Opinion
Civ. No. 99-1408, SECTION "N".
January 20, 2000.
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Plaintiff Rodney R. Thibodeaux's Motion for Reconsideration of Order Granting Motion as Unopposed and Defendants Darlene Watson's and Cheryl Boty's Motion to Dismiss. For the following reasons, Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss are GRANTED. Additionally, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims and therefore DISMISSES all of plaintiff's claims.
A. BACKGROUND
This case arises from an investigation of alleged child abuse conducted by two employees of the Louisiana Department of Social Services, Office of Community Services (OCS). Plaintiff Rodney R. Thibodeaux alleges that the OCS employees Darlene Watson and Cheryl Boty forbade him to see his minor children and thereby violated his constitutionally-protected family liberty interest and his rights to procedural due process and inflicted emotional distress on him. Defendants Watson and Boty move to dismiss Thibodeaux's § 1983 claim on the basis of qualified immunity or, alternatively, on the basis of the Parrat/Hudson doctrine.
As is required by Federal Rule of Federal Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the following allegations from the Complaint are taken as true.
On February 27, 1996 Rodney R. and Natasha K. Thibodeaux divorced. As part of the divorce judgment, which was rendered by the 24th Judicial District Court for Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, Mr. Thibodeaux was awarded joint custody of the couple's two minor children. Although Ms. Thibodeaux was named as domiciliary parent, this designation was specifically subject to Mr. Thibodeaux' s right to "reasonable visitation."
Mr. Thibodeaux alleges that, beginning at the end of May 1998 and continuing systematically, Darlene Watson and Cheryl Boty, in their capacity as employees of the Louisiana Department of Social Services, Office of Community Services (OCS), forbade him to see his minor children "on the basis of unsubstantiated and unfounded allegations of sexual abuse." Mr. Thibodeaux further alleges that he was afforded neither a pre- nor a post-deprivation hearing of any type for approximately seven months following Watson's and Boty's actions.
Complaint ¶¶ VIII-IX. Mr. Thibodeaux does not allege in detail the form or the specific substance of this interdict.
On May 6, 1999, Mr. Thibodeaux brought suit in this court, asserting two causes of action against Watson and Boty. Mr. Thibodeaux' s first claim, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleges that Watson and Boty "conspired to deprive" him of his "fundamental liberty interest and freedom of personal choice in matters of family life" and failed to provide him with the procedural due process to which he was entitled for seven months. Mr. Thibodeaux's second claim, grounded in Louisiana tort law, alleges that Watson and Boty intentionally or negligently inflicted emotional distress on him. Jurisdiction for these claims is premised, respectively, on federal question jurisdiction and supplemental jurisdiction.
Complaint ¶ VIII.
Complaint ¶ X.
Id.
B. LAW AND ANALYSIS 1. Motion for Reconsideration
Rather than answering Mr. Thibodeaux's Complaint, defendants Watson and Boty filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can be Granted. Because Mr. Thibodeaux did not file a timely opposition, the Court granted the motion to dismiss as unopposed. Mr. Thibodeaux now timely moves for reconsideration of that order, and defendants do not oppose reconsideration. The Court will grant Mr. Thibodeaux' s motion and will reconsider defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
See Order October 1, 1999. Local Rule 7.5E requires that memoranda in opposition to a motion be filed and a copy be delivered to chambers eight days prior to the date set for hearing of the motion.
2. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
Watson and Boty have moved to dismiss Thibodeaux's § 1983 claim on the basis of qualified immunity or, alternatively, on the basis of the Parrat/Hudson doctrine. As more fully set forth below, the Court finds that the defendants are protected by qualified immunity and accordingly dismisses Thibodeaux's § 1983 claim without considering defendant's Parrat/Hudson defense. But first a word on the applicable standard of review.
In determining whether the Court should grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must "accept all well-pleaded facts as true, and . . . view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Capital Parks, Inc. v. Southeastern Adver. Sales Sys., Inc., 30 F.3d 627, 629 (5th Cir. 1994). Dismissal is justified "only if it appears that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proven consistent with the allegations." Id. (citation omitted). Conclusory allegations or legal conclusions appearing as factual conclusions are insufficient to prevent dismissal for failure to state a claim. See Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993). In the instant dispute, if the Court finds that defendants Watson and Boty are entitled to qualified immunity, then Thibodeaux will be unable to obtain relief on his § 1983 claim and a 12(b)(6) dismissal will therefore be appropriate.
