" Southern Co. v. Hamburg, 220 Ga. App. 834, 842 (5), supra. See Pure Oil Co. v. Dukes, 107 Ga. App. 326, 327 (3), 328 ( 130 S.E.2d 234). With this view in mind, and since it appears from the trial transcript that Gloria A. Alday testified not from her own recollection but almost exclusively from Allgood's attorney's billing sheets, I find it appropriate to clarify confusion arising from this Court's holdings in Santora v. American Combustion, 225 Ga. App. 771, 774 (3), 775-776 ( 485 S.E.2d 34), and N.D.T., Inc. v. Connor, 196 Ga. App. 314, 315 (6), 316 ( 395 S.E.2d 901), regarding the admissibility of attorney billing sheets under Georgia's Business Records exception to the hearsay rule, OCGA § 24-3-14. Compare Oden v. Legacy Ford-Mercury, 222 Ga. App. 666, 669 (3) ( 476 S.E.2d 43).
" Jones v. Spindel, 143 Ga. App. 341, 343(1) ( 238 S.E.2d 703). Plaintiff contends that the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is not a proper procedural device by which defendant may seek to reduce the amount of the judgment awarded to plaintiff and plaintiff further argues that defendant's proper procedural vehicle would have been a motion for new trial. See Pure Oil Co. v. Dukes, 107 Ga. App. 326, 327 (2) ( 130 S.E.2d 234). Additionally, plaintiff argues that defendant has appealed "only from the trial court's denial of its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict."
While appellee was not required to prove its damages to the exact dollar, it was required to provide some rational basis of computation. See The Pure Oil Co. v. Dukes, 107 Ga. App. 326 ( 130 S.E.2d 234). This it failed to do. The trial court therefore erred in refusing to grant a new trial on these grounds. 3. The remaining grounds and enumerations need not be considered in light of the above holding.
McFarland v. Bradley, 82 Ga. App. 223 (4), 227 ( 60 S.E.2d 498), and cases cited; Georgia Power Co. v. Smith, 94 Ga. App. 166, 167 ( 94 S.E.2d 48). See also Pure Oil Co. v. Dukes, 107 Ga. App. 326, 328 ( 130 S.E.2d 234). The verdict, therefore, is not erroneous on the ground of excessiveness and should not be set aside on that ground.
This is the third appearance of this litigation in this court. See Pure Oil Co. v. Dukes, 101 Ga. App. 786 ( 115 S.E.2d 449), and Pure Oil Co. v. Dukes, 107 Ga. App. 326 ( 130 S.E.2d 234). From an examination of the opinions of this court on the two former appearances of this case it would sufficiently appear that this was an action for breach of an alleged lease contract entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant for the rental of an automobile service station located in Milledgeville, Georgia. Upon the retrial of the case the jury verdict was for the defendant. The plaintiff made a motion for a new trial on the general grounds and on seven special grounds which the trial court overruled, and the exception is to that judgment.
The measure of damages for breach of a lease is the difference between the fair market value of the unexpired term and the agreed rental. Pure Oil Co. v. Dukes, 107 Ga. App. 326 (3) ( 130 S.E.2d 324). While the agreed rental is easily ascertainable, there is no competent evidence of the fair market value of the unexpired term of the lease. 3. Cross-appellant Smart's allegation that there was no evidence to support the verdict and that the nominal damages awarded were excessive is also without merit.