Opinion
Civil Action 1:20-cv-003007-WJM-SKC
02-22-2022
EMMANUEL C. THEUS-ROBERTS, Plaintiff, v. DEAN WILLIAMS, JOAN CARSON, Defendants.
RECOMMENDATION RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS [DKT. 26]
S. Kato Crews United States Magistrate Judge
This Recommendation addresses Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (“Motion”). [Dkt. 26]. District Judge Martinez referred the Motion to the Magistrate Judge. [Dkt. 42.] The Court has reviewed the Motion and related briefing. No hearing is needed. For the following reasons, the Court recommends the Motion be GRANTED.
The Court accepts the well-pleaded facts as true and views the allegations in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Casanova v. Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120, 112425 (10th Cir. 2010). Moreover, Plaintiff is pro se. Therefore, the Court must liberally construe the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint without acting as his advocate. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
Plaintiff is an incarcerated person who has recently gone through several prison transfers. When he first filed his Complaint, he was housed at the Colorado State Penitentiary (“CSP”). [Dkt. 1-2, p.1.] Sometime after he filed his original complaint, he was transferred to the Sterling Correctional Facility (“Sterling”). [Dkt. 11, p. 10.] While at Sterling, he filed his Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 complaining about the conditions of his confinement when at CSP. [See generally, Id.] Specifically, he alleged he was denied access to college-level academic programs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. [Id. p. 4.] He sued Defendants alleging they promulgated Administrative Regulation 500-01, which he claims discriminates against certain classifications of persons detained at the CSP. [Id.] The SAC seeks prospective declaratory and injunctive relief. [Id. at 7-8.]
Defendants filed their Motion arguing mootness and, alternatively, dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). [Dkt. 26.] Plaintiff was then returned to CSP, but he has since been transferred to an out-of-state prison. He presently resides at the Indiana Department of Correction, Reception - Diagnostic Center. [Dkt. 58.]
The Court takes judicial notice of the record and notes Plaintiff was transferred to Indiana after Defendants filed their Motion. [Dkt. 58.] While Defendants' mootness arguments were directed to Plaintiff's transfer to Sterling, the Court considers them here in light of his recent move to Indiana.
B. LEGAL STANDARDS
Defendants seek dismissal of the SAC under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
Rule 12(b)(1) is the appropriate rule to challenge subject matter jurisdiction. Satterfield v. Malloy, 700 F.3d 1231, 1234 (10th Cir. 2012). Federal courts have limited jurisdiction. As such, there must be a specific legal basis for their jurisdiction. See Morris v. City of Hobart, 39 F.3d 1105, 1111 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing Castaneda v. INS, 23 F.3d 1576, 1580 (10th Cir. 1994)).
The determination of a court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law. Madsen v. U.S. ex rel. U.S. Army, Corps of Eng'rs, 841 F.2d 1011, 1012 (10th Cir. 1987). “A court lacking jurisdiction cannot render judgment but must dismiss the cause at any stage of the proceedings in which it becomes apparent that jurisdiction is lacking.” Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 1974).
When reviewing a factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction, a district court may not presume the truthfulness of the complaint's factual allegations. A court has wide discretion to allow affidavits, other documents, and a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed jurisdictional facts under Rule 12(b)(1). In such instances, a court's reference to evidence outside the pleadings does not convert the motion to a Rule 56 motion.Holt v. United States, 46 F.3d 1000, 1003 (10th Cir. 1995). “The burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction is on the party asserting jurisdiction.” Montoya v. Chao, 296 F.3d 952, 955 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)).
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The Twombly-Iqbal pleading standard requires that courts take a two-prong approach to evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 (2007). The first prong requires the court to identify which allegations “are not entitled to the assumption of truth” because, for example, they state legal conclusions or are mere “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The second prong requires the court to assume the truth of the well-pleaded factual allegations “and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679. “Accordingly, in examining a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), [courts] will disregard conclusory statements and look only to whether the remaining, factual allegations plausibly suggest the defendant is liable.” Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir. 2012).
To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted). A claim is plausible when the plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. This standard requires more than the sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Id. If the allegations “are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent, then the plaintiffs ‘have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.'” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The standard is a liberal one, and “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Dias v. City & Cty. of Denver, 567 F.3d 1169, 1178 (10th Cir. 2009).
C. DISCUSSION
In their Motion, Defendants argue Plaintiff's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief should be denied for mootness. [Dkt. 26, pp. 4-5.] The Court agrees and recommends Defendant's Motion be granted on this basis.