The Fifth Circuit has held that child care workers are entitled to qualified immunity in the performance of discretionary, nonprosecutorial functions. Doe v. Louisiana, 2 F.3d 1412, 1416 (5th Cir. 1993). To determine whether an individual child care worker is protected by qualified immunity, courts generally must consider (1) whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a clearly established constitutional right and (2) whether the defendants' conduct was objectively reasonable. See Kiser v. Garrett, 67 F.3d 1166, 1170 (5th Cir. 1995).
In the instant case, the parties have focused only on the first prong of this two-part inquiry and the Court need determine only whether Thibodeaux's "family liberty interest" was a "clearly established" constitutional right in 1998. Watson and Boty argue succinctly that "[g]iven the nebulous nature of the right to `family integrity' — which is measured on a case-by-case basis by a constitutional balancing test — the contours of the right are not sufficiently particularized that a reasonable state official in the position of defendants would have realized that her conduct violated that right." Accordingly, they argue, "[i]n the absence of such a clearly established constitutional right, defendants cannot be stripped of their immunity from suit as a matter of law." Defendants' argument is premised largely on a series of similar cases — Hodorowski v. Ray, 844 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1988), Doe v. Louisiana, 2 F.3d 1214 (5th Cir. 1993), andKiser v. Garrett, 67 F.3d 1166 (5th Cir. 1995) — in which the Fifth Circuit found child care workers entitled to qualified immunity on the basis that the contours of the right to family integrity are not clearly established.
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss p. 3.
Id. (emphasis in original).
While Thibodeaux concedes the holdings of these Fifth Circuit cases, he argues that "subsequent jurisprudence has found the right to family integrity to be clearly established." In particular, Thibodeaux cites Ram v. Rubin, 118 F.3d 1306 (9th Cir. 1997), in which the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's finding on summary judgment that certain child protection workers were entitled to qualified immunity, and Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 954 F. Supp. 1056, 1061 (E.D. Pa. 1997), in which the district judge stated that "the initiation of child custody proceedings by ex parte order provides constitutionally adequate procedural due process, so long as the state provides a prompt post-deprivation hearing." Thibodeaux also attempts to distinguish this case on the basis that the Fifth Circuit cases dealt with substantive rather than procedural due process.
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss p. 6.
In ruling upon Watson's and Boty's motion, the Court first notes the striking similarity between the instant case and another case in this District, Davis v. Evans, 1999 WL 544689 (E.D. La. July 26, 1999), decided just a few months ago by Judge Berrigan. In Davis, the plaintiff and his wife divorced in 1994 after 12 years of marriage, and the plaintiff received visitation rights to all four of his children. In March of 1996, two OCS social workers began an investigation into allegations that the plaintiff had sexually abused two of his daughters. At some point after commencement of the investigation, one of the social workers instructed plaintiff to stop all unsupervised visits during the investigation. In March 1997, the plaintiff filed suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Louisiana law. The plaintiff's § 1983 claim was based on the allegation that the two OCS workers, in their capacity as state actors, violated his constitutional right to freedom of personal choice in the matters of family life by interfering with his joint custody of and visitation rights with his four minor children. The plaintiff alleged both substantive and procedural due process violations. The defendants moved to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity.
In arguing their positions before Judge Berrigan, the plaintiff and defendants in Davis presented arguments that are substantially identical to the arguments presented in the instant case: the defendants argued that Fifth Circuit case law demonstrates that the right to family integrity is not "clearly established", while the plaintiff asserted that Ram v. Rubin andMiller v. City of Philadelphia demonstrate the opposite. TheDavis plaintiff also attempted to distinguish his claims from the Fifth Circuit cases by emphasizing the distinction between substantive and procedural due process.
The district court's decision in Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 954 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D. Pa. 1997) was affirmed inMiller v. City of Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 368 (3d Cir. 1999). Judge Berrigan addressed the latter in Davis.
