The People v. Mentola

34 Citing cases

  1. State v. Vance

    164 W. Va. 216 (W. Va. 1980)   Cited 142 times
    Holding that "Article III, Section 5 of the West Virginia Constitution, which contains the cruel and unusual punishment counterpart to the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, has an express statement of the proportionality principle: 'Penalties shall be proportioned to the character and degree of the offence.'"

    At least three jurisdictions have the substantive corroboration rule by virtue of nonlegislative action: Maryland and Tennessee as a result of judicial decision, Swann v. State, 192 Md. 9, 63 A.2d 324 (1949); Sherrill v. State, 204 Tenn. 427, 321 S.W.2d 811 (1959); and Kentucky by virtue of a judicially promulgated rule, see Taylor v. Commonwealth, 461 S.W.2d 920 (Ky. 1970), cert. denied sub nom. Brown v. Kentucky, 404 U.S. 837, 30 L.Ed.2d 70, 92 S.Ct. 126 (1971).E.g., Pieramico v. People, 173 Colo. 276, 478 P.2d 304 (1970); Anderson v. State, 241 So.2d 390 (Fla. 1970), modified on other grounds, 408 U.S. 938, 33 L.Ed.2d 758, 92 S.Ct. 2868 (1972); People v. Mentola, 47 Ill.2d 579, 268 N.E.2d 8 (1971); Coleman v. State, 264 Ind. 64, 339 N.E.2d 51 (1975); State v. Sawyer, 314 A.2d 830 (Me. 1974); Commonwealth v. DeBrosky, 363 Mass. 718, 297 N.E.2d 496 (1973); People v. Barron, 381 Mich. 421, 163 N.W.2d 219 (1968); State v. Rumney, 109 N.H. 544, 258 A.2d 349 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1051, 25 L.Ed.2d 666, 90 S.Ct. 1389 (1970); State v. Burgess, 97 N.J. Super. 428, 235 A.2d 231 (1967); State v. Flonnory, 31 Ohio St.2d 124, 285 N.E.2d 726 (1972); State v. Givens, 267 S.C. 47, 225 S.E.2d 867 (1976); Dillard v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 820, 224 S.E.2d 137 (1976); State v. Johnson, 77 Wn.2d 423, 462 P.2d 933 (1969); Kutchera v. State, 69 Wis.2d 534, 230 N.W.2d 750 (1975). The federal position is the same as this latter view. See, Annot., 17 A.L.R. Fed. 249 (1973).

  2. People v. Edwards

    77 Ill. App. 3d 237 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)   Cited 8 times

    In Illinois, prosecutorial comment violates the fifth amendment if it is intended to direct the jury's attention to the defendant's decision not to take the witness stand. ( People v. Mentola (1971), 47 Ill.2d 579, 268 N.E.2d 8.) Courts have found that the following comments have been intended to direct the jury's attention to the defendant's decision not to take the witness stand: "`And then he's [defendant] got to explain the blood on the pants.

  3. People v. Mattison

    271 N.E.2d 119 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971)   Cited 5 times
    In People v. Mattison (1971), 132 Ill. App.2d 1069, 271 N.E.2d 119, this court held that a motion to strike admissions similarly made by an accused in custody of and while being transported by a law enforcement officer to a police station were properly denied.

    " (A-9) • 6 As we view it, the observations of the Supreme Court, in People v. Mentola (1971), 47 Ill.2d 579, 268 N.E.2d 8, are determinative of this issue. In Mentola, the complained of remarks were: "`He [Gary Stark] told you quite honestly and truthfully what was not contradicted in any way. Just told you about his part in it and told you who was there. And that's uncontradicted testimony in this case.

