And we must observe that earlier decisions of this court approved the admission of the record of out-of-State or Federal convictions for impeachment purposes, ( People v. Derrico, 409 Ill. 453, 465,) and under the Habitual Criminal Act. People v. Derrico, 409 Ill. 453, 461 and 462; People v. Hamlett, 408 Ill. 171, 176, and People v. Poppe, 394 Ill. 216, 220 et seq. The case of People v. Montana, 380 Ill. 596, is not pertinent, and Hildreth v. Heath, 1 Ill. App. 82, while in point, is not binding upon this court.
In the case cited it was held that to establish a prior conviction it was necessary to prove by record or certified copy, the caption, the return of the indictment into open court by the grand jury, the indictment, the arraignment of the defendant, the record of the impaneling and the verdict of the jury, or if he waives a jury and is tried before the court without a jury, the finding of the judge, and the judgment of conviction. * * *." In the case of People v. Poppe, 394 Ill. 216, the contention was made that the Habitual Criminal Act of Illinois did not contemplate convictions of crime in other States as a basis of prosecution under the act. This court said at page 221: "We do not believe that such was the intention of the Habitual Criminal Act of Illinois, because section 2 of that act provides for `a duly authenticated copy' to be used as proof of a former conviction, which must relate to one from a foreign jurisdiction, as certified copies of transcripts of judgments of courts within the State are admissible in evidence in Illinois.
Defendant now contends the prior conviction predicated on the information cannot be invoked under the Habitual Criminal Act because of the constitutional provision. In People v. Poppe, 394 Ill. 216, this court had to deal with the issue whether a previous conviction obtained outside of the State could be invoked under the act, even though the latter did not specifically so provide. We held that according to the intent of the act such previous conviction could be used. The issue was decided irrespective of whether the previous offense was predicated upon an indictment or an information.
Taking up these points in inverse order, it has been recently held that the Habitual Criminal Act does not deny a defendant the equal protection of the law or due process of law. (People v. Lawrence, 390 Ill. 499; People v. Poppe, 394 Ill. 216.) It is unnecessary to elaborate further, as these cases specifically hold against the plaintiff in error on his second point. Plaintiff in error contends that the judgment of the court cannot be sustained under the Habitual Criminal Act because he has not been convicted of a crime enumerated in the Habitual Criminal Act.
This court has repeatedly held that the act refers to punishment and does not state a new or independent offense. (People v. Poppe, 394 Ill. 216; People v. Atkinson, 376 Ill. 623; Featherstone v. People, 194 Ill. 325.) Courts of other jurisdictions have construed statutes similar to ours and applied the same principle. (Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 32 Sup. Ct. 583, 56 L. ed. 917; McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311, 21 Sup. Ct. 389, 45 L. ed. 542.) For other cases, see 58 A.L.R. 20, and annotations supplementary thereto.
It will be observed that specific provision is made that an authenticated copy of the record of a former conviction of any court of record is prima facie evidence of such conviction and may be used in evidence in such cases. We held in the case of People v. Poppe, 394 Ill. 216, that an indictment charging burglary and averring in apt words a prior indictment and conviction of burglary in the State of Ohio properly supported a sentence under the Habitual Criminal Act. This was held a proper averment of a prior conviction in a jurisdiction other than Illinois, and we see no reason why this should not include cases coming from courts of record of Federal jurisdiction.
In recent years the Supreme Court has repeatedly denied certiorari in all cases raising such issues. ( Matter of Tedford, 31 Cal.2d 93, cert. denied 335 U.S. 847; People v. Poppe, 394 Ill. 216, cert. denied 329 U.S. 798; Hill v. Hudspeth, 161 Kan. 376, cert. denied 32 U.S. 756; Matter of Hibbs, 86 Okla. Cr. 113, cert. denied 335 U.S. 835.) The basis of all such decisions is that the subsequent offender and habitual offender laws do not create new crimes but merely describes circumstances under which more severe punishment may be imposed because of previous convictions.