Opinion
A166314
09-26-2023
In re D.V., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. D.V., Defendant and Appellant. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Solano County Super. Ct. No. J45290
STEWART, P.J.
D.V. appeals from a juvenile court order committing him to the Challenge Program after he admitted a probation violation. Due to changes in circumstances since his opening brief was filed, D.V. acknowledges that two of the three arguments he initially advanced are moot, but he asks us to find the third argument is not moot or to consider it despite its mootness. We find all three arguments moot and therefore dismiss the appeal.
BACKGROUND
This case began with a juvenile wardship petition (Welf. &Inst. Code, § 602) filed on July 7, 2021, alleging that 16-year-old D.V. committed felony possession of a firearm by a minor (Pen. Code, § 29610) (count 1) and misdemeanor possession of live ammunition by a minor (id., § 29650) (count 2). On July 15, D.V. admitted misdemeanor possession of a firearm by a minor in count 1, and count 2 was dismissed. On July 29, he was declared a ward of the court and placed on probation in the custody of his mother, with electronic monitoring.
On August 13, 2021, the probation department filed a notice of violation (Welf. &Inst. Code, § 777) after his mother reported that he had cut off his electronic ankle monitor and left home. D.V. failed to appear for the hearing on August 16 and the court issued a bench warrant.
On September 20, 2021, another Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition was filed, alleging five felony counts and two misdemeanors: felony unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) (count 1); receiving stolen property, motor vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a)) (count 2); carrying a loaded firearm (id., § 25850, subd. (a)) (count 4); having a concealed firearm in a vehicle (id., § 25400, subd. (a)(1)) (count 5); possession of a firearm by a minor (id., § 29610) (count 6); misdemeanor unlicensed driving (Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a)) (count 3) and misdemeanor possession of live ammunition by a minor (Pen. Code, § 29650) (count 7). D.V. admitted count 1 and the remaining counts were dismissed. On October 15, the court continued the wardship and returned D.V. to probation, in his mother's home, with electronic monitoring.
On March 30, 2022, the probation department filed a probation violation notice alleging D.V. had failed to obey curfew and to abstain from using marijuana. D.V. admitted the latter, the former was dismissed, and D.V. was placed on probation, in his mother's custody, on GPS.
Another probation violation notice was filed on April 22, 2022, alleging that D.V. had failed GPS. He admitted the violation and was again placed on probation, in his mother's home, on GPS.
On June 30, 2022, a third probation violation notice was filed, alleging D.V. failed GPS and failed to abstain from using marijuana. D.V. admitted the GPS failure and the other allegation was dismissed. The probation department reported that D.V.'s mother was prepared to move out of state as soon as possible to make a fresh start for D.V. and remove him from the ongoing trouble he was having in the community; she had researched housing options with family friends in Alabama and Tennessee and was financially prepared to move, and D.V. wanted to move out of state. The probation department, however, recommended that D.V. be removed from his mother's custody and committed to the Challenge Academy.
After a contested dispositional hearing on August 5, 2022, the court adopted the probation department's recommendation and committed D.V. to the care, custody and control of the probation officer for placement in the nine-month Challenge Academy program. Consistent with previous orders, the court ordered conditions of probation including that D.V. "attend counseling" of the "type determined by the Probation officer," "as directed by the Probation Officer."
D.V. arrived at the Challenge Academy on August 22, 2023. He filed a timely notice of appeal on September 28, 2022.
On April 2, 2023, D.V. failed to return to the Challenge Academy after having been released to his mother for a 52-hour furlough. The court issued a bench warrant on April 4. At a hearing on May 31, 2023, D.V. denied the allegations and a Welfare and Institutions Code section 777 hearing was set for June 14, 2023. The court ordered that D.V. be transported to and housed at the Juvenile Detention Facility (JDF).
Shortly before the time D.V. was due to return to the program, his mother called to say she did not know where he was and he was not responding to her attempts to contact him. We took judicial notice of several trial court records pertaining to these post-disposition events at the request of the People and others at D.V.'s request.
On June 14, 2023, D.V. admitted violating probation by failing to complete the Challenge Academy program. The case was set for a review hearing on September 11, 2023, and the probation department was directed to prepare an update report "regarding interstate compact &relocation to Alabama." The court authorized the probation department to release D.V. to his uncle for transportation to the Department of Motor Vehicles to obtain a California identification card and gave D.V. permission to appear remotely at the review hearing if he was residing in Alabama.
As of a hearing on July 12, 2023, D.V. was residing with his mother in Alabama.
DISCUSSION
D.V. originally raised three issues on this appeal: First, that substantial evidence did not support the juvenile court's order finding he would benefit from commitment to the Challenge Academy and moving to Alabama would not be beneficial; second, the juvenile court abused its discretion in making its commitment order without considering his ADHD diagnosis and special education needs, which are evident in the record; and third, the probation condition requiring him to participate in counseling of a type determined by the probation officer was an invalid delegation of judicial authority and unconstitutionally vague.
At the time the People filed the respondent's brief on June 12, 2023, D.V. had absconded from the Challenge Academy and the court had ordered him detained at JDF, with a Welfare and Institutions Code section 777 hearing set for June 14. Accordingly, the People argue this appeal should be dismissed as moot.