  4. Commonwealth of the N. Mariana Islands v. Muna

    2016 N. Mar. I. LEXIS 10 (N. Mar. I. 2016)

    1970), Connecticut, State v. La Fountain, 140 Conn. 613, 103 A.2d 138, 142 (Conn. 1954), Delaware, Jacobs v. State, 358 A.2d 725, 729 (Del. 1976), Florida, Land v. State, 59 So.2d 370, 370 (Fla. 1952), Hawaii, State v. Carvelo, 45 Haw. 16, 361 P.2d 45, 58-59 (Haw. 1961), Illinois, People v. Mentola, 47 Ill. 2d 579, 268 N.E.2d 8, 10 (Ill. 1971), Indiana, Newman v. State, 263 Ind. 569, 334 N.E.2d 684, 687 (Ind. 1975), Kansas, State v. Shepherd, 213 Kan. 498, 516 P.2d 945, 952 (Kan. 1973), Louisiana, State v. May, 339 So.2d 764, 775 (La. 1976), Maine, State v. Jewell, 285 A.2d 847, 851 (Me. 1972), Massachusetts, Commonwealth v. Giacomazza, 311 Mass. 456, 42 N.E.2d 506, 515 (Mass. 1942), Michigan, People v. De Lano, 318 Mich. 557, 28 N.W.2d 909, 913 (Mich. 1947), Mississippi, Sanders v. State, 313 So.2d 398, 400 (Miss. 19975), Missouri, State v. Lang, 515 S.W.2d 507, 509 (Mo. 1974), Nebraska, State v. Huffman, 222 Neb. 512, 385 N.W.2d 85, 90 (Neb. 1986), New Hampshire, State v. Rumney, 109 N.H. 544, 258 A.2d 349, 350 (N.H. 1969), New Jersey, State v. Spruill, 16 N.J. 73, 106 A.2d 278, 280 (N.J. 1954), New Mexico, State v. Gutierrez, 1965- NMSC 143, 75 N.M. 580, 408 P.2d 503, 504 (N.M 1965), North Carolina, State v. Saunders, 245 N.C. 338, 95 S.E.2d 876, 879 (N.C. 1957), Ohio, State v. Tapp, 2007-Ohio-2959 at ¶ 44 (Ohio Ct. App.

  5. People v. Newell

    103 Ill. 2d 465 (Ill. 1984)   Cited 37 times
    Affirming appellate court's reversal of defendant's conviction "where the only evidence [was] the testimony of three accomplices, all convicted felons, one of whom [said] defendant [was] guilty and two of whom [said] he [was] not, with no corroboration of either view"

    But where the only evidence is the testimony of three accomplices, all convicted felons, one of whom says defendant is guilty and two of whom say he is not, with no corroboration of either view, we simply cannot say there has been proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Hermens; People v. Mentola (1971), 47 Ill.2d 579, 583. The cases urged by the State and those cited in the appellate court dissent are inapposite.

  6. People v. Dixon

    91 Ill. 2d 346 (Ill. 1982)   Cited 249 times
    Holding appellate court was authorized, upon reversing sentenced convictions, to remand for imposition of a sentence on remaining convictions

    We do not agree. The appropriate test for determining whether a defendant's right to remain silent has been violated is whether "the reference [was] intended or calculated to direct the attention of the jury to the defendant's neglect to avail himself of his legal right to testify." ( People v. Hopkins (1972), 52 Ill.2d 1, 6; People v. Mentola (1971), 47 Ill.2d 579, 582; People v. Mills (1968), 40 Ill.2d 4, 8; People v. Wollenberg (1967), 37 Ill.2d 480, 488.) The prosecutor may comment on the uncontradicted nature of the State's case ( People v. Skorusa (1973), 55 Ill.2d 577, 584; People v. Norman (1963), 28 Ill.2d 77, 81), and, where motivated by a purpose of demonstrating the absence of any evidentiary basis for defense counsel's argument rather than a purpose of calling attention to the fact that defendant had not testified, such argument is permissible ( People v. Jones (1970), 47 Ill.2d 66, 67-70).

