“[I]mmaterial matters, or matters which may be omitted from an indictment without rendering it insufficient or doing damage to the material averments, may be regarded as surplusage.” People v. Figgers, 23 Ill.2d 516, 519, 179 N.E.2d 626 (1962); People v. Crawford, 23 Ill.2d 605, 607, 179 N.E.2d 667 (1962). If the essential elements of an offense are properly charged but the manner in which the offense is committed is incorrectly alleged, the error is one of form. People v. Nathan, 282 Ill.App.3d 608, 611, 218 Ill.Dec. 164, 668 N.E.2d 648 (1996); Simpkins, 48 Ill.2d at 111, 268 N.E.2d 386.
The mere mention of a conversation or statement does not entitle the opponent to bring out its content. ( People v. Crawford (1962), 23 Ill.2d 605.) The remainder of the conversation or statement must concern "`what was said on the same subject at the same time.'"
The additional phrase was unnecessary and could be disregarded as surplusage without affecting the validity of the complaints. (See People v. Crawford (1962), 23 Ill.2d 605, 607; People v. Adams (1970), 46 Ill.2d 200.) The particular means by which each defendant participated in the creation of the disturbance was not critical, and the fact that none of the individual defendants had fired a revolver was immaterial.
The additional allegation of physical contact is