Opinion
H051775
09-17-2024
THE PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SANTA CRUZ COUNTY, Respondent; JOSE LUIS RAMOS, Real Party in Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Cruz Super. Ct. No. 16CR08320
BROMBERG, J.
In July 2022, an analyst in the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) sent a letter to the Santa Cruz County Superior Court identifying a possible error in the abstract of judgment for an inmate, Jose Luis Ramos. In light of this letter, Ramos moved for full resentencing, which the trial court granted out of an abundance of caution. The Santa Cruz County District Attorney filed a petition for a writ of mandate, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant full resentencing. We agree and therefore issue a preemptory writ of mandate commanding the trial court to vacate its order granting Ramos' motion for resentencing and issue a new one denying the motion.
I. Background
In 2019, Ramos was convicted by a jury of murder, attempted murder with premeditation, and shooting at an occupied vehicle. Later that year, the trial court sentenced Ramos to a total of 90 years to life, including 15 years to life for the attempted murder. Ramos appealed, arguing, among other things, that the proper sentence for attempted murder was life with the possibility of parole. The Attorney General conceded this point, and in May 2021, this court reversed Ramos' judgment and remanded with directions to the trial court "to prepare an amended abstract of judgment correctly identifying the term for the attempted murder count as life with the possibility of parole." (People v. Ramos (May 25, 2021, H046895) [nonpub. opn.].) Four months later, the trial court amended the abstract of judgment, checking a box to indicate Ramos received a sentence of life with the possibility of parole on the attempted murder count. In addition, an accompanying minute order stated that the total sentence was 75 years to life.
In July 2022, a CDCR analyst sent a letter to the trial court stating that the amended abstract of judgment and the minute order "may be in error." In particular, the analyst asserted that a review of the counts and enhancements indicated a total term of 82, rather than 75, years to life. The letter therefore asked the trial court to "[p]lease review your file to determine if a correction is required." The letter made no mention of recalling the sentence or resentencing Ramos, and it did not mention what is now Penal Code section 1172.1. (See Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 9 [amending former Penal Code, § 1170 and renumbering it as Penal Code, § 1172.1].)
The trial court appointed the public defender's office to represent Ramos, and through counsel he moved for full resentencing. Over the district attorney's objection, the trial court granted Ramos' motion, explaining that it was doing so "[j]ust out of an abundance of caution."
The district attorney filed a petition for a writ of mandate, arguing that Ramos' sentence was lawful and the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hold a full resentencing hearing. On December 4, 2023, after receiving a preliminary opposition, this court issued an order staying the resentencing hearing as well as an alternative writ commanding the trial court to vacate the order granting defendant's motion for resentencing and to enter a new order denying the motion or to show cause why a preemptory writ of mandate should not be issued. The order also provided that, if the trial court did not comply with the alternative writ, Ramos could file a written return. The trial court did not comply, and Ramos filed a return.
II. Discussion
As a general rule, "a trial court is deprived of jurisdiction to resentence a criminal defendant once execution of the sentence has commenced." (People v. Karaman (1992) 4 Cal.4th 335, 344; see also Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 442, 455 [noting the "common law rule that the court loses resentencing jurisdiction once execution of sentence has begun"].) However, there are exceptions allowing resentencing where, among other things, a sentence unauthorized by law was imposed (People v. Codinha (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 976, 990 (Codinha)) or the Department of Corrections recommended resentencing (Penal Code, § 1170, subd. (d)(1)). (Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.) Ramos contends that both exceptions apply here. As explained below, we conclude that neither does.
A. The Attempted Murder Sentence
"A trial court that imposes a sentence unauthorized by law retains jurisdiction (or has inherent power) to correct the sentence at any time the error comes to its attention, even if execution of the sentence has commenced or the judgment imposing the sentence has become final and correction requires imposition of a more severe sentence, provided the error is apparent from the face of the record." (Codinha, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 990, fn. omitted; see also id. at pp. 988-990 [discussing case law].) Although the trial court imposed on Ramos the sentence for attempted murder that our prior opinion directed it to impose-life with possibility of parole-Ramos contends that the sentence was illegal because it did not contain a seven-year minimum term. We disagree.
The Penal Code expressly states that the sentence for attempted premeditated murder is life with the possibility of parole. Section 664 prescribes the penalties generally applicable to attempts. It specifically sets forth the punishment for attempted premeditated murder: "[I]f the crime attempted is willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder, as defined in Section 189, the person guilty of that attempt shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life with the possibility of parole." (§ 664, subd. (a).) No minimum sentence is mentioned. (Ibid.)