  7. Brown v. State

    281 Md. 241 (Md. 1977)   Cited 57 times
    Noting that 17 states, including Oregon, have adopted statutes requiring accomplice corroboration and two states, Maryland and Tennessee, have adopted that requirement by judicial precedent; court required independent evidence

    tates v. Owens, 460 F.2d 268, 269 (10th Cir. 1972); United States v. Adams, 454 F.2d 1357, 1360 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Miller, 451 F.2d 1306, 1307 (4th Cir. 1971); United States v. Miceli, 446 F.2d 256, 258-59 (1st Cir. 1971); United States v. Strauss, 443 F.2d 986, 991 (1st Cir. 1971); United States v. Corallo, 413 F.2d 1306, 1322 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Haynes, 403 F.2d 54, 55 (6th Cir. 1968); United States v. Tiche, 424 F. Supp. 996, 1000-01 (W.D. Pa. 1977). The state jurisdictions which do not require corroboration are: People v. Martinez, 187 Colo. 413, 531 P.2d 964 (1975); State v. Cari, 163 Conn. 174 303 A.2d 7 (1972); State v. La Fountain, 140 Conn. 613, 103 A.2d 138 (1954); Jacobs v. State, 358 A.2d 725 (Del. 1976); O'Neal v. State, 247 A.2d 207 (Del. 1968); Anderson v. State, 241 So.2d 390 (Fla. 1970); Scott v. State, 229 Ga. 541, 192 S.E.2d 367 (1972); State v. Johnston, 51 Haw. 195, 456 P.2d 805 (1969); State v. Carvelo, 45 Haw. 16, 361 P.2d 45 (1961); People v. Mentola, 47 Ill.2d 579, 268 N.E.2d 8 (1971); People v. Baer, 35 Ill. App.3d 391, 342 N.E.2d 177 (1976); Tope v. State, Ind., 362 N.E.2d 137 (1977); Newman v. State, 263 Ind. 569, 334 N.E.2d 684 (1975); State v. Bey, 217 Kan. 251, 535 P.2d 881 (1975); State v. May, 339 So.2d 764 (La. 1976); State v. Matassa, 222 La. 363, 62 So.2d 609 (1952); State v. Sawyer, 314 A.2d 830 (Me. 1974); State v. Smith, 312 A.2d 187 (Me. 1973); Commonwealth v. Johnson, Mass., 361 N.E.2d 212 (1977); Commonwealth v. French, 357 Mass. 356, 259 N.E.2d 195 (1970); People v. De Lano, 318 Mich. 557, 28 N.W.2d 909 (1947); People v. Massey, 63 Mich. App. 142, 234 N.W.2d 432 (1975); Sanders v. State, 313 So.2d 398 (Miss. 1975); State v. Carlos, 549 S.W.2d 330 (Mo. 1977); State v. Lang, 515 S.W.2d 507 (Mo. 1974); State v. Martin, 190 Neb. 212, 206 N.W.2d 856 (1973); State v. Oglesby, 188 Neb. 211, 195 N.W.2d 754 (1972); State v. West, 112 N.H. 317, 295 A.2d 457 (1972); State v. Rumney, 109 N.H. 544, 258 A.2d 349 (1969); State v. Begyn, 34 N.J. 35, 167 A.2

  8. State v. Wolery

    46 Ohio St. 2d 316 (Ohio 1976)   Cited 584 times
    In State v. Wolery, (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 316 [75 O.O.2d 366], the defendant assigned as error matters concerning a grant of immunity to a prosecution witness.

