k , 70 Ill. App. 3d 698, 27 Ill.Dec. 144, 388 N.E.2d 1107 (1979) (aggravated battery conviction reduced sua sponte to battery); People v. O'Neil , 50 Ill. App. 3d 900, 8 Ill.Dec. 871, 365 N.E.2d 1333 (1977) (rape conviction reduced sua sponte to attempted rape where evidence was insufficient to prove penetration); People v. Goolsby , 45 Ill. App. 3d 441, 4 Ill.Dec. 38, 359 N.E.2d 871 (1977) (murder conviction reduced sua sponte to voluntary manslaughter); People v. Plewka , 27 Ill. App. 3d 553, 327 N.E.2d 457 (1975) (indecent-liberties-with-a-child conviction reduced sua sponte to contributing to the sexual delinquency of a child); People v. Borden , 84 Ill. App. 2d 442, 228 N.E.2d 248 (1967) (burglary conviction reduced sua sponte to attempted burglary); People v. Kurtz , 69 Ill. App. 2d 282, 216 N.E.2d 524 (1966) (conviction of theft of property exceeding $150 in value reduced sua sponte to conviction of theft of property not exceeding $150 in value), aff'd in par &, rev'd in part , 37 Ill. 2d 103, 224 N.E.2d 817 (1967). ¶ 64 In each of these cases, the appellate court, apparently without the request of either party, exercised the power provided by Rule 615(b)(3).
In order to sustain a conviction of a felony the value of the property stolen must be shown to be in excess of $150. ( People v. Kurtz, 37 Ill.2d 103.) It is true that in this case there was no direct proof of value.
At that time, the court stated its belief that there had not been publicity which would affect the trial. Whether a motion for a continuance should be granted because of publicity concerning the case resides within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its judgment will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. ( People v. Kurtz (1967), 37 Ill.2d 103, 108, 224 N.E.2d 817; People v. Brinn (1965), 32 Ill.2d 232, 204 N.E.2d 724, cert. denied (1965), 382 U.S. 827, 15 L.Ed.2d 72, 86 S.Ct. 62.) In cases of pretrial publicity, the examination of prospective jurors on voir dire has been recognized as the most valuable means of ascertaining partiality or indifference among persons summoned as jurors. ( People v. Torres (1973), 54 Ill.2d 384, 388, 297 N.E.2d 142; People v. Kurtz (1967), 37 Ill.2d 103, 108.
"The examination of prospective jurors on voir dire is, in a typical instance of pretrial publicity, probably the most valuable means of ascertaining partiality or indifference among persons summoned as jurors." People v. Kurtz (1967), 37 Ill.2d 103, 108; 224 N.E.2d 817, 820; People v. Gendron (1969), 41 Ill.2d 351, 355; 243 N.E.2d 208, 211. • 3 If a juror meets the statutory qualifications, the determination of whether a challenge for cause should be allowed rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and his ruling will not be disturbed unless he has clearly abused his discretion.
The standard for determining whether the value of property at the time and place of the theft exceeded the statutory amount of $150 is the property's fair cash market value. ( People v. Kurtz, 37 Ill.2d 103, 110-11.) Evidence presented may be sufficient, however, to support a conviction for the felony amount, though the testimony of witnesses was not addressed precisely to the "fair cash market value."
Other decisions which defendant cites were also predicated upon the application of Rule 27. People v. Kurtz, 37 Ill.2d 103, 110 (value of stolen property); People v. Ritchie, 36 Ill.2d 392, 397-98 (multiple convictions); People v. Petropoulos, 34 Ill.2d 179, 181 (speedy trial). Defendant's argument relating to section 6 of article VI of the 1970 Constitution is without merit.
"The examination of prospective jurors on voir dire is, in a typical instance of pretrial publicity, probably the most valuable means of ascertaining partiality or indifference among persons summoned as jurors." People v. Kurtz, 37 Ill.2d 103, at 108. The prospective jurors on examination did not reflect a deep-seated prejudice against the defendant.
Furthermore, there has been no showing that the ruling of the trial judge was erroneous. The granting of a continuance was within the sound discretion of the trial judge and absent a showing of abuse, that determination will not be reversed. ( People v. Kurtz, 37 Ill.2d 103.) Further, there was no showing why a change of venue to the "State of New York" was appropriate or even how the State of New York could attain jurisdiction over this matter.
As for the defendants' repeated requests for a continuance, we cannot say that the trial judge erred in denying them. Granting a continuance based upon publicity attendant to a trial is a matter largely committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. We see no abuse of that discretion here. ( People v. Kurtz, 37 Ill.2d 103, 108; People v. Wilson, 29 Ill.2d 82, 90.) There is absolutely no showing in the record before us that the newspaper articles referred to by the defendants affected them prejudicially during the trial. It should be noted that they did not ask to have the jury sequestered, which might have been appropriate under the circumstances.
This court has consistently approved the foregoing guide lines where the reduction of sentence by virtue of the rule and its antecedent statute has been directly raised. ( People v. Cage, 34 Ill.2d 530; People v. Hicks, 35 Ill.2d 390; People v. Kurtz, 37 Ill.2d 103; People v. Crews, 38 Ill.2d 331; People v. Gold, 38 Ill.2d 510; People v. Caldwell, 39 Ill.2d 346.) In none of these cases has a reduction in punishment been made, but they do recognize the right to reduce sentence.