Opinion
Case No. 1:04-CV-212.
October 20, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Craig J. Bobay's Motion to Dismiss [DE 8], filed on September 24, 2004.
BACKGROUND
On August 30, 2004, the Plaintiff, Kevin Thomas, filed his pro se Complaint under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Plaintiff had previously sought in forma pauperis status, which the Court denied because he did not meet the statutory poverty guidelines under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). The Plaintiff sued Craig J. Bobay, magistrate judge of the Allen Circuit Court; Harry W. Foster, an attorney; and Sandra Michelle Reid. The Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Craig Bobay violated his due process and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment during custody proceedings in Allen Circuit Court.
On September 24, 2004, the Defendant moved to dismiss the Plaintiff's action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6). The Defendant's Motion complied with Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1982). On October 1, 2004, the Plaintiff responded and on October 4, 2004, the Defendant replied. On October 8, 2004, the Plaintiff filed an Amended Response in which he urges the Court to exercise jurisdiction over his claims.
DISCUSSION
The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant acted improperly in his role as a magistrate during the course of a change of custody proceeding when he conducted ex-parte communications, relied on hearsay evidence, did not allow the Plaintiff a reasonable opportunity to be heard or to call witnesses, conspired with the attorney for the mother, refused to allow certain documents into evidence, did not inform the Plaintiff of all his rights, made an erroneous finding of a pattern of violence, and conducted a hearing that, at 2½ hours, was not long enough. The Plaintiff also alludes to his "fundamental liberty interest as the father" of his minor child. The Plaintiff seeks a "writ of habeas corpus" concerning the magistrate's May 29, 2003, order and also seeks $950,000 in damages.
The Defendant provides three basis for dismissal of the Plaintiff's Complaint against him: federal sovereign immunity, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and judicial immunity. The Plaintiff contends that exceptions to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine apply to his case.
a. Standard of Review
A case may be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) when the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter. "Subject-matter jurisdiction is the first question in every case, and if the court concludes that it lacks jurisdiction it must proceed no further." State of Illinois v. City of Chicago, 137 F.3d 474, 478 (7th Cir. 1998).
When considering a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 320 F.3d 698, 701 (7th Cir. 2003). In addition, pro se pleadings are held to less exacting standards than those prepared by counsel and are to be liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); McCormick v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 319, 325 (7th Cir. 2000).
The plaintiff has the obligation to establish jurisdiction by competent proof. Sapperstein v. Hager, 188 F.3d 852, 855-56 (7th Cir. 1999). The presumption of correctness accorded to a complaint's allegations falls away on the jurisdictional issue once a defendant proffers evidence that calls the court's jurisdiction into question. Id. at 856.
b. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine derives its name from two Supreme Court decisions, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). The doctrine "precludes lower federal court jurisdiction over claims seeking review of state court judgments . . . [because] no matter how erroneous or unconstitutional the state court judgment may be, the Supreme Court of the United States is the only federal court that could have jurisdiction to review a state court judgment." Brokaw v. Weaver, 305 F.3d 660, 664 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Remer v. Burlington Area Sch. Dist., 205 F.3d 990, 996 (7th Cir. 2000)); see also Durgins v. City of East St. Louis, Ill., 272 F.3d 841, 844 (7th Cir. 2001) ("The doctrine stands for the principle that decisions of state courts may not be challenged in litigation under § 1983; instead the aggrieved party must pursue all remedies through the state system and then seek certiori under 28 U.S.C. § 1257.").
The doctrine bars federal court review, not only of state court "judgments" but, of claims that are "inextricably intertwined" with the state court judgment. Id. However, it does not apply where the plaintiff did not have a reasonable opportunity to raise his federal claim in state proceedings. Browkaw, 305 F.3d at 667. But, a plaintiff cannot avoid the jurisdictional doctrine of Rooker-Feldman simply by "casting his complaint in the form of a civil rights action," or by adding claims of constitutional deprivations. Ritter v. Ross, 992 F.2d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1993)
By asking this Court to review the state court decision and say whether the proceedings were constitutionally flawed, the Plaintiff runs headlong into the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In his prayer for relief, the Plaintiff specifically asks this Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus concerning the judgment of the state court magistrate and to award him damages. The Plaintiff, in essence, is challenging the magistrate's decision not to award the Plaintiff custody of his minor child and to uphold his support obligations. This Court could not give the Plaintiff the relief he seeks without reviewing and reversing the state court's judgment. It makes no difference under Rooker-Feldman that the Plaintiff seeks money damages in addition to equitable relief. Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1370 (7th Cir. 1996) (the doctrine applies equally to claims for monetary damages and prospective or injunctive relief). Moreover, there is no evidence that the Plaintiff could not have raised his alleged constitutional concerns regarding his "liberty" interest, the ex-parte communications, his ability to call witnesses or present documents, and the like during the state court proceedings. The Plaintiff seeks an improper review of the state court judgment.
