Given the inherent recreational uses of a bicycle, we conclude that petitioner has not shown that the bicycle would not have been purchased "but for" her medical condition. Instead, we conclude that the expenditure was only beneficial to her health generally and therefore does not qualify as medical care. See France v. Commissioner, 690 F.2d 68, 69 (6th Cir. 1982) (finding physician-recommended dance lessons to alleviate arthritic pains and nervous tensions not medical care), aff'g T.C. Memo. 1980-215; Thoene v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 62, 65 (1959) (finding physician-recommended dance lessons not medical care); Peacock v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1978-30, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 177, 184 (1978) (finding gym membership expense not medical care where physician recommended exercise). We therefore conclude that petitioner is not entitled to deduct medical expenses for 2008 in excess of those allowed by respondent.

If we were to accept her evaluation of the benefits she received from Scientology auditing as a fact, which we do not since she totally lacked the expertise to have any weight given to her conclusion as to the reasons for her improvement, it would not follow that the amounts petitioner expended for her Scientology auditing are deductible medical expenses. That an indirect medical benefit may result from a personal expense does not make that personal expense deductible, since deductible medical expenses are limited to those primarily incurred for medical care. Donnelly v. Commissioner, 262 F.2d 411, 413 (C.A. 2, 1959), affirming 28 T.C. 1278 (1957). See also John T. Thoene, 33 T.C. 62 (1959). We hold that petitioner is not entitled to deduct as medical expenses the amounts paid in 1968 to Benner for Scientology processing and to the Hubbard College of Scientology and the Hubbard Academy of Personal Independence for his wife's Scientology auditing.

’ Strikingly analogues to the issue in this case is the issue in John J. Thoene, 33 T.C. 62 (1959). There we had occasion to consider whether doctor-recommended dancing lessons for postoperative treatment would constitute medical care under section 213.

It may be that the legal services paid for by petitioners influenced the general well-being and disposition of Jayne and alleviated what that expenses generally beneficial to a taxpayer's health and well-being but permeated with personal and family considerations do not constitute ‘medical care’ as defined in section 213(e)(1) and the regulations promulgated thereunder. See Edward A. Havey, 12 T.C. 409 (1949); John J. Thoene, 33 T.C. 62 (1959); and H. Grant Atkinson, Jr., supra. In the Havey case, on which the petitioners place heavy reliance, we said (12 T.C.at 411-412):