In a well-reasoned and thoroughly-researched opinion, Judge Berrigan held that the defendants
did not violate a clearly established right when, in the course of investigating allegations that [the plaintiff] sexually abused his daughters, they told [him] he could not visit his children without supervision. Although the defendants may have violated Davis's constitutional right to family integrity, the right is not sufficiently particularized so that they would understand that their actions violated that right.Davis at *4. In so ruling, Judge Berrigan rejected the plaintiff's interpretation of Ram and Miller and pointed out that, contrary to the plaintiff's contentions, the Fifth Circuit cases addressed both procedural and substantive due process claims.
Having reviewed the Davis case, the Court agrees with Judge Berrigan's reasoning and adopts it in the instant matter. Thus, the Court concludes that Watson and Boty did not violate a clearly established right when, in the course of investigating allegations that Thibodeaux sexually abused his children, they forbade him to see his minor children.
Plaintiff notes that the Davis decision is currently on appeal. Although the Fifth Circuit may eventually disagree, this Court believes that Judge Berrigan correctly interpreted the applicable law and thus adopts her conclusions without reservation.
To reinforce this conclusion, the Court wishes to point out the recent decision of Morris v. Dearborne, 181 F.3d 657 (1999), in which a panel of the Fifth Circuit had reason to re-visit the holdings in Hodorowski v. Ray, 844 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1988), Doe v. Louisiana, 2 F.3d 1214 (5th Cir. 1993), and Kiser v. Garrett, 67 F.3d 1166 (5th Cir. 1995). Addressing the disputed actions of a school teacher in ferreting out suspected child abuse, the court first noted that, although the right to family integrity is constitutionally protected, states "can adopt necessary policies to protect the health, safety, and welfare of children." Morris, 181 F.3d at 669. In particular, "[w]here a parent has mistreated a child, the state may intervene to protect the child, including, when necessary, separating the child from the parents or even permanently terminating the parent-child relationship." Id. The Court acknowledged the difficulty in determining the appropriate balance between the family's interest in its privacy on the one hand and the state interest in protecting children (and the corresponding need for independence for social workers charged with investigating child abuse) on the other. Id. at 670. According to the court, claims of undue government interference into family life are properly addressed along a continuum:
Cases claiming governmental interference with the right of family integrity are properly analyzed by placing them, on a case by case basis, along a continuum between the state's clear interest in protecting children and a family s clear interest in privacy. When the facts of a case place it in the center of the continuum where the two interests overlap and create a tension, the right to family integrity may properly be characterized as nebulous, and thus a defendant may claim the protection of qualified immunity. However, when the facts of a case place it squarely on the end of the continuum where the state s interest is negligible and where the family privacy right is well developed in jurisprudence from this circuit and the Supreme Court, a defendant's defense of qualified immunity, based on a claim that the right to family integrity was not clearly established, will fail.Id. at 671. The court placed the claims in Hodorowski, Doe, andKiser "close between the rule" of family privacy and "the exception" of governmental intervention; in such a situation, social workers are entitled to qualified immunity. Id. In the instant dispute, the Court finds that Thibodeaux's claim falls much closer to the state interest side of the continuum than did the claims of the plaintiffs in Hodorowski and Doe, as Thibodeaux alleges only that Watson and Boty "forbade" him from visiting his children; such an action is a far cry from the physical removal of a child from a household at issue in Hodorowski and Doe.
Thus, because the right at issue was nebulous in 1998, the Court concludes that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and plaintiff's § 1983 claim must be dismissed.
3. State Law Claims
In addition to raising a § 1983 claim, Thibodeaux has raised a state negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, over which the Court has supplemental jurisdiction. As Thibodeaux points out, "Ms. Watson and Ms. Boty have presented no argument concerning" these claims. Thus, despite the Court's October 1, 1999 Order dismissing the entire suit, the Court cannot dismiss Thibodeaux's state law claims on the merits. It can and will, however, decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) over what is, at its essence, a state matter. Accordingly, plaintiff's state law claims are dismissed without prejudice.
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss p. 11.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the district court "may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . [it] has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction".
C. CONCLUSION
Because plaintiff Rodney R. Thibodeaux did not have a clearly established right to family liberty on the facts set forth in his complaint, the Court finds that defendants Darlene Watson and Cheryl Boty are entitled to qualified immunity and that Thibodeaux's § 1983 claim must be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims.
For the reasons set forth above,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and that Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 20th day of January, 2000.