Subsequently, D.V. moved to Alabama, apparently to be supervised pursuant to the Interstate Compact for Juveniles (Welf. &Inst. Code, § 1400). In his reply brief, D.V. agrees that his arguments concerning placement at the Challenge Academy, permission to move out of state and the probation condition requiring counseling are moot. He urges, however, that his challenge to the trial court's failure to address his special educational needs is not moot because he is still under a wardship order and the issue "is a matter of continuing public interest and likely to recur."
We say "apparently" because we have not been provided with documentation of orders expressly authorizing D.V.'s move to Alabama. Our inference is based on the court records the parties have submitted to us, which (as noted in the text) show that the court directed the probation department to prepare an update report "regarding interstate compact & relocation to Alabama" and gave D.V. permission to appear remotely for the September 11, 2023 review hearing if he was residing in Alabama.
"A court is tasked with the duty' "to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it."' (Consolidated etc. Corp. v. United A. etc. Workers (1946) 27 Cal.2d 859, 863.) A case becomes moot when events' "render[ ] it impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant him any effect[ive] relief."' (Ibid.) For relief to be 'effective,' two requirements must be met. First, the plaintiff must complain of an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be redressable or capable of being rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks. (See id. at p. 865.)" (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276.)"' "[W]hen, pending an appeal from the judgment of a lower court, and without any fault of the [opposing party], an event occurs which renders it impossible for this court, if it should decide the case in favor of [defendant], to grant him any effectual relief whatever, the court will not proceed to a formal judgment, but will dismiss the appeal"' as moot. (Paul v. Milk Depots, Inc. (1964) 62 Cal.2d 129, 132, quoting Consol. etc. Corp. v. United A. etc. Workers (1946) 27 Cal.2d 859, 863.)" (People v. DeLeon (2017) 3 Cal.5th 640, 645.)
The parties agree that D.V.'s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the commitment order and to the probation condition requiring him to engage in counseling of a type determined by the probation officer are moot. We concur. The disposition order D.V. challenged is no longer applicable, as D.V. is no longer in the Challenge Academy program or even in California.
D.V. argues his claim that the trial court failed to consider his educational needs is not moot because he remains under a wardship, but we fail to see how this issue differs from the others he concedes are now moot. His argument on this appeal is that "[t]he [juvenile] court's lack of consideration of [his] ADHD and special education needs in evaluating the suitability of the Challenge Academy was an abuse of discretion." Like his other arguments, this one is directed to a disposition order that is no longer applicable. Even if we were to decide the juvenile court failed to consider D.V.'s special educational needs when it committed him to the Challenge Academy, remanding the case for reconsideration of that issue could have no practical impact on D.V.'s present circumstances. D.V. does not suggest how our addressing this issue could afford him effectual relief.
D.V. relies on In re Angela M. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1399, which concluded remand was required where the juvenile court, in committing the minor to the California Youth Authority, made no mention of the minor's educational needs despite evidence in the record that she had special educational needs, including the court-appointed psychologist's specific recommendation that she undergo an IEP assessment "to determine whether she had special educational needs." Unlike the situation in that case, where the evidence indicated a need for educational assessment that the trial court did not address, in the present case D.V. already had an IEP. Juvenile courts have an established obligation to consider a ward's educational needs. (E.g., Ed. Code, §§ 56000, 56001; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1742; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.651(b)(2)(A); Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 5.40(g).) Given the references to D.V.'s IEP at hearings and in the probation reports, and the juvenile court's presumed awareness of its legal obligation to consider a ward's educational needs (see People v. Jacobo (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1416, 1430 ["' "trial court is presumed to have known and applied the correct statutory and case law in the exercise of its official duties"' "]), we would not lightly assume the absence of explicit reference to the IEP reflected a lack of consideration.
D.V. also asks us to exercise our discretion to reach the issue even if it is moot, as "an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur." (In re William M. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 16, 23.) He argues that juvenile courts likely see many minors with special educational needs and have a duty to consider those needs. Nevertheless, the present case is not an appropriate vehicle to invoke this exception. The obligation of juvenile courts to consider wards' special educational needs when making commitment orders is established by law. (E.g., In re Angela M., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1397-1399); Ed. Code, §§ 56000 [right of individuals with exceptional needs to special educational services, 56026, subds. (a), (b) [definition of "individuals with exceptional needs" includes those with IEP], 56001, subd. (e) ["[e]ach individual with exceptional needs shall have his or her educational goals, objectives, and special education and related services specified in a written [IEP]"]; Welf. &Inst. Code, § 1742 [ward with IEP cannot be conveyed to Youth Authority until IEP provided to Department of Youth Authority]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.651(b)(2)(A) [court required to "[c]onsider and determine" at disposition whether "any need for special education and related services" being met]; Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 5.40(g) [guiding principles for juvenile court include that many children in court process have exceptional needs qualifying for special education services].) If juvenile courts are not complying with their obligations in this regard, we have no reason to suspect the issue will evade review rather than being raised in a case where it can be evaluated in the context of an actual controversy.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed as moot.
We concur: RICHMAN, J., MARKMAN, J. [*]
[*] Judge of the Alameda Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.