Opinion
G062795
07-01-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JEFFREY JAY JENNINGS, Defendant and Appellant.
Jan B. Norman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County No. 19NF0952, Michael J. Cassidy, Judge. Affirmed.
Jan B. Norman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
GOETHALS, J.
Defendant Jeffrey Jay Jennings was charged in 2019 with multiple violations of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a), involving two different victims, S.R. and A.R. It was alleged that Jennings engaged in substantial sexual conduct with both victims (§ 1203.066, subd. (a)(8)), and that Jennings's felony misconduct involved more than one victim (§ 667.61 (b), (e)).
All subsequent statutory references are to this code.
Jennings pleaded not guilty. In 2023, a jury convicted him of the charges related to S.R. It also found the special allegations true. The jury acquitted Jennings of the charges related to A.R. The trial court sentenced Jennings to eight years in state prison. Jennings filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment.
We appointed counsel to represent Jennings on appeal. Appointed counsel informed us in her declaration that she reviewed the reporter's transcript as well as the clerk's transcript; she also consulted with a staff attorney at Appellate Defenders, Inc. Counsel then filed a brief pursuant to the procedures set forth in People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738. While not arguing against her client, counsel set forth the facts of the case and asked this court to conduct its own independent review of the appellate record, which we have done. Counsel also advised Jennings of his right to file a written argument on his own behalf; he has not done so.
FACTS
Briefly stated, these are the relevant facts. In 2018, J.M. and her two daughters, S.R. and A.R., informed law enforcement that Jennings, J.M.'s prior boyfriend, had sexually abused the two girls almost twenty years earlier when the girls were children. Under the supervision of a police officer, S.R. placed a covert telephone call to Jennings which was recorded. S.R. confronted him with her allegation. Jennings initially denied it. Finally, he said he must have been drunk or on drugs when he acted, and he apologized.
At trial, after offering the testimony of S.R. and A.R., the prosecutor called Dr. Jody Ward as an expert in forensic psychology. Dr. Ward testified concerning her professional knowledge of the child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS).
The jury convicted Jennings of the charges related to S.R. The jury acquitted him of the charges related to A.R.
DISCUSSION
Although appointed counsel informs us that she has found no issues to argue on Jennings's behalf, she asks us to consider two questions:
"Did the trial court abuse its discretion by admitting the expert testimony on CSAAS?"
"If so, is there a reasonable probability of a different result had the expert testimony on CSAAS been excluded?"
We have evaluated these issues in light of the complete record and find no merit in either. The decision of a trial court to admit expert testimony "will not be disturbed on appeal unless a manifest abuse of discretion is shown." (People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24, 39.) It is well established that appropriately tailored CSAAS testimony "is admissible to rehabilitate [a] witness's credibility when the defendant suggests that the child's conduct after the incident-e.g., a delay in reporting-is inconsistent with his or her testimony claiming molestation." (People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1300.)
Here, Dr. Ward's testimony, which was relatively brief and benign in comparison with that of the two complaining witnesses, fell well within the prescribed parameters for CSAAS evidence. She testified generally about the components of CSAAS, and explained why victims of sexual abuse may not report it until they reach adulthood. She expressed no opinion concerning the guilt or innocence of Jennings.
There is nothing in this record to suggest the jury failed to conscientiously discharge its responsibilities, or that its verdicts were inappropriately influenced by Dr. Ward's testimony. Indeed, the jury convicted Jennings of some crimes and acquitted him of others. We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in admitting Dr. Ward's testimony, and no reasonable probability that the verdicts would have been different had her testimony been excluded.
We have examined the entire record in this case and, like counsel, have found no other arguable appellate issues.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J., GOODING, J.