The trial in that Court was on the theory that Illinois law applied. A pertinent Illinois authority is Thieme v. Union Labor Life Ins. Co., 1956, 12 Ill. App.2d 110, 138 N.E.2d 857. There a master policy was executed in Washington, D.C., and delivered to an International Union located in Missouri. The insured, a member of the Illinois local, received his certificate of insurance in Illinois and brought suit in that state.

" Eipert , 136 Ill.Dec. 973, 545 N.E.2d at 501 (citing Boyd v. Madison Mut. Ins. Co. , 146 Ill.App.3d 420, 99 Ill.Dec. 862, 496 N.E.2d 555, 558 (1986) ("statutory provisions applicable to insurance policies which are in effect at the time the policy is issued or renewed are treated as part of the agreement"), aff'd , 116 Ill.2d 305, 107 Ill.Dec. 702, 507 N.E.2d 855 (1987) ). "Each time a policy is renewed it results in a new contract for purposes of incorporating statutory provisions into the policy." Eipert , 136 Ill.Dec. 973, 545 N.E.2d at 501 (citing Thieme v. Union Labor Life Ins. Co., 12 Ill.App.2d 110, 138 N.E.2d 857 (1956) ). The rule is also codified by statute.

The court found a new contract particularly appropriate because the original policy was expressly made subject to existing statutory provisions. The court found support for its holding in Illinois decisions, citing Dickirson v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 150 N.E. 256 (Ill. 1926); Thieme v. Union Labor Life Ins. Co., 138 N.E.2d 857 (Ill.App. 1956). According to the Thieme court, Illinois precedents have established "that a contract of annually renewable insurance forms a new contract at each renewal for the purpose of incorporating into the contract the statutory provisions enacted after the creation of the original contract relationship."

Beltmann cites indiscriminately Illinois authority that deals with a variety of insurance contexts. See Hofeld v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 322 N.E.2d 454, 458 (Ill. 1975) (holding group life, health and accident policy construed according to the party choice); Jadczak v. Modern Serv. Ins. Co., 503 N.E.2d 794, 797 (Ill.App.Ct. 1987) (holding automobile policy construed according to law of state where issued and delivered or when contract was formed); Thieme v. Union Labor Life Ins. Co., 138 N.E.2d 857, 859-60 (Ill.App.Ct. 1956) (holding group life insurance policy construed according to law of state where delivered and the location of the insured). In this case, under the analysis set forth by the Restatement, it is clear that the law of Texas ought to be applied.

Illinois is the gorum state and its choice of law directs a court to turn to the state where the policy was issued for its interpretation, unless such an interpretation would upset Illinois public policy. Hofeld v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 59 Ill.2d 522, 528, 322 N.E.2d 454 (1975); Jadcazak v. Modern Serv. Ins. Co., 151 Ill. App.3d 589, 593, 104 Ill.Dec. 932, 503 N.E.2d 794 (1st Dist. 1987); Thieme v. Union Labor Life Ins. Co., 12 Ill. App.2d 110, 112-113, 138 N.E.2d 857 (1st Dist. 1956). Since the policy was issued in Minnesota, where Beltmann is incorporated and has its principal place of business, Minnesota law governs what the term "actual malice" means. After ascertaining what actual malice means in this context, a proper analysis reverts to Illinois law, because Illinois is where the alleged tort occurred and where the underlying tort action was filed, to determine whether that meaning of actual malice is incorporated, explicitly of implicitly, in the elements for retaliatory discharge under Illinois law.

However, Illinois courts have recognized that "where the certificate varies in substance from the terms of the master policy it forms a part of the contract of insurance." Thieme v. Union Labor Life Ins. Co., 12 Ill. App.2d 110, 114, 138 N.E.2d 857, 859 (1st Dist. 1956); see also Hofeld, 59 Ill.2d at 527, 322 N.E.2d at 457 (stating that if the certificate "contains provisions conflicting with those in the master policy, the certificate normally will be held to control. Courts have so held either under the theory that the certificates are a part of the total contract under the particular language of the certificate or on the theory of estoppel."). The Illinois Supreme Court applied these rules to the conflict of laws question involving a group policy as follows:

Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 1021-1022, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941) teaches Illinois choice of law rules apply to this diversity-of-citizenship action. When an insurance contract covers risks in several states and contains no choice of law provision, Illinois courts generally look to the law of the state of the policy's issuance in interpreting the policy ( Thieme v. Union Labor Life Insurance Co., 12 Ill. App.2d 110, 112-13, 138 N.E.2d 857, 858-59 (1st Dist. 1956)). But when the public policy of Illinois prohibits the enforcement of any contractual term, the very meaning of that concept is that such public policy overrides the contract in that respect. Indeed, Thieme itself recognizes that limitation, for the law review article it characterizes as "well-reasoned," and from which it quotes the operative rule derived "from a summary of Illinois conflicts of law cases," says this ( id., emphasis added):