    People v. Martinez (Colo. 1975), 531 P.2d 964, 965; State v. LaFountain (1954), 140 Conn. 613, 616, 620-621, 103 A.2d 138; O'Neal v. State (Del., 1968), 247 A.2d 207, 210; Anderson v. State (Florida, 1970), 241 So.2d 390, 396; Scott v. State (1972), 229 Ga. 541, 545, 192 S.E.2d 367; Cf. Famber v. State (1975), 134 Ga. App. 112, 213 S.E.2d 525 (Ga. Code Ann. 38-121); State v. Carvelo (1961), 45 Haw. 16, 42, 361 P.2d 45; People v. Mentola (1971), 47 Ill.2d 579, 583, 268 N.E.2d 8; Newman v. State (Ind. 1975), 334 N.E.2d 684, 687; State v. Bey (1975), 217 Kan. 251, 260, 535 P.2d 881; State v. Matassa (1952), 222 La. 363, 379, 62 So.2d 609; State v. Smith (Me. 1973), 312 A.2d 187, 188; Commonwealth v. French (1970), 357 Mass. 356, 396, 259 N.E.2d 195; People v. DeLano (1947), 318 Mich. 557, 567-568, 28 N.W.2d 909; Sanders v. State (Miss. 1975), 313 So.2d 398, 400; State v. Lang (Mo., 1974), 515 S.W.2d 507, 509; State v. Oglesby (1972), 188 Neb. 211, 212, 195 N.W.2d 754; State v. Rumney (1969), 109 N.H. 544, 545, 258 A.2d 349; State v. Begyn (1961), 34 N.J. 35, 54, 167 A.2d 161; State v. Maes (1970), 81 N.M. 550, 554, 469 P.2d 529; State v. McNair (1967), 272 N.C. 130, 132, 157 S.E.2d 660; Commonwealth v. Bradley (1972), 449 Pa. 19, 21-22, 295 A.2d 842; State v. Pella (1966), 101 R.I. 62, 69, 220 A.2d 226; State v. Steadman (1972), 257 S.C. 528, 537-538, 186 S.E.2d 712; State v. Crepeault (1967), 126 Vt. 338, 341-342, 229 A.2d 245; Brown v. Commonwealth (1968), 2

  9. People v. Brown

    281 N.E.2d 682 (Ill. 1972)   Cited 5 times

    Although the testimony of an accomplice is necessarily received with caution, such testimony, even if uncorroborated, is sufficient to warrant a conviction if it satisfies the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt, and material corroboration of an accomplice's testimony is entitled to great weight. People v. Mentola (1971), 47 Ill.2d 579. Petitioner cites our opinion in People v. Smith (1967), 38 Ill.2d 13, as being an analogous factual setting in which it was decided that the improperly admitted identification testimony could not be said to be harmless error.

  10. People v. Smith

    402 Ill. App. 3d 538 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010)   Cited 28 times
    Rejecting the State's argument that a prosecutor's improper comment on the defendant's failure to testify was invited by defense counsel's closing argument

    Moreover, a defendant cannot ordinarily claim error where the prosecutor's remarks are in reply to and may be said to have been invited by defense counsel's argument." People v. Dixon, 91 Ill. 2d 34 (3, 350-51 (1982), quoting People v. Hopkins, 52 Ill. 2d 1, 6 (1972), and citing People v. Mentola, 47 Ill. 2d 579, 582 (1971); People v. Mills, 40 Ill. 2d 4, 8 (1968); Wollenberg, 37 Ill. 2d at 488; People v. Skorusa, 55 Ill. 2d 577, 584 (1973); People v. Norman, 28 Ill. 2d 77, 81 (1963); People v. Jones, 47 Ill. 2d 66, 67-70 (1970); People v. Vriner, 74 III. 2d 329, 344 (1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929, 61 L. Ed. 2d 296, 99 S. Ct. 2858 (1979); People v. Zuniga, 53 Ill. 2d 550, 558 (1973); and People v. Bey, 51 Ill. 2d 262, 266 (1972). The State claims that defense counsel invited the prosecutor's remarks, but the State does not cite any page of the record or quote an argument or comment made by defense counsel that invited or would justify the prosecutor's remarks concerning defendant's failure to present evidence that he did not know Johnson was a police officer. Defense counsel in his closing argument never suggested that defendant did not know Johnson was a police officer. More importantly, "a defendant in a criminal case can never `open the door' to shift the burden of proof."