Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-cv-04744.
September 17, 2004
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff, Crystal Thomas, seeks judicial review of the denial of her disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Social Security Act Titles II and XVI. Both sides' summary judgment motions were referred to Magistrate Judge Thomas J. Rueter, who recommended that I grant summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner. Ms. Thomas has objected to Judge Reuter's Report and Recommendation. I overrule those Objections and adopt the Report and Recommendation.
Factual and Procedural History
Ms. Thomas is 40 years old and has a high school education. In 1983, Ms. Thomas worked as a dispatcher and receptionist, and from 1984 to 1988 she performed various short-term, odd jobs. (R. 52-53). In 1988, she began working as a cleaner at Children's Hospital of Pennsylvania, but was terminated in 1992 after she allegedly became disabled. She received disability payments for six months, and collected unemployment benefits for nine months. (R. 54). In 1993, Ms. Thomas worked for approximately one month at the Singer Manufacturing Company tagging garments, but could not continue working, allegedly due to her medical condition. Since 1993, she has been on public assistance. (R. 55).
Ms. Thomas contends that on July 7, 1992 — the day she suffered an intracranial hemorrhage — she became disabled because of psychological impairment, seizures, right side weakness, urinary incontinence, and asthma. Ms. Thomas has a history of alcohol, cocaine, and marijuana use. It was her cocaine use that caused her to suffer the hemorrhage. In her November 12, 2000 testimony, Ms. Thomas estimated that she "binged" on drugs every six months. (R. 390-93).
Ms. Thomas filed applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income on December 15, 1994, alleging that her condition made her unable to work. These applications were denied at both the initial and reconsideration levels of administrative review. On November 5, 1996, at Ms. Thomas's request, the Administrative Law Judge held a hearing on Ms. Thomas's claims. On December 16, 1996, the ALJ concluded that Ms. Thomas was not entitled to benefits. The Appeals Council denied Ms. Thomas's request for review of that decision, and she then filed an application for judicial review.
On July 8, 1998, Judge Van Antwerpen remanded the case to the Commissioner for further administrative proceedings. Judge Van Antwerpen ordered a mental status consultative examination with psychological testing and a consultative examination by a board certified neurologist. (R. 420-21). Pursuant to that Order, Dr. Mahmood Ghahramani performed a neurological disability examination on June 7, 2000, and Dr. Ely Sapol performed a comprehensive disability psychological evaluation with projectives on June 2, 2000. Dr. Ghahramani concluded that Ms. Thomas suffered from a variety of physical limitations. (R. 428-33). Among Dr. Sapol's conclusions was that Ms. Thomas suffered from depression. (R. 435-43).
The ALJ held a supplemental hearing on November 12, 2000, and on May 22, 2001, denied Ms. Thomas's application, finding that Ms. Thomas was not disabled, and that she could engage in work she had performed in the past. (R. 358-74). In making these determinations, the ALJ accepted and rejected certain of Dr. Ghahramani's and Dr. Sapol's conclusions. Ms. Thomas filed exceptions to that decision on June 8, 2001. In May 2003, the Appeals Council permitted Ms. Thomas to seek judicial review.
After filing her Complaint in this Court, Ms. Thomas filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on December 30, 2003. The Commissioner filed a Summary Judgment Motion on March 1, 2004. Both Motions were referred to Magistrate Judge Reuter on March 15, 2004.
Standard of Review
A District Court must conduct a de novo review of objections to a Magistrate's Report and Recommendation concerning social security benefits. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2004). In reviewing the ALJ's factual findings, the District Court must determine whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence to support the findings. Jesurum v. Sec'y of U.S. Dept. Of Health and Human Services, 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995). Substantial evidence is evidence that "a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); Jerusum, 48 F.3d at 117, Although the evidence must be greater than a scintilla, it need not constitute a preponderance of the evidence. Jerusum, 48 F.3d at 117. Even if the District Court disagrees with the weight the ALJ gives to the evidence, it is improper for the Court to "substitute its conclusions for those of the fact finder." Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 924 (1993). As long as the ALJ's findings are supported by substantial evidence, the District Court may not disturb them. Monsour Med. Ctr. v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 905 (1987).
Discussion
Ms. Thomas raises two objections to the Report and Recommendation: (1) that the ALJ improperly rejected some of Dr. Ghahramani's conclusions; and (2) that based on "lay" speculation, the ALJ impermissibly rejected some of Dr. Sapol's conclusions. Having reviewed these Objections de novo, I conclude that the ALJ's findings are supported by substantial evidence.
After an exhaustive review of the record, the ALJ determined that Dr. Ghahramani's conclusions regarding Ms. Thomas's residual functioning capacity were not supported by Ms. Thomas's medical history. The ALJ stated that Dr. Ghahramani's "opinion is not consistent with the medical evidence, which shows minimal treatment since 1996, and is clearly not supported by the record as a whole." (R. 369). The ALJ identified numerous instances — including a lack of corroborating clinical and laboratory evidence — where the conclusions of Dr. Ghahramani were not supported by the record. In addition, the ALJ found that Dr. Ghahramani's conclusions were inconsistent with those of Ms. Thomas's treating physicians. Plainly, there is substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's findings.
The record also confirms that the ALJ did not displace Dr. Sapol's medical opinion with his own lay conclusions; in fact, many of the ALJ's findings are consistent with Dr. Sapol's report. The ALJ carefully detailed the medical evidence in the record regarding Ms. Thomas's depression, and noted Dr. Sapol's assessment that "the claimant has `good' to `fair' abilities to make work-related adjustments." (R. 366). The ALJ observed that this finding "is consistent with the psychological evidence of record." Id. The ALJ specifically noted Dr. Sapol's assessment that Ms. Thomas "perceives herself as less capable than she may actually be." Id. The ALJ also agreed with Dr. Sapol's observation that Ms. Thomas "was able to work diligently but slowly," and found that she suffered only a moderate impairment in the areas of concentration, persistence, and pace.Id. Dr. Sapol observed that although Ms. Thomas's day-to-day activities may be affected by her depression, she is "able to understand, retain, and follow simple instructions." (R. 437). Further, Dr. Sapol concluded that Ms. Thomas "could sustain attention to perform simple repetitive tasks and relate to others including fellow workers and supervisors." Id.
Ms. Thomas's contention that the ALJ substituted "lay speculation" for Dr. Sapol's assessment is not convincing. Although crediting substantial portions of Dr. Sapol's report, the ALJ found some of Dr. Sapol's conclusions — for instance that Ms. Thomas is seriously limited in her activities of daily living — were outweighed by other expert and scientific evidence. (R. 366). Those findings are supported by substantial evidence.
In sum, Ms. Thomas, in effect, argues that because Drs. Ghahramani and Sapol conducted their examinations pursuant to this Court's remand, their opinions necessarily bound the ALJ in all particulars. This is obviously incorrect. The ALJ was obligated to consider the evidence of Drs. Ghahramani and Sapol as he did that of the other experts in this case. That is precisely what the ALJ did.
Accordingly, I will adopt Judge Reuter's Report and Recommendation will grant the Commissioner's Motion for Summary Judgment. An appropriate order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 17th day of September, 2004, upon consideration of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Magistrate Judge Thomas Rueter's Report and Recommendation, and Plaintiff's Objections, Magistrate Judge Rueter's Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED.The Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant, Jo Ann Barnhart, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, is GRANTED.
The Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, Crystal Thomas, is DENIED.
The Clerk of Court shall close this matter for statistical purposes.