The Plaintiff's Complaint may also implicate the "domestic relations exception" to federal jurisdiction. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992) (holding that federal courts do not have the power to issue divorce, alimony, or child custody decrees).
The Plaintiff, correctly, notes an exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine where a federal statue authorizes collateral federal review of final state court decisions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and 2254 (habeas corpus review). Federal courts, however, can only entertain habeas corpus petitions where the petitioner is "in custody," id., and the Plaintiff is not in custody.
Because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the case, and it is dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). See Browkaw, 305 F.3d at 664; Frederiksen v. City of Lockport, ___ F.3d ___, 2004 WL 2066053, at *2 (7th Cir. Sept. 16, 2004). Accordingly, the Court does not consider the issues of judicial or sovereign immunity. See Crestview Village Apartments v. United States Dept. of Housing and Urban Dev., ___ F.3d ___, 2004 WL 195663 (7th Cir. Sep. 2, 2004) (declining to consider claim under 12(b)(6) where Rooker-Feldman doctrine operated as a jurisdictional bar to the plaintiff's claim in federal court). The Plaintiff's claim against Thomas Bobay is dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). c. Remaining Defendants
The Court notes that even if it had jurisdiction over the subject matter, Magistrate Bobay would have absolute immunity from suit. See Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1015 (7th Cir. 2000) (judicial immunity). Although the Defendant would like the Court to dismiss all claims against him and enter final judgment in his favor, based, in part, on this immunity, dismissal for want of subject matter jurisdiction is without prejudice. T.W. by Enk v. Brophy, 124 F.3d 893, 898 (7th Cir. 1997).
The Motion to Dismiss was filed by Defendant Bobay only. However, a court must address potential jurisdictional problems sua sponte at whatever point they arise in the proceedings. Hay v. Ind. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 312 F.3d 876, 879 (7th Cir. 2002); Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) ("Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action."). In addition, Defendants Foster and Reid asked the Court, in their Answer, to dismiss the Plaintiff's claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and indicated that the district court is not the appropriate forum for this matter.
The Seventh Circuit generally discourages district courts from sua sponte dismissing a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction without first providing the plaintiff notice and a hearing or an opportunity to amend. Frey v. EPA, 270 F.3d 1129, 1132 (7th Cir. 2001). Such a dismissal is improper unless the jurisdictional defect is incurable. Id.; Shockley v. Jones, 823 F.2d 1068, 1073 (7th Cir. 1987) ("[U]nless the defect is clearly incurable a district court should grant the plaintiff leave to amend, allow the parties to argue the jurisdictional issue, or provide the plaintiff with the opportunity to discover the facts necessary to establish jurisdiction.")
Although the Plaintiff's Complaint does not set forth any claims against Harry W. Foster III and Sandra Michelle Reid that are unrelated to, and independent of, the state court proceedings and judgment, the Court cannot say that the jurisdictional defect is incurable, i.e., that the Plaintiff cannot state any claims against Defendants Foster and Reid that do not require review of the state court decision. The Plaintiff will be given an opportunity to amend his Complaint to clarify both the legal claims against Foster and Reid and the facts supporting these claims.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Craig Bobay's Motion to Dismiss [DE 8] is GRANTED and the claims against him are DISMISSED without prejudice. As explained above, the Plaintiff is allowed thirty days from the issuance of this Order to amend his Complaint and to file any brief in support of the Court's subject matter jurisdiction. Failure to amend the Complaint in the time allowed will result in dismissal without prejudice and without further notice.SO ORDERED.