inclusive). Said act violates Section 28, of Article IV of the Constitution, which provides that: "No bill . . . shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title." (2) Said act offends against Sub-division 2, of Section 53, or Article IV of the Constitution, in that said act is local and special in character and applies solely and exclusively to Buchanan County and undertakes to regulate solely and exclusively the affairs of Buchanan County. (a) Said act is in violation of Sub-division 15, of Section 53, of Article IV of the Constitution of Missouri, for that, while it applies solely and exclusively to Buchanan County and is purely local and special in character, it undertakes to create and constitute the County Court of Buchanan County a purchasing agent of said county and undertakes to prescribe the powers and duties of said county court and also to prescribe the powers and duties of said county court acting in the capacity of a purchasing agent or board. (b) The classification of the county or counties to which said acts should be, or become, applicable is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to lead to the undeniable conclusion that such act is purely local and special in its nature and character and, therefore, offends against the letter and spirit of Section 53, of Article IV of the Constitution. Davis v. County, 318 Mo. 248, 300 S.W. 493; State ex inf. v. Armstrong, 315 Mo. 298, 286 S.W. 705. (c) Said act violates Subdivision 32, of Section 53, of Article IV of the Constitution of Missouri, in that it is wholly local and special in its character and deals exclusively with Buchanan County in matters concerning which a general law, applying to all counties of the State of Missouri or to a reasonable classification of counties, could have been made applicable. (3) Said act is in violation of that portion of Section 12, of Article X of the Constitution of the State of Missouri, which provides that: "No county . . . shall be allowed to become indebted in any manner or for any purpose to an amount exceeding in any year the income and revenue provided for such year, without the consent of two-thirds of the voters thereof voting on such proposition at an election to be held for that purpose."
The respondents, as tax paying citizens, brought this suit against Buchanan County and the three judges of the county court to enjoin the issuance and sale of certain "tax anticipation" notes under Laws 1931, page 292, and to restrain the assessment, levy and collection of taxes to pay the same, on the ground that the aforesaid act is unconstitutional. The defendants filed answer admitting that they intended to issue notes under the law but denied that it was unconstitutional. The respondents then filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings and the cause was submitted to the trial court thereon. The court held against the constitutionality of the law and the correctness of that ruling is challenged on this appeal taken by the defendant county and county judge. In other words, the only questions presented are constitutional questions.
The contention of the respondents was and is that said Act of the General Assembly contravenes the following provisions of the State Constitution, for the following reasons:
(a) that it is double and contains two unrelated subjects; and that these are not clearly expressed in its title; all in violation of Article IV, Section 28;
(b) that it is a local and special law applying only to Buchanan County; and attempts to regulate the affairs of that county and to create offices therein and to prescribe the powers and duties thereof, whereas the general laws of the State are and can be made applicable to the matters and situations sought to be dealt with by the act; all in violation of Article IV, Section 53, subdivisions 2, 15 and 32;
(c) that it permits the county court to issue tax anticipation notes during a given year in an amount which, with other existing indebtedness, will exceed the income and revenue provided for that year without a vote of the people; in violation of Article X, Section 12.
The title of the act is as follows:
"An act to provide that the county court of counties now or hereafter having a population of not less than ninety-five thousand inhabitants and not more than one hundred and fifty thousand inhabitants, as shown by the last preceding decennial national census, may, under such conditions and upon the terms prescribed in this act, issue negotiable notes payable in not more than one year to be paid out of current revenue of the year, providing for a board of estimates to estimate the revenue, and prescribing the duties of the board, providing for the sale of the promissory notes and the registry thereof; and providing that the county court shall provide for the purchase of all supplies, including all printing, and providing that any purchase of supplies or having any printing or advertising done otherwise than as provided in this act, shall be unlawful, and providing a penalty for the violation of the act, with an emergency clause."
The act contains fifteen sections and applies only to counties "Which may now or hereafter have a population of not less than 95,000 inhabitants and not more than 150,000 inhabitants." The first ten sections cover the issuance of the so-called "tax anticipation" notes. It is provided that the county court of any county falling in the class designated may "issue negotiable notes payable in one year or less from the date of issue out of the current county revenues to be derived from the taxes of the year in which said notes are issued; but where taxes are levied for special purposes the notes issued against the anticipated revenues derived therefrom shall bear a statement that the said notes are to be paid out of said special revenues."
