(See Dorsey v. Barba (1952) 38 Cal.2d 350, 356 [ 240 P.2d 604], overruled on other grounds in Jehl v. Southern Pac. Co. (1967) 66 Cal.2d 821, 828 [ 59 Cal.Rptr. 276, 427 P.2d 988].) Unless waived (see Thibeault v. Brown (1942) 92 N.H. 235 [ 29 A.2d 461, 462]), that right includes the determination of all facts properly at issue and presented by the evidence necessary to determine the aggregate award. Thus, it would appear plaintiffs upon joint request should be entitled to jury apportionment if the jury has been presented the case in a fashion requiring it to determine the damages sustained by each plaintiff before arriving at the aggregate award.

Those cases attempting to spell out New Hampshire's approach to damages in wrongful death actions are silent on the precise question of whether taxes are to be taken into account. Thibeault v. Brown, 92 N.H. 235, 29 A.2d 461 (1942); Humphreys v. Ash, 90 N.H. 223, 6 A.2d 436 (1939). This court has followed the majority rule before, Kennett, supra, and we see no reason why the majority rule should not be followed here.

A careful reading of prior decisions of this court leads us to doubt that any element of damages other than loss of earning capacity was ever intended to be discounted. See Burke v. Burnham, 97 N.H. 203, 209, 84 A.2d 918, 923 (1951); Adams v. Severance, 93 N.H. 289, 292, 41 A.2d 233, 236 (1945); Thibeault v. Brown, 92 N.H. 235, 236-38, 29 A.2d 461, 462-63 (1942). In any event, we now hold that the amount of damages not attributable to the deceased's lost earning capacity should not be discounted and that the trial judge did not err in refusing to discount that portion of the verdict relating to the deceased's physical and mental pain and suffering.

The defendant contends also that the court erred in allowing the jury to determine the life expectancy of Lawrence Bromfield without the introduction of expectancy tables. Although expectancy tables are admissible and may be considered by a jury (Russell v. Stores, 96 N.H. 471, 79 A.2d 573 (1951); Watkins v. Holmes, 93 N.H. 53, 35 A.2d 395 (1943); Thibeault v. Brown, 92 N.H. 235, 29 A.2d 461 (1942)), they are not required. Raskus v. Allegheny Val. St. Ry. Co., 302 Pa. 34, 153 A. 117 (1930); Marendino v. Spitz, 121 N.J.L. 556, 3 A.2d 601 (1939); 30 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 1112 (1967). There was evidence of the decedent's health before the accident and of his work habits and expert evidence of his probable work expectancy.

Before the amendment of 1963, it was not unusual lot counsel in argument, or the court in instructing the jury, to inform the jury of the statutory limitation upon recovery. See Thibeault v. Brown, 92 N.H. 235, 237. Such a practice appears to have the sanction of the weight of authority, so long as the limitation is clearly stated to be a limit upon the recoverable amount and not a measure for the assessment of damages by the jury.

The present worth of a sum payable in the future is generally said to be, in substance, such sum as put at interest at the legal rate would amount to the sum named at the end of the future period. Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Geher, 9 Cir., 50 F.2d 657, 659, 660; Rivers v. Bay City Traction Elec. Co., 164 Mich. 696, 128 N.W. 254, 259, 131 N.W. 86; Thibeault v. Brown, 92 N.H. 235, 29 A.2d 461, 462. In In re Estate of Wickham, supra, 241 Iowa 198, 199, 201-203, 40 N.W.2d 469, 470, the estate was appraised at testator's death, the tax was paid on the life estate but on the remainder interests it was deferred until the life tenant's death.

These tables appear to be based on the so-called compound interest, that is to say the discounts taken for the various years are invested and kept invested. See Thibeault v. Brown, 92 N.H. 235, 29 A.2d 461. A conservative method of finding the present worth of future payments is by taking a straight discount, proportionate to the number of years.

The decedent's right of recovery against the defendant was diminished when the payment was received. The cause of action which survived the decedent was a right to recover the present worth (Thibeault v. Brown, 92 N.H. 235, 236) of the total damages occasioned by the injury, reduced before death by the amount paid her in partial satisfaction. It is the unpaid balance surviving the decedent as thus determined to which the statutory limit applies. "The statute . . . merely establishes a limit to the recoverable damages, although in fact the actual damage may exceed the statutory limit."