The People v. Lee

68 Citing cases

  1. People v. Mendez

    371 Ill. App. 3d 773 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007)   Cited 7 times

    Several Illinois courts have held that a police officer may form a reasonable suspicion that an individual was involved in a shooting due to his spatial and temporal proximity to the shots fired. For example, in People v. Lee, 48 Ill. 2d 272 (1971), police officers testified that they were assigned to patrol an area where a gang war was expected to occur. At approximately 9:30 p.m., the officers heard what they believed to be gunshots.

  2. People v. Mitchell

    165 Ill. 2d 211 (Ill. 1995)   Cited 54 times   4 Legal Analyses
    In Mitchell, 165 Ill. 2d at 216, this court applied the Supreme Court's decision in Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 124 L. Ed. 2d 334, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993) (holding that the "plain feel" doctrine does not offend the fourth amendment), to conclude that the "plain touch" doctrine comports with the search and seizure clause of article I, section 6, of the state constitution.

    Notably, even prior to Long, this court read Terry and Illinois' codification of its holding to permit such seizures. See People v. Lee (1971), 48 Ill.2d 272; see also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, pars. 107-14, 108-1.01. The notion of "plain touch" is not foreign to Illinois.

  3. State v. Williams

    51 Ohio St. 3d 58 (Ohio 1990)   Cited 166 times
    In State v. Williams (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 58, 60-61, the Ohio Supreme Court stated, [t]he standard for reviewing such police conduct is an objective one: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate? * * * That is, an investigatory stop must be justified by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.

    Adams, supra, 407 U.S. at 146. See People v. Lee (1971), 48 Ill.2d 272, 269 N.E.2d 488. Analyzing Deputy Garst's conduct here against the objective standard required by Terry, and based on the totality of the circumstances, we hold that he acted properly in conducting a protective search of Williams.

  4. People v. Smithers

    75 Ill. App. 3d 883 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)   Cited 1 times

    To justify a "stop and frisk" of a person, police officers must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion. ( Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 88 S.Ct. 1868; People v. Lee (1971), 48 Ill.2d 272, 269 N.E.2d 488.) The facts justifying a "stop and frisk" need not be sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest.

  5. People v. Sanford

    34 Ill. App. 3d 990 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976)   Cited 15 times
    In Sanford two officers of the Rockford police department were on patrol duty when they received a radio message at about midnight of the armed robbery of a gas station, without any description of the bandits.

    The State argues that the motion to suppress was properly denied because the officers lawfully detained the defendants pursuant to section 107-14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 107-14) and obtained sufficient information during that detention to form the probable cause necessary to arrest the defendants without a warrant and seized evidence pursuant to a valid search incident to that arrest. • 1, 2 In People v. Lee (1971), 48 Ill.2d 272, 269 N.E.2d 488, the Illinois Supreme Court held that this section is a legislative codification of the holding of the Supreme Court of the United States in Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 88 S.Ct. 1868, and that the tests enunciated in Terry are the standards for determining whether a stop by a police officer falls within the ambit of section 107-14. Under Terry the "stop" itself must be justified by "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." ( 392 U.S. 1, 21, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906.)

  6. People v. Watson

    292 N.E.2d 457 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972)   Cited 9 times

    " The above statutes represent a codification of the holdings in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, and Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40. ( People v. Lee, 48 Ill.2d 272, 269 N.E.2d 488), which impose three restrictions upon the right of policemen to "stop and frisk" individuals suspected of criminal acts. First, the "stop" itself must be justified by "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." ( Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21.) Inarticulate hunches cannot suffice; rather, the objective determination to be made is whether "the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure * * * warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.

  7. State v. Hairston

    2019 Ohio 1622 (Ohio 2019)   Cited 41 times
    In Hairston, the police "knew from personal experience that crime often occurred at night in the area where the stop took place."

    That distance is farther than the one or two blocks many courts have considered close for purposes of supporting reasonable suspicion when an officer immediately responded to gunshots and found only one person or group in the area. SeeTally-Clayborne at ¶ 10 (one block); Commonwealth v. Griffen-Jacobs , Penn.Sup.Ct. No. 1891 EDA 2016, 2017 WL 4992754, *1 (Nov. 1, 2017) (approximately one block); Basiak at 156, 8 Ill.Dec. 332, 365 N.E.2d 570 (around the corner); State v. Brooks , 281 So.2d 55, 56 (Fla.App.1973) (around the block); People v. Lee , 48 Ill.2d 272, 274, 269 N.E.2d 488 (1971) (about two blocks). {¶ 44} Even in cases in which the location of the gunshots was very close, however, courts have typically relied on additional evidence—that directly implicated the defendant—to support a finding of reasonable suspicion.

  8. People v. Walker

    2013 Ill. App. 4th 120118 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)   Cited 13 times

    Our supreme court has held that once a reasonable belief of danger arises, “the type of search authorized in Terry is one confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover weapons or objects capable of use as weapons.” People v. Lee, 48 Ill.2d 272, 276, 269 N.E.2d 488, 491 (1971) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 29, 88 S.Ct. 1868). “The sole justification for the search allowed by the Terry exception is the protection of the police officer and others in the vicinity, not to gather evidence.”

  9. People v. Meyer

    402 Ill. App. 3d 1089 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010)   Cited 7 times

    Defendant argues that the State failed to prove his conviction beyond a reasonable doubt because it did not introduce evidence that the ammunition was live. The supreme court considered and rejected the argument defendant makes in People v. Lee, 48 Ill. 2d 272, 281, 269 N.E.2d 488, 493 (1971). The Lee court held that the statute did not require proof that the ammunition was live to sustain a conviction, stating as follows:

  10. In re S.V

    326 Ill. App. 3d 678 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001)   Cited 16 times
    Finding that a Terry search was reasonable because the officer observed the respondent flashing gang signs typical of the gang believed to be involved in a shooting and the officer also observed the defendant walking away from the area of the shooting

    The State contends that the totality of the facts articulated by Officer Nallen provided sufficient reasonable suspicion to justify the frisk or protective pat-down of respondent. We find People v. Lee, 48 Ill.2d 272 (1971), instructive. In Lee, the police were assigned to patrol an area where a gang war was expected to occur.