The notes can be issued only after the anticipated revenue for the year has been estimated by the three judges and the clerk of the county court, sitting with the county assessor, collector and treasurer, as a board of estimate; "and when issued shall be in proportion to the total estimated revenue as follows: not to exceed ten per cent in any month nor fifty per cent before June 1st of any year, and not more than an additional ten per cent in each of the months of June, July, August and September and the total of such notes shall not exceed ninety per cent of the total anticipated revenue in any one year; but if said notes, or any thereof, shall not be issued within or at the times so fixed they may be subsequently issued to the amount so limited."
It is further provided that the faith and credit of the county shall be deemed pledged for the payment of the notes and interest (6 per cent per annum) in the manner and from the funds specified in the act; and that the monies derived therefrom "shall be used solely for the payment of county warrants issued for the payment of the expenses and obligations of the county of the year in which said notes are issued," any surplus remaining to be applied to the payment of maturing anticipation notes or transferred to the various county funds according to law.
So much for the first ten sections of the act. The remaining five sections in effect require the judges of the county court on or before February 1 of each year to make up a budget, determining the kind and quantity of supplies which will be required by the several county officers during the year, including county printing and advertising; and to contract for said supplies with the lowest and best bidder after three weeks published notice and the reception of sealed bids. When the supplies are such as cannot be contracted for at a saving to the county, they may be purchased for the officer requiring them on a special order of the county court. All county and township officers are forbidden to purchase any supplies not thus contracted for or ordered; and the act declares it to be, unlawful for the county court "to draw, or authorize the drawing of, any check or county warrant, or other order for the payment of money for any supplies for any county officer," which were not purchased as in the act provided.
The act closes with an emergency clause reciting the law shall take effect immediately, "the financial condition of such counties making it necessary that such notes be issued and such expenditures be controlled."
The foregoing summary is sufficient for the purposes of this case. For a complete statement of the law in all its details the act will have to be read.
I. Taking up the contentions made by respondents in their order. The first is that the act does not conform to the requirements of Article IV, Section 28 of the State Constitution. We can see no infirmity in the title of the act. It fairly reflects its contents, and counsel for respondents do not seriously contend otherwise. The point they make is that the act is double; that it deals with two separate and unrelated subjects: (1) borrowing money on tax anticipation notes; (2) the purchase of supplies and printing for the county offices by contract. In dealing with this contention, we are to remember that when confronted by such questions "this court has uniformly given a broad and liberal construction to" the constitutional provision, and that "when all the provisions of a statute fairly relate to the same subject, have a natural connection with it, are the incidents or means of accomplishing it, then the subject is single." [State v. Ward (Mo. Sup.), 328 Mo. 658, 40 S.W.2d 1074, 1076.]
It is true the first ten sections of the act deal with the issuance of tax anticipation notes, and the last five sections with the budgeting of county expenses for supplies and the purchase thereof by contract from the lowest and best bidder. But have not these two subjects a natural relation in fact, and is not that relation shown by the act? Counsel for certain of the respondents concede the two matters — issuing notes and buying supplies — could have been combined under and as a single subject if the title and body of the act had provided for the issuance of the tax anticipation notes for the purpose of paying for supplies. But they say the act as it stands expresses no such purpose and permits the county to issue notes and borrow money without using it to purchase supplies, and to buy supplies by contract and pay for them without issuing notes.
We do not think this is sufficient to demonstrate the act is double. Buying supplies and obtaining funds to pay for them are not incongruous matters. They are very much related; and the tax anticipation note proceeds are at least made available for that purpose. The issuance of such notes to finance the county's needs, including supplies, and regulation of the purchase of supplies are functions having a natural relation in that they provide a means of obtaining money and making it go as far as possible; and this is true even though supplies may be bought and paid for out of revenues obtained from sources other than the notes, for in either event the economies effected result in a reduction of the general financial burden of the county which the note proceeds must bear somewhere along the line.
A case somewhat in point is Lynch v. Murphy, 119 Mo. 163, 171, 24 S.W. 774, 776. There, Laws 1893, page 150 and Laws 1891, page 128 were assailed as unconstitutional because duplicitous. The title of the first mentioned act, which recites the title of the other, was as follows: "An act to increase the state dramshop license, and to change the distribution of the county dramshop license by amending section 7 of an act entitled 'An act to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors in the original packages or otherwise. Both acts provided a specified portion of the revenue derived by each county from dramshop licenses should be set apart as a special road fund and distributed between the various road districts in the county according to mileage of public roads. It was contended the matter of providing and apportioning revenue for road purposes was a separate, distinct subject having no connection with the regulation of dramshops, but this court said "the disposition of the tax thus collected in that way is germane to the title of the act." So in the instant case control of the disbursement of money for supplies, which is or may be derived from the tax anticipation notes provided for, constitutes a single subject.
