( Commonwealth v. Joyce (1951) 326 Mass. 751, 756 [ 97 N.E.2d 192]; Ex parte Kneedler (1912) 243 Mo. 632, 640 [147 S.W. 983, 1913C 923, 40 L.R.A.N.S. 622].) It would appear that the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois in People v. Lucus (1968) 41 Ill.2d 370 [ 243 N.E.2d 228], construing the federal constitutional privilege, follows the same approach as Diller and the cases cited above. The court stated: "Using the standard of Marchetti v. UnitedStates . . . the [Illinois "hit-and-run"] statute's provisions do not present a substantial and real hazard of [self-]incrimination."

In rejecting a facial challenge to a California statutory requirement that motorists who have been involved in an accident must stop at the scene and give their names and addresses, the United States Supreme Court held in California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 29 L. Ed. 2d 9, 91 S. Ct. 1535 (1971), that disclosure of one's identity is not a selfincriminating act. Similarly, in People v. Lucus, 41 Ill. 2d 370, 372 (1968), our supreme court held that a former statute requiring that a driver involved in an accident resulting in damage to a vehicle provide his name, address, and registration number to persons in the other vehicle (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, eh. 95V2, par. 134) did not violate the fifth amendment, because "the statute's provisions do not present a substantial and real hazard of incrimination."

This section simply requires a driver to identity himself or herself without providing any information which may indicate that a criminal offense had actually occurred. With respect to Fawell's argument that the reporting requirement "compelled" John Doe into making a report, we note that our supreme court has determined, in People v. Lucus (1968), 41 Ill.2d 370, that requiring a driver to reveal his name and address does not infringe upon the driver's "guaranty against self-incrimination." ( Lucus, 41 Ill.2d at 373-74.)

Many other states have also held that disclosure requirements under similar vehicle-code provisions do not violate a defendant's right against compelled self-incrimination. See, e.g., State v Adams, 181 Ariz. 383; 891 P.2d 251 (Ariz Ct App, 1995); State v. Melemai, 64 Haw. 479; 643 P.2d 541 (1982); People v. Lucas, 41 Ill.2d 370; 243 N.E.2d 228 (1968); People v. Samuel, 29 N.Y.2d 252; 277 N.E.2d 381 (1971); Lamb v. State, 488 P.2d 1295 (Okla Crim App, 1971); State v. Smyth, 121 R.I. 188; 397 A.2d 497 (1979); Banks v. Com, 217 Va. 527; 230 S.E.2d 256 (1976). Defendant also argues that the prosecutor's misconduct denied him a fair trial.

California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 428, 29 L.Ed.2d 9, 17, 91 S.Ct. 1535, 1538 (1971); Larkin v. Hartigan, 250 Ill. App.3d 969, 975 (1993). The constitutional violation may occur if the information the citizen is required to give is used as evidence against him in a criminal proceeding.People v. Lucus, 41 Ill.2d 370, 374 (1968). In Lucus our supreme court decided whether a statute requiring a driver involved in a vehicular accident to provide his name, address and vehicle registration to persons in the other vehicle violated the fifth amendment.

This doctrine is called the citizen-informer doctrine within Illinois case law and has been upheld by the Illinois Supreme Court. People v. Lucus, 41 Ill.2d 370, 243 N.E.2d 228 (1968). In the case at bar, no genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether there was probable cause to arrest McKinney on December 17, 1978, or to apprehend him on November 13, 1979.

Because of the problems and danger inherent in the operation of motor vehicles, the legislature may impose reasonable conditions on their use. ( People v. Lucus (1968), 41 Ill.2d 370, 373.) A statute enacted pursuant to this authority must represent a reasonable exercise of police power and cannot, of course, be violative of constitutionally assured rights.

Although Lahm did not personally interview Birmingham, this court has held that a phone conversation can be the basis for establishing probable cause to arrest. ( People v. Parks (1971), 48 Ill.2d 232, 236; People v.Lucus (1968), 41 Ill.2d 370, 375.) Under the facts and law stated, we conclude that Lahm had probable cause at the time he arrested defendant Bean. Having ascertained the existence of probable cause, we must determine if the arrest of Bean without a warrant in his apartment violated his rights under the fourth amendment.

Reid's Branson Instructions to Juries, 3d ed., Vol. 1, § 23, p. 57. Cases are numerous which recognize that this rule is aimed at the assumption of material facts. People v. Lucus, 41 Ill.2d 370, 243 N.E.2d 228, 232 (1968); Fields v. State, Miss., 272 So.2d 650, 653 (1973); State v. Thornton, 17 N.C. App. 225, 193 S.E.2d 373 (1972); Smith v. U.S., 6th Cir., 230 F.2d 935, 938 (1956); Pulliam v. State, 167 Neb. 614, 94 N.W.2d 51, 60 (1959). In the case of Thornton, supra 193 S.E.2d at p. 375, appears this following applicable quote:

Nor is it that of Illinois. See People v. Lucus ( 41 Ill.2d 370), holding its hit-and-run statute valid and collecting cases in other States sustaining similar enactments. See, also, People v. Christiansen ( 62 Misc.2d 1034 [Crim.