Counsel for both sides concede that on the facts presented here the West Virginia Court would be confronted with the choice of applying either the law of this state or the law of the District of Columbia. Some states have applied the law of the state in which the master policy was delivered, while others have applied the law of the state in which delivery of the certificate was effected. Boseman v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 301 U.S. 196, 57 S.Ct. 686, 81 L.Ed. 1036 (1937), is the leading case in the first line of decisions while Thieme v. Union Labor Life Ins. Co., 12 Ill.App.2d 110, 138 N.E.2d 857, and Coleman v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 261 F.2d 296 (7th Cir. 1958), are representative of the latter line. Assuming the West Virginia Court elected to apply the law of the District of Columbia, it would find no case law in that jurisdiction dispositive of the substantive issue. Under the circumstances it would be presumed that the law of the District would be the same as that of the forum, see Vigderman v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 802 (D.C.E.D.Pa. 1959); Restatement, Conflicts § 622; and the holding in Morris v. Missouri State Life Insurance Co., supra, would apply.

It is generally held that such contracts are made where the master policy and the individual certificate are delivered. Burns v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 234 Mo. App. 1207, 123 S.W.2d 185 (1939); Murphy v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 197 S.C. 393, 15 S.E.2d 646 (1941). Where the master policy is delivered in one State and the certificate in another, the courts go both ways. E. g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 101 F. Supp. 808 (E.D.La. 1951) (law of place where master policy delivered controls); Thieme v. Union Labor Life Ins. Co., 12 Ill.App. 2d 110, 138 N.E.2d 857 (1956) (law of place where certificate delivered controls). Without deciding which rule Kansas would follow, I shall apply the law of Illinois because it is the only State with which any connection is shown.

On the other hand, Black's Law Dictionary defines a "policy" in the relevant sense as "[a] document containing a contract of insurance." Black's Law Dictionary 1196 (8th ed.2004) (emphases added); accord United Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. McCrory, 414 F.2d 928, 932-33 (8th Cir. 1969); S.E. Colo. Homeless Ctr. v. West, 843 P.2d 117, 118 (Colo.Ct.App. 1992); Maurer v. Int'l Re-Ins. Corp., 86 A.2d 360, 365 (Del. 1952); Maurer v. Int'l Re-Ins. Corp., 31 Del.Ch. 352, 360, 74 A.2d 822, (Del. 1950); Fontenot v. Marquette Cos. Co., 235 So.2d 631, 637 (La.Ct.App. 1970); In re Casey, 540 N.W.2d 854, 857 (Minn.Gt.App. 1995); Floars v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 144 N.C. 232, 56 S.E. 915, 916 (1907); Banfield v. Allstate Ins. Co., 152 N.H. 491, 880 A.2d 373, 376 (2005); Hunt v. N.H. Fire Underwriters' Ass'n, 68 N.H. 305, 38 A. 145, 147 (1895); see also Thieme v. Union Labor Life Ins. Co., 12 Ill.App.2d 110, 138 N.E.2d 857, 860 (1956); Francis v. Tex. Pac. Ry. Employees Hosp. Ass'n, 148 So.2d 118, 120 (La.Ct.App. 1963); Hurd v. Me. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 139 Me. 103, 27 A.2d 918, 922 (1942); Anderson v. N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 443 N.W.2d 546, 549 (Minn.Ct.App. 1989); Delcampo v. N.J. Auto. Full Ins. Underwriting Ass'n, 266 N.J.Super. 687, 630 A.2d 415, 421-22 (1993) (quoting Meier v. N.J. Life Ins. Co., 195 N.J.Super. 478, 480 A.2d 919, 923 (1984)); Modisette v. Found. Reserve Ins. Co., 77 N.M. 661, 427 P.2d 21, 25 (N.M. 1967); Bergmann v. Hutton, 337 Or. 596,101 P.3d 353, 358 (2004); Ellis v. R.I. Pub. Transit Auth, 586 A.2d 1055, 1058 (R.I. 1991). Furthermore, whereas the legislature enunciated that a certificate policy "shall be deemed a policy for the purposes of [the Insurance Code, HRS ch. 431]," the legislature did not similarly categorize assigned claims.