Opinion
2:02-CV-0326
January 17, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiff PAUL THIAS, while a prisoner incarcerated in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, has filed suit pursuant to Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983 complaining against the above-referenced defendants and has been granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis.
Plaintiff complains that, on November 1, 2001, he was found guilty of a disciplinary violation and received solitary confinement as a result. In preparation for such solitary confinement, most of plaintiff's personal property was taken and inventoried by an officer and plaintiff was given a personal property receipt. Before his release from solitary confinement, plaintiff was transferred from the Neal Unit to the Ellis I Unit, and the remainder of his personal property was taken and inventoried, except for the hygiene and writing supplies plaintiff was allowed to take with him.
Upon his November 12, 2001, arrival at the Ellis I Unit, plaintiff was assigned to medium custody and submitted an 1-60 request inquiring when he would received his personal property from the Neal Unit.
Ultimately, plaintiff received only part of his property and his attempts to obtain a remedy through the grievance system were not successful. Instead, plaintiff asserts, his due process rights were violated because no reasonable attempt was made to investigate and resolve his complaint in compliance with prison rules and regulations.
Plaintiff requests monetary relief, both compensatory and punitive, as well as injunctive relief in the form of a reform of the grievance system.
JUDICIAL REVIEW
When a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity, the Court must evaluate the complaint and dismiss it without service of process, Ali v. Higgs, 892 F.2d 438, 440 (5th Cir. 1990), if it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The same standards will support dismissal of a suit brought under any federal law by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility, where such suit concerns prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1). A Spears hearing need not be conducted for every pro se complaint. Wilson v. Barrientos, 926 F.2d 480, 483 n. 4 (5th Cir. 1991). The District Judge has reviewed plaintiffs pleadings and has viewed the facts alleged by plaintiff in his complaint to determine if his claims present grounds for dismissal or should proceed to answer by defendants.
A claim is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact, Booker v. Koonce, 2 F.3d 114, 115 (5th Cir. 1993); see, Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 1733, 118 L.Ed.2d 340 (1992).
Cf, Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1120 (5th Cir. 1986) ("Of course, our discussion of Spears should not be interpreted to mean that all or even most prisoner claims require or deserve a Spears hearing. A district court should be able to dismiss as frivolous a significant number of prisoner suits on the complaint alone or the complaint together with the Watson questionnaire.").
THE LAW AND ANALYSIS
Plaintiff sues defendant HAMMER, the unit property officer, in her individual capacity, claiming she is responsible for the day to day managerial operations of the unit's offender property section. Plaintiff sues defendant COLE in his individual capacity, alleging he is responsible for the day-to-day managerial operations of the Neal unit. Plaintiff sues defendant LIGHTSEY in his individual capacity and defendant CLENDENNEN in his official capacity, each based on his responsibility for managing or supervising the Offender Grievance Program.
It is clear that plaintiff's claim against each defendant is based on that defendant's supervisory position and not on any personal involvement with plaintiff's property or grievances; however, the acts of subordinates trigger no individual section 1983 liability for supervisory officers. Champagne v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office, 188 F.3d 312, 314(5th Cir. 1999). A supervisory official may be held liable only when he is either personally involved in the acts causing the deprivation of a person's constitutional rights, or there is a sufficient causal connection between the official's act and the constitutional violation sought to be redressed. Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1987); Douthit v. Jones, 641 F.2d 345, 346 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam). Plaintiff has alleged no fact demonstrating personal involvement by these officials and has alleged no fact showing any causal connection between their acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional violation. Consequently, plaintiff's allegations against these defendants, both with respect to his property loss and the handling of his grievances, fail to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
Moreover, to the extent plaintiff sues defendant LIGHTSEY for his handling of plaintiff's step 1 grievance submitted February 4, 2002 or defendant CLENDENNEN for any part he may have played in the handling of plaintiff's step 2 grievances, the narrowing of prisoner due process protection announced in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995), leaves plaintiff without a federally-protected right to have his grievances investigated and resolved. Any right of that nature is grounded in state law or regulation and the mere failure of an official to follow state law or regulation, without more, does not violate constitutional minima. See, e.g., Murray v. Mississippi Dept. of Corrections, 911 F.2d 1167, 1168 (5th Cir. 1990); Ramirez v. Ahn, 843 F.2d 864, 867 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1085, 109 S.Ct. 1545, 103 L.Ed.2d 849 (1989); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146-47, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2695-2696, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979). Thus, these claims against defendants LIGHTSEY and CLENDENNEN lack an arguable basis in law and are frivolous. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989).
Finally, although plaintiff does not allege any of the named defendants was personally involved with the handling of his property, plaintiff's contentions resemble tort claims for negligence; however, section 1983 imposes liability for deprivation of constitutionally protected rights, not for violations of tort duties of care. Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427, 1435 (5th Cir. 1990); see, also, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331-34, 106 S.Ct. 662, 664-67, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986); Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1993)("negligent medical care does not constitute a valid section 1983 claim"). Consequently, plaintiff's claims lack an arguable basis in law and are frivolous. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989).
CONCLUSION
Pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, sections 1915A and 1915(e)(2), as well as Title 42, United States Code, section 1997e(c)(1),
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Civil Rights Complaint filed pursuant to Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983, by plaintiff PAUL THIAS is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AS FRIVOLOUS AND FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM ON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
A copy of this Order shall be mailed to plaintiff and to any attorney of record by first class mail. The Clerk shall also mail copies of this Order of Dismissal to TDCJ-Office of the General Counsel, P.O. Box 13084, Austin, TX 78711; and to the Pro Se Clerk at the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Tyler Division.
IT IS SO ORDERED.