In Pacific National Bank of Boston v. Mixter, 124 U.S. 721, 727, 8 S.Ct. 718, 721, 31 L.Ed. 567, 571 (1888), the Supreme Court held that the effect of 12 U.S.C. § 91 was to prohibit the availability of the remedy of prejudgment attachment as against national banks, "and in this way it operates as well on the courts of the United States as on those of the states." The absolute prohibition against attaching a national bank's property found in Mixter has been more recently narrowed by the United States Supreme Court in Third National Bank v. Impac Ltd., Inc., 432 U.S. 312, 97 S.Ct. 2307, 53 L.Ed.2d 368 (1977). The Court in Third National construed § 91 to prohibit only "prejudgment seizure of bank property by creditors of the bank", id. at 324, 97 S.Ct. at 2314, 53 L.Ed.2d at 377, and thus permitted an injunction to issue to prevent a national bank from foreclosing upon the plaintiff's property.

Elsewhere the Supreme Court has expounded the similar principle that "words grouped in a list should be given related meaning". See Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 114-15, 109 S.Ct. 1668, 1673, 104 L.Ed.2d 98 (1988); see also Third National Bank v. Impac Limited, Inc., 432 U.S. 312, 322 and n. 16, 97 S.Ct. 2307, 2313 and n. 16, 53 L.Ed.2d 368 (1977) (equating noscitur a sociis with principle that grouped words are to be given related meaning). Continental urges the court to apply noscitur a sociis to § 1110, and rule that "lease" means acquisition lease, because the other words in the list: "conditional sales" and "purchase money equipment security agreements" necessarily involve acquisitions.

It is a familiar principle of statutory construction that words grouped in a list should be given related meaning." Third Nat'l Bank in Nashville v Impac Ltd, Inc, 432 U.S. 312, 322; 97 S.Ct. 2307; 53 L.Ed.2d 368 (1977). In the present case, the statute uses the word "obstruct" as part of a list containing five other words, namely, "resist, oppose, assault, beat [and] wound."

Nor has any federal appellate court.See Pacific National Bank v. Mixter, 124 U.S. 721, 8 S.Ct. 718, 31 L.Ed. 567 (1888); Earle v. Pennsylvania, 178 U.S. 449, 20 S.Ct. 915, 44 L.Ed. 1146 (1900); Van Reed v. People's National Bank, 198 U.S. 554, 25 S.Ct. 775, 49 L.Ed. 1161 (1905); and Third National Bank v. Impact Limited, Inc., 432 U.S. 312, 97 S.Ct. 2307, 53 L.Ed.2d 368 (1977). We find only one state appellate decision Loews' Incorporated v. Superior Court of the State of California, 301 P.2d 64 (Cal.Ct.App. 1956), which defined final judgment as a judgment "from which no appeal can be taken."

See In re Richmond Produce Co., Inc., 195 B.R. 455, 466 (N.D. Cal. 1996). In his supplemental opposition, Plaintiff cites to a district court case that denied the bank's motion to stay the monetary judgment pending appeal without the posting of a supersedeas bond. Gutierrez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2010 WL 4688989, *2 (N.D. Cal. 2010). The court rejected the holding in LeMaire as not precedent and because LeMaire contradicts a clear directive of the Supreme Court in Third Nat'l Bank in Nashville v. Impac Limited, Inc., 432 U.S. 312 (1977), regarding the interpretation of a final judgment when applying Section 91. Id. at 1.

Whitney first argues that the lis pendens should be removed because it violates federal law, specifically 12 U.S.C. § 91, which provides that no pre-judgment "attachment, injunction, or execution" shall be issued against a national banking association or its property. In Third National Bank in Nashville v. Impac Ltd., Inc., 432 U.S. 312, 97 S.Ct. 2307, 53 L.Ed.2d 368 (1977), which was relied upon by the trial judge, the Supreme Court concluded that § 91 was meant to have a limited scope, and therefore prevented only "state judicial action, prior to final judgment, which would have the effect of seizing the bank's property." Impac, supra, 432 U.S. at 323, 97 S.Ct. at 2314.

"One hardly need rely on such Latin phrases as ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis to reach this obvious conclusion [that "words grouped in a list should be given related meaning"]." Third National Bank v. Impac Limited, Inc., 432 U.S. 312, 322 n. 16, 97 S.Ct. 2307, 2313 n. 16, 53 L.Ed.2d 368 (1977) (internal quotations omitted). The structure and history of the Act confirm this reading.

Following the "familiar principle of statutory construction that words grouped in a list should be given related meaning," we look to the other statutory and regulatory examples of "taking." Third Nat'l Bank in Nashville v. Impac Ltd., 432 U.S. 312, 322, 97 S.Ct. 2307, 2313, 53 L.Ed.2d 368 (1977). The statute groups "harass" with "hunt," "capture," and "kill" as forms of prohibited "taking."

An abstract of judgment is also similar to an injunction in that the lien created by an abstract of judgment prohibits a national bank from freely transferring its property. Third National Bank in Nashville v. Impac Ltd., Inc., 432 U.S. 312, 97 S.Ct. 2307, 2314 n. 18, 53 L.Ed.2d 368 (1977). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has ruled that section 91 is not to be given a completely literal meaning.

"Debentures" differ from bonds only in that they are unsecured.See Third Nat'l Bank in Nashville v. IMPAC, Ltd. 432 U.S. 312, 322 n. 16, 97 S.Ct. 2307, 2313 n. 16, 53 L.Ed.2d 368 (1977) ("words grouped in a list should be given related meanings"); Am. Maritime Ass'n v. Stans, 485 F.2d 765, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (same). Cf. Jarecki v. G.D. Searle Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307, 81 S.Ct. 1579, 1582, 6 L.Ed.2d 859 (1961) (statutory term "gathers meaning from the words around it").