However, we find the narrow principle relied on in Kliner inapplicable here. This court first recognized that judicial misconduct could provide a basis for relaxing the forfeiture rule in People v. Sprinkle, 27 Ill. 2d 398 (1963). In Sprinkle, the trial court conducted witness examinations during the defendant's jury trial and used several questions to imply its own opinions of the case and the witnesses, but defense counsel did not object.
We consider the waiver principle a salutary one, conductive to the effective enforcement of the rules which society has established for its protection, but we have not hesitated to relax its application where fundamental fairness so requires. ( People v. Sprinkle, 27 Ill.2d 398; People v. Davies, 354 Ill. 168.) Defendant here sought to raise on the original writ of error the claims presented in the amended post-conviction petition.
See People v. Hillier, 237 Ill.2d 539, 544-45 (2010) (stating to preserve a claim of sentencing error, counsel must make both a contemporaneous objection and a written postsentencing motion raising the issue). Defendant argues that we should relax the forfeiture doctrine pursuant to People v. Sprinkle, 27 Ill.2d 398 (1963), and consider his claim as if it were properly preserved.
At the outset, we address the State's argument that defendant has waived the issue by failing to contemporaneously object. Defendant argues that pursuant to People v. Sprinkle, 27 Ill. 2d 398 (1963), and People v. Sims, 192 Ill. 2d 592 (2000), he was not required to make a contemporaneous objection. In Sprinkle, we noted that where the alleged error is an act of the trial judge, the making of a contemporaneous objection to questions or comments by the judge poses a practical problem for the trial lawyer.
The judge further signaled to the jury his attitude towards the defense when he referred to the prosecution's redirect examination of Barnes as “what we just did,” and when he said to Swift's counsel, in front of the jury, “watch yourself, man.” ¶ 45 The State contends that we should not review the judge's conduct because defense counsel did not object at trial to the judge's comments and actions. Our supreme court confronted a similar situation in People v. Sprinkle, 27 Ill.2d 398, 189 N.E.2d 295 (1963). The Sprinkle court said:
The judge further signaled to the jury his attitude toward the defense when he referred to the prosecution's redirect examination of Barnes as "what we just did," and when he said to Swift's counsel, in front of the jury, "watch yourself, man."¶ 45 The State contends that we should not review the judge's conduct because defense counsel did not object at trial to the judge's comments and actions. Our supreme court confronted a similar situation in People v. Sprinkle, 27 Ill. 2d 398 (1963). The Sprinkle court said:
Consequently, defendant has forfeited this issue on appeal. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). ¶ 17 The Sprinkle doctrine provides a basis for relaxing the forfeiture rule when the issue arises from judicial misconduct. People v. Sprinkle, 27 Ill. 2d 398, 400-01 (1963). The primary concern of the Sprinkle doctrine is to ensure that the defendant has a fair trial.
In addition, Alyssa contends that the rule of forfeiture is relaxed where the conduct of the trial court is the source of the error. People v. Sprinkle , 27 Ill. 2d 398, 189 N.E.2d 295 (1963). Neither case supports Alyssa's contentions.
¶ 21 The State responds that Miller forfeited the issue because, even though his posttrial motion raised the issue, he did not contemporaneously object to the trial court's conduct.¶ 22 Relying on People v. McLaurin , 235 Ill.2d 478, 337 Ill.Dec. 221, 922 N.E.2d 344 (2009), Miller urges us to relax the forfeiture rule first enunciated in People v. Sprinkle , 27 Ill.2d 398, 189 N.E.2d 295 (1963), where the defense counsel made no objection when the trial court conducted witness examinations during the defendant's jury trial and implied its own opinions of the case and the witnesses. In Sprinkle , the supreme court granted review of the defendant's claims and held "a less rigid application of the rule requiring timely and proper objection and preservation of rulings thereon should prevail where the basis for the objection is the conduct of the trial judge than is otherwise required.
However, given the fundamental importance of a fair trial and the practical difficulties involved in objecting to the conduct of the trial judge, the waiver rule is applied less rigidly when the judge's conduct is the basis for the objection. ( People v. Sprinkle (1963), 27 Ill.2d 398, 401; People v. Smalley (1973), 10 Ill. App.3d 416, 427; People v. McGrath (1967), 80 Ill. App.2d 229, 236; contra People v. Crosby (1976), 39 Ill. App.3d 1008, 1010.) Therefore, we will consider the merits of this issue.