Ramos asserts that another provision, section 3046, imposes a seven-year minimum sentence on inmates serving life sentences. That is incorrect. Section 3046 does not address sentencing. It addresses parole, setting a period of parole ineligibility for inmates serving life sentences: "An inmate imprisoned under a life sentence shall not be paroled until he or she has served the greater of the following: [¶] (1) A term of at least seven calendar years. [¶] (2) A term as established pursuant to any other law that establishes a minimum term or minimum period of confinement under a life sentence before eligibility for parole." (§ 3046, subd. (a).) Thus, "[a] term of life with the possibility of parole does not have a minimum determinate term of seven years; rather, a person sentenced to such a term first becomes eligible for parole in seven years. [Citation.]" (People v. Robinson (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 69, 72, fn. 3.)
The Supreme Court's decision in People v. Jefferson, (1999) 21 Cal.4th 86 (Jefferson) does not help Ramos. In Jefferson, the Supreme Court construed the "Three Strikes" law. Among other things, the Three Strikes Law doubles sentences for a felony conviction if the defendant has a prior serious or violent felony conviction: "If a defendant has one prior serious or violent felony conviction . . ., the determinate term or minimum term for an indeterminate term shall be twice the term otherwise provided as punishment for the current felony conviction." (§ 667, subd. (e)(1).) Much like Ramos, the defendant in Jefferson was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole without any minimum term. (Jefferson, supra, at p. 91.) Nevertheless, the Supreme Court refused to conclude that there was no "minimum term for an indeterminate term" (§ 667, subd. (e)(1) for purposes of the Three Strikes law. Such a conclusion, the Supreme Court reasoned, would produce "an anomalous result" that the Legislature was unlikely to have intended: It would treat an attempted murder without premeditation-which is punishable by a definite term of five, seven, or nine years (§ 664, subd. (a)) and, thus, subject to doubling under the Three Strikes law-more harshly than the more serious crime of attempted murder with premeditation. (Jefferson, supra, at p. 97.) Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that "[t]he parole ineligibility period set by section 3046" should be treated as "a 'minimum term' within the sentence-doubling language of section 667(e)(1)." (Id. at p. 96.)
Ramos contends that Jefferson should be read broadly, as holding for all purposes that "section 3046 establishes a seven-year minimum sentence for the charge of attempted murder." However, as the Supreme Court repeatedly has admonished,"' "cases are not authority for propositions not considered." '" (People v. Gray (2023) 15 Cal.5th 152, 169, fn. 5.) This admonition applies with especial force to Jefferson, as the Supreme Court repeatedly stressed in that opinion that its construction of the phrase "minimum term" was limited to the Three Strikes law. (Jefferson, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 94 ["Here, we must interpret the phrase 'minimum term for an indeterminate term,' as it is used in section 667(e)(1)." (Italics added.)]; id. at p. 96 ["A statute requiring a prisoner to serve a specified term of incarceration before being released on parole is a provision requiring service of a 'minimum term' within the sentence-doubling language of section 667(e)(1)." (Italics added.)]; ibid. ["The parole ineligibility period set by section 3046 is a minimum term within the senlence-doubling language of section 667(e)(1)." (Italics added.) ].)
As a consequence, we decline to conclude that the trial court entered an illegal sentence by following the plain language of section 664 and sentencing Ramos to life with the possibility of parole on his conviction for attempted premeditated murder.
B. The CDCR Letter
In addition to arguing that the trial court had jurisdiction to resentence him because his sentence was unauthorized by law, Ramos argues that he was entitled to resentencing because the CDCR requested it. As Ramos points out, under section 1172.1, after a defendant has been committed to the CDCR's custody, a court may recall a sentence and resentence the defendant "at any time upon the recommendation of the secretary or the Board of Parole Hearings." (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1). There was no such recommendation here. The trial court received a letter from a CDCR analyst, not the secretary of the department. Moreover, the letter did not recommend resentencing; indeed, there is no mention of sentencing, resentencing, or recall in the letter. The letter merely stated that "the Abstract of Judgment and/or Minute Order may be in error, or incomplete," and it asked the court to "review your file to determine if a correction is required." (Italics added.) As prior decisions recognize, such a request for correction is not a recommendation for recall and resentencing under section 1172.1. (Codinha, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 987; People v. Magana (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 1120, 1125-1126; People v. Humphrey (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 371, 378.)
Consequently, neither of the exceptions invoked by Ramos applies, and the general rule that a trial court lacks jurisdiction to resentence after execution of a sentence controls.
III. Disposition
The petition for a writ of mandate is granted. Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing respondent superior court to vacate its order of December 4, 2023 and to issue an order denying Ramos' motion for resentencing. Upon issuance of the remittitur, the temporary stay is vacated.
WE CONCUR: BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, ACTING P.J. WILSON, J.