“The mootness doctrine provides that although there may be an actual and justiciable controversy at the time the litigation is commenced, once that controversy ceases to exist, the federal court must dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.” Jordan v. Sosa, 654 F.3d 1012, 1023 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing 15 James W. Moore & Martin H. Redish, Moore's Federal Practice § 101.90, at 101-237 (3d ed. 2010)). When considering the mootness of injunctive relief, a justiciable controversy over such relief will be deemed to no longer exist “unless [a plaintiff] can demonstrate a good chance of being likewise injured [by the defendant] in the future.” Facio v. Jones, 929 F.2d 541, 544 (10th Cir. 1991). The key consideration is a plaintiff's vulnerability to suffering further injury from a defendant's actions. Jordan, 654 F.3d at 1025 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Where a plaintiff seeks an injunction, his susceptibility to continuing injury is of particular importance[.]”). “Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.” O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974).
Similarly, in the context of an action for declaratory relief, a plaintiff must be seeking more than a retrospective opinion that he was wrongly harmed by the defendant. Jordan, 654 F.3d at 1025. When the mootness doctrine is applied in the declaratory judgment context, it is well established that what makes a declaratory judgment action proper for judicial resolution is the settling of some dispute that affects the behavior of the defendant toward the plaintiff. Id.
As applied here, Defendants' oversight extends only to Colorado statepenitentiaries. Plaintiff presently resides outside the Court's jurisdiction in Indiana. When an incarcerated person's claims for declaratory or injunctive relief relate solely to the conditions of confinement at the penal institution at which he is no longer housed, courts have concluded that they are unable to provide the incarcerated person with effective relief. Id . at 1027. Consequently, “courts have routinely dismissed such penitentiary-specific conditions-of-confinement claims as moot.” Id.; see also Green v. Branson, 108 F.3d 1296, 1299-1300 (10th Cir.1997) (inmate's release from prison facility mooted his claims for equitable relief); accord Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985) (prisoner's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief concerning prison conditions were moot where prisoner had been moved to another prison unit); Inmates v. Owens, 561 F.2d 560, 562 (4th Cir. 1977) (injunctive relief should be denied when there is no longer a substantial controversy between the former inmate and prison officials of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of either injunctive or declaratory relief). For these reasons the Court recommends granting Defendants' Motion.
In his Response, Plaintiff argues, citing Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, that “courts are disinclined to rule moot a ‘challenge to general policies of [sic] prison system' even after the incarcerated person's transfer.” [Dkt. 32, p. 2.] However, the facts here are distinguishable from those in Abdulhaseeb. There, plaintiff sued the Director of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections (ODOC) who was the final policymaking authority, and plaintiff remained incarcerated in ODOC's custody and subject to its policy. Id. at 1312. But here, Plaintiff is no longer in CDOC custody and Defendants have no policymaking authority extending to Indiana's state penitentiaries where Plaintiff now resides. [See, Dkt. 11, pp.2-3.] Thus, the Court cannot “accord [him] prospective relief that would have any effect in the real world.” Jordan, 654 F.3d at 1026. This is also true as to Plaintiff's claims for declaratory relief. Id.
Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301, 1311 (10th Cir. 2010).
Plaintiff also argues that his claims are not moot because they are “capable of repetition.” [Dkt. 32, p. 2.] Where the issue is deemed a wrong capable of repetition yet evading review, the mootness doctrine is excepted. Ind v. Colo. Dep't of Corrections, 801 F.3d 1209, 1213-14 (10th Cir. 2015). But the exception is narrow and the plaintiff bears the burden in such exceptional situations. Id. at 1215 (citing Jordan, 654 F.3d at 1035). To avail himself of the exception, a plaintiff must establish: “(1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same claiming party will be subjected to the same action again.” Id. (citing Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975) (internal quotes omitted).
Plaintiff has not shown that in the event he is transferred back to the Colorado state penitentiary system that “there would be insufficient time for him to obtain review of his claim in federal court.” Ind, 801 F.3d at 1215. See also Wyoming v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 674 F.3d 1220, 1229 (10th Cir. 2012) (the capable of repetition inquiry turns on whether something inherent exits in the nature or structure of the governmental action that makes it necessarily short of duration). Moreover, Plaintiff would have be treated the same way - classified the same and apply and be denied access to the same college-level programs. The Court finds this too far removed from a live harm capable of repetition. Ind, 801 F.3d at 1215. Accordingly, this Court recommends finding that Plaintiff's claims for relief are moot and FURTHER RECOMMENDS GRANTING Defendants' Motion in its entirety.
Because the Court recommends granting Defendants' Motion on grounds of mootness, it does not address Defendants' arguments under Rule 12(b)(6).
The parties have 14 days after service of this recommendation to serve and file any written objections in order to obtain reconsideration by the District Judge to whom this case is assigned. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). The party filing objections must specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which the objections are made. The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusive or general objections. A party's failure to file such written objections to proposed findings and recommendations contained in this report may bar the party from a de novo determination by the District Judge of the proposed findings and recommendations. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676-83 (1980); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Additionally, the failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations within 14 days after being served with a copy may bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge that are accepted or adopted by the District Court. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985); Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).