Thigpen v. Meyers

11 Citing cases

  1. Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:12cv691 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 2, 2013)

    In all one-person, one-vote cases, the unconstitutional vote dilution is brought about by two factors acting in conjunction, one, that elected officials represent disproportionate numbers of voters, and two, that those officials exercise equal power despite having unequal constituencies. Cf. Roxbury Taxpayers Alliance v. Delaware Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 80 F.3d 42, 49 (2d Cir. 1996) (declining to find a one-person, one-vote violation because, even though the districts were not equipopulous, the legislators were afforded weighted votes in accordance with their respective constituency sizes); Thigpen v. Meyers, 231 F. Supp. 938, 941 (W.D. Wash. 1964) (three-judge court) (ordering weighted voting, rather than redistricting, to remedy a one-person, one-vote violation). The injury alleged in this case is caused by the redistricting plans as much as it is by the rules affording all Local Delegation members equal power.

  2. Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. State

    988 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (M.D. Ala. 2013)   Cited 3 times
    Dismissing partisan gerrymandering claim because the plaintiffs "failed to provide...'a judicial standard by which we can adjudicate the claim' "

    In all one-person, one-vote cases, the unconstitutional vote dilution is brought about by two factors acting in conjunction, one, that elected officials represent disproportionate numbers of voters, and two, that those officials exercise equal power despite having unequal constituencies. Cf. Roxbury Taxpayers Alliance v. Delaware Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 80 F.3d 42, 49 (2d Cir.1996) (declining to find a one-person, one-vote violation because, even though the districts were not equipopulous, the legislators were afforded weighted votes in accordance with their respective constituency sizes); Thigpen v. Meyers, 231 F.Supp. 938, 941 (W.D.Wash.1964) (three-judge court) (ordering weighted voting, rather than redistricting, to remedy a one-person, one-vote violation). The injury alleged in this case is caused by the redistricting plans as much as it is by the rules affording all Local Delegation members equal power.

  3. Burns v. Gill

    316 F. Supp. 1285 (D. Haw. 1970)   Cited 9 times
    Approving of such a plan, reasoning that “Kauai's senatorial voters, at first glance, seem more seriously shortchanged, but ... [a]ny such ‘loss' however was deliberately and meaningfully compensated for by providing 3 representatives for those same Kauai voters”

    Morris v. Board of Supervisors, 50 Misc.2d 929, 273 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1966); Graham v. Board of Supervisors, 18 N.Y.2d 672, 273 N YS.2d 419, 219 N.E.2d 870 (1966). Thigpen v. Meyers, D.C., 219 N.E.2d 870, 231 F. Supp. 938, 941 (1964). This court, feeling that the rationale of WMCA, Inc. and Bannister (n. 70) is sound and that there are no extraordinary circumstances present in the Hawaii reapportionment scheme and scene which permit of fractional voting, likewise cannot approve of the same.

  4. Long v. Avery

    251 F. Supp. 541 (D. Kan. 1966)   Cited 11 times

    We are repeatedly admonished to act with proper judicial restraint. The Court in Thigpen v. Meyers, 231 F. Supp. 938 (Wash.) went so far as to modify an original order forbidding the holding of elections under void statutes and permitted a legislature to be elected because of equitable principles. That a legislative assembly, though elected under a law declared unconstitutional, still has de facto status was held in Paulson v. Meier, 232 F. Supp. 183 (N.D.) The Oklahoma apportionment case, Reynolds v. State Election Board, 233 F. Supp. 323 held only that no more elections could be held under the statutes which that Court declared to be unconstitutional and directed that elections thereafter held must be in conformity with both the Oklahoma and Federal constitutions.

  5. Baker v. Carr

    247 F. Supp. 629 (M.D. Tenn. 1965)   Cited 7 times

    WASHINGTON: Thigpen v. Meyers, 211 F. Supp. 826 (W.D.Wash., 1962), aff'd, 378 U.S. 554, 84 S.Ct. 1905, 12 L.Ed.2d 1024 (1964); on remand, 231 F. Supp. 938 (W.D.Wash., 1964). BOYD, District Judge (concurring in part, dissenting in part).