Furthermore, in our opinion the face of the act inferentially shows it was in legislative contemplation that the money obtained from the sale of the notes would or might be used in part to pay for supplies. It is a matter of common knowledge that a very substantial portion of every county's financial outlay is so spent. Section 10 of the act provides the notes can be used only to pay warrants for county expenses and obligations; Section 12 defines the word supplies as including "every article or thing for which payment may by law be required to be made by the county," including advertising and printing; Section 14 says no warrants shall be issued for supplies except such as shall have been contracted for or ordered in obedience to the requirements of the act; and Section 15 declares an emergency exists because the financial condition of the counties covered by the act makes it necessary that such notes be issued and county expenditures controlled. This declaration amounts to an express legislative affirmation that the issuance of the notes and the regulation of county expenditures for supplies are connected and necessary steps toward proper system of fiscal management.
Respondents grant the motive or object of the law may have been to ameliorate the financial condition of the counties covered thereby, but they say the Constitution requires every legislative bill to have a single subject. They draw a distinction between the object and the subject of a law, saying the latter refers to "the matter treated of; the theme or topic," or, in other words, "the things talked about in the act," citing McNeely v. So. Penn. Oil Co., 52 W. Va. 616, 62 L.R.A. 562, 576, and other cases. It is true some underlying motive not expressed or disclosed in a legislative act cannot be treated as the subject of the act. But as we have said, the act here under consideration not only discloses but actually states its ultimate purpose to improve the financial condition of the counties affected, by the means set out therein.
Respondents further remind us the main object of the Constitution in forbidding the enactment of laws having more than one subject is to prevent "log-rolling" and to insure that each separate subject will be dealt with on its own merits, citing State v. Burgdoerfer, 107 Mo. 1, 19, 17 S.W. 646, 651. And they make the point that at the passage of the act here involved some of the legislators may have been in favor of authorizing the issuance of tax anticipation notes but opposed to buying supplies by contract, and other legislators may have taken a reverse position; and that by combining the two matters in one bill all these legislators were coerced into voting for the whole measure whereas one or both parts of the law might have been rejected if separately submitted. That probably is more or less true of many bills. [4] But the law does not require each separate legislative thought to be embodied in a different bill, when they have a natural connection with each other. [Lynch v. Murphy, supra, 119 Mo. l.c. 169, 24 S.W. l.c. 775, 776; State v. Ward, supra, 328 Mo. 658, 40 S.W.2d l.c. 1076.] Our Public Service Commission law enacted in 1913 with its numerous provisions scattered through 140 sections, the Motor Vehicle Act and Highway Commission law passed in 1921, may be cited as familiar examples of this fact, along with many others.
Going back to the title, if the body of the act, expressly as well as by reasonable inference, discloses an intention to deal with matters all falling under the subject and central thought of fiscal management of the counties' affairs, and as a means to that end — as we have held it does — then by the same token, the title of the act, which fairly reflects its contents and refers to the emergency clause, should be similarly construed.
In this connection part of the respondents call attention to the fact that the title of the act designates the counties to which it applies as those "having a population of not less than ninety-five thousand inhabitants, and not more than one hundred and fifty thousand inhabitants, as shown by the last preceding decennial national census" (italics ours) whereas the body of the law omits all reference to the census in setting out the population limits aforesaid. It is argued the title cannot be read into the text of the act and that under the latter counties to be classified by their actual population as locally determined, so, notwithstanding the petitions of all the respondents allege and the answers of appellants thereto admit, Buchanan County has a population between 95,000 and 150,000 according to the last Federal census, respondents nevertheless say the fact thus established by the pleadings does not bring the case within the act because there is no showing as to the actual population. This position we think is clearly untenable. The law is well established that in construing a statute the title may be considered. [Glaser v. Rothchild, 221 Mo. 180, 212, 120 S.W. 1, 12, 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1045, 17 Ann. Cas. 576; Straughan v. Meyers, 268 Mo. 580, 587, 187 S.W. 1159, 1161; In re Graves, 325 Mo. 888, 896, 30 S.W.2d 149, 151-2; 36 Cyc. p. 1133; 25 R.C.L. sec. 267, pp. 1033-4.] The body of the act not stating how the population is to be determined, undoubtedly the title may be resorted to in ascertaining the legislative intent.
