47 Ill.2d 501, 504-05. Going one step further is People v. Griffin (1967), 36 Ill.2d 430, in which the complaint alleged that the defendant "did * * * drive his vehicle with a willful and wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property." ( 36 Ill.2d 430, 431.)
It "is no empty technicality, but a substantial provision that may not be ignored." People v.Green (1938), 368 Ill. 242, 254, overruled in part on other grounds in People v. Griffin (1967), 36 Ill.2d 430; People v. Abrams (1971), 48 Ill.2d 446, 458-59. Illinois cases have shown a long history of treating the "nature and elements" requirement of an indictment in conformance with the dictates of the United States Supreme Court.
While we do not now know which of that series of acts the State intended to rely on at trial, one certainly cannot now say that it would rely solely upon Vitale's failure to reduce speed to the exclusion of his other misconduct. In People v. Griffin (1967), 36 Ill.2d 430, the State charged defendant with reckless driving, but the court found the information which the State filed in that case so imprecise that the defendant would not be able to plead a judgment thereon as a bar to a future prosecution arising from the same facts. The particular act or acts which constituted reckless driving may have been any one of a number of acts, such as "driving while intoxicated, or running through a stop-light, or driving at an excessive speed or without brakes, lights or horn; he may have been driving on the wrong side of the road or on the sidewalk, or without keeping proper lookout for children, or any one of dozens of things which might constitute wilful and wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property."
ORDER ¶ 1 Held: Where the misdemeanor complaint charging defendant with reckless driving merely recited the statutory language (625 ILCS 5/11-503 (West 2014)) without stating the specific acts which constitute wanton disregard for the safety of others, the trial court's finding of guilt cannot stand pursuant to People v. Griffin, 36 Ill. 2d 430 (1967). ¶ 2 Following a bench trial, defendant Sara Hadwiger was found guilty of reckless driving (625 ILCS 5/11-503 (West 2014)) and speeding (625 ILCS 5/11-601 (West 2014)).
We affirm. Defendant relies on People v. Griffin (1967), 36 Ill.2d 430, 223 N.E.2d 158, and People v. Podhrasky (1990), 197 Ill. App.3d 349, 554 N.E.2d 578. In both of those cases charges of reckless driving in much the same form as here were held to be insufficient to advise the accused of the nature of the conduct of which he was charged.
In support of that proposition, the Chambers court cited People v. Coolidge (1970), 124 Ill. App.2d 479, 483-84. Coolidge, in turn, cited People v. Griffin (1967), 36 Ill.2d 430, in which this court stated: "Unless a defendant is advised of the particular acts relied upon to sustain a charge of reckless driving, he is not advised of the `nature and elements' of the offense, and he is not afforded the full protection against double jeopardy contemplated by the constitution." Griffin, 36 Ill.2d at 433.
There is no requirement of joinder where multiple offenses arise from a series of related acts. ( People v. Griffin (1967), 36 Ill.2d 430, 433-34; ( People v. Patete (1980), 91 Ill. App.3d 655; People v. Whitlow (1977), 48 Ill. App.3d 425.) "Section 3-3 is not intended to cover the situation in which several offenses * * * arise from a series of acts which are closely related with respect to the offender's single purpose or plan." (Ill.
This court concluded that the sufficiency of an indictment or information may not be determined by whether the charge stated as definitely as could be done the time and place of an alleged offense. (See also People v. Schmidt, 10 Ill.2d 221; People v. Griffin, 36 Ill.2d 430.) The indictment here fixed the crime alleged at a time before the return of the indictment and within the applicable statute of limitations period.
For instance, if a defendant drove at an excessive rate of speed, ran through three successive red lights, and drove on the wrong side of the road, the defendant has committed offenses based on separate acts for purposes of compulsory joinder. People v. Griffin, 36 Ill.2d 430, 433, 223 N.E.2d 158, 160 (1967). But if a charge of reckless driving is brought based upon the act of running a stop sign, a later charge of running the stop sign would be subject to compulsory joinder as the two charges are based on the same act.
]" (Emphasis added.) People v. Griffin, 36 Ill. 2d 430, 433-34 (1967). The legislature could have enhanced the legislative purpose of the statute by using the word "conduct," but it chose not to do so, using the word "act" instead.