  6. Dungan v. Sawyer

    250 F. Supp. 480 (D. Nev. 1965)   Cited 7 times

    In W.M.C.A., Inc. v. Lomenzo, supra, the New York ratio was 2.4 to 1 in the Senate and 11.9 to 1 in the Assembly. In Thigpen v. Meyers, 211 F. Supp. 826 (W.D.Wash., 1962) and 231 F. Supp. 938 (W.D.Wash., 1964), a panel from this circuit, sitting as a district court found a variance of 7.25 to 1 in the Washington Senate, and 4.65 to 1 in the Washington House of Representatives. In Herweg v. Thirty Ninth Legislative Assembly, 246 F. Supp. 454 (D.Mont., 1965) the Montana legislature, before reapportionment, was weighted 80 to 1 in favor of a Petroleum County voter for a senator, compared to a voter of Yellow-stone County; and 10 to 1 in the same counties with respect to members of the House of Montana Representatives.

  7. WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo

    246 F. Supp. 953 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)   Cited 3 times

    It has been criticized but not convicted. In Asbury Park Press, Inc. v. Woolley, 33 N.J. 1, 161 A.2d 705, League of Nebraska Municipalities v. March, D.C. 209 F. Supp. 189, Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 228 Md. 412, 180 A.2d 656, Thigpen v. Meyers, D.C., 231 F. Supp. 938, and to some extent Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 84 S. Ct. 1459, 12 L.Ed.2d 632. It is my opinion that no interim plan should be based upon a form of legislative plan which violates the New York State Constitution. I am opposed to the use of Plan A.

  8. Allegan Apportionment — 1968

    13 Mich. App. 692 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968)   Cited 7 times

    Our finding that Plan A is invalid requires that the Allegan county board of supervisors be reapportioned by the county apportionment commission in accordance with mandatory guidelines specified in PA 1966, No 261, § 4. In the meantime, we adopt as the most feasible method of fulfilling our obligation the weighted voting plan used in Thigpen v. Meyers (1964), 231 F. Supp. 938. Each supervisor elected in 1968 under Plan A shall be entitled to vote as supervisor in the proportion the population represented by him bears to the average population of the 21 districts. The supervisors from the respective districts shall have the following votes:

  9. Graham v. Bd. of Supervisors

    49 Misc. 2d 459 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966)   Cited 13 times

    In Maryland Committee v. Tawes ( 228 Md. 412, 439, revd. 377 U.S. 656), the Maryland court suggested in dictum that a reapportionment act might "adjust the number of votes or the fractional votes to be cast by the members (of the Legislature) so as to achieve the same relative voting strength as if an actual reapportionment of membership were made." Weighted voting was approved as a stopgap measure only in Thigpen v. Meyers ( 231 F. Supp. 938 [U.S. Dist. Ct., W.D. Wash, 1964]). In that case, the court recognized that chaos and confusion might result from weighted voting but accepted it as an expedient.

  10. Seaman v. Fedourich

    47 Misc. 2d 26 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965)   Cited 6 times
    In Seaman v. Fedourich, 47 Misc.2d 26, 262 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1965), on remand after the decision by the New York Court of Appeals, 16 N.Y.2d 94, 262 N.Y.S.2d 444, 209 N.E.2d 778 (1965), the Common Council of Binghamton was directed to "adopt and submit to this court for approval a districting plan, which, in good faith, is intended to meet constitutional requirements of equal representation;" (p. 29, 262 N.Y.S.2d p. 594).

    The weighting of a Councilman's vote is a form of redistricting which will give constitutional validity to the condemned districting plan because it satisfies the constitutional test of equal representation. ( Thigpen v. Meyers, 231 F. Supp. 938; Shilbury v. Board of Supervisors of County of Sullivan, 46 Misc.2d 837.) Assuming the validity of this premise, we may provide for the election of Councilmen to a Common Council in which weighted voting procedure is followed.