II. The next point made by certain of the respondents is that the law is local and special in violation of subdivisions 2, 15 and 32 of Section 53, Article IV of the Constitution, in that it singles out Buchanan County and attempts to regulate its affairs, creates a special board of estimate, and makes the county court a purchasing agent. It is true the only county in the State which, at this time, has a population between 95,000 and 150,000 is Buchanan County. But this does not make the law local, because the act applies as well to all counties which may hereafter have that population. In other words, the class is fixed, but the counties that fall within it may change as their population fluctuates. That such legislation is not local is established by numerous decisions of this court: Davis v. Jasper Co., 318 Mo. 248, 253, 300 S.W. 493, 495; State ex rel. Moseley v. Lee, 319 Mo. 976, 993, 5 S.W.2d 83, 90.
These same respondents also assert the classification fixed by the law is arbitrary and unreasonable; but they merely state that as a conclusion and give no reason. The presumptions are all in favor of the validity of the act, and the burden is on him who maintains the contrary to point out wherein the classification is unreasonable. As said in a recent banc decision, State ex rel. Hollaway v. Knight, 323 Mo. 1241, 1249, 21 S.W.2d 767, 770, "it must be made to appear beyond a reasonable doubt that there are no distinctive circumstances" justifying the classification.
III. The next assignment is that the act violates Section 12 of Article X of the Constitution in that it permits the county court to issue tax anticipation notes during a given year in an amount which, with other existing indebtedness, will exceed the income and revenue provided for that year without a vote of the people. Respondents' theory on this point is twofold. First they say the act authorizes a county coming within the class created by it to issue tax anticipation notes up to ninety per cent of the anticipated revenue for a given year, and does not forbid the county from being indebted at the same time on county warrants. The gist of the contention is that a county might issue notes up to ninety per cent of its anticipated revenue although it already had outstanding warrants in an amount which, with the issued notes, would exceed the constitutional limit.
This contention is not well founded because Section 12, Article X of the Constitution is self-enforcing and must be read into the act. [State ex rel. Audrian County v. Hackmann, 275 Mo. 534, 540, 205 S.W. 12, 13; State ex rel. City of Jefferson v. Hackmann, 287 Mo. 156, 166, 229 S.W. 1082, 1085; State ex rel. City of Sedalia v. Weinrich, 291 Mo. 461, 468, 236 S.W. 872, 874.] This can be done without defeating the spirit and purpose of the law, or, indeed, deviating from its provisions. In authorizing the issuance of tax anticipation notes its terms are permissive, not mandatory, and the act merely fixes a maximum for the notes of ninety per cent of the anticipated revenue for the year. It is clear the law contemplates notes may be issued although prior warrants for the year are outstanding, and warrants may also be issued subsequent to the issuance of the notes. But there is nothing in the act saying tax anticipation notes must, or even may, be issued to an amount which, with existing indebtedness, will exceed 100 per cent of the anticipated revenue for the year, or that after the ninety per cent in notes have been issued, warrants may be issued for more than the remaining ten per cent which would bring the indebtedness up to the constitutional limit. Laws with substantially the same provisions, applying to counties of between 200,000 and 600,000 population, have been in force in this State since 1921, Laws 1921, page 275, Laws 1925, page 168, Sections 7692 to 7702, Revised Statutes 1929; and to counties of between 70,000 and 90,000 since 1925, Laws 1925, pages 175, 176, Sections 2095 to 2110, Revised Statutes 1929. The last mentioned statutes are almost identical with the act attacked in this case. We cannot overthrow all these laws merely because they contain no express restriction limiting the total indebtedness of the counties each year, including tax anticipation notes, to the anticipated revenue for that year.
The other contention presented by respondents is that the act gives the county court "an unrestrained license" to issue anticipation notes "regardless of necessity." In other words the county court can issue notes and borrow money before there is any indebtedness to be paid with it. It is said this would make the county a borrower, put it on a credit basis, and take it away from the cash system, contrary to the intent and purpose of Section 12, Article X of the Constitution as interpreted in earlier cases. We see nothing in this section forbidding the enactment of State laws authorizing counties to borrow money so long as the indebtedness does not exceed the constitutional limit. Cases which say Sections 11 and 12 of Article X of the Constitution put the counties of the State on a cash basis, mean merely that the indebtedness contracted in any year shall not exceed the anticipated revenue for that year. [State ex rel. Clark County v. Hackmann, 280 Mo. 686, 698, 218 S.W. 318, 320.]
Being of the opinion that the several attacks on the statutes involved are not well grounded, for the reasons herein given, the judgment of the court below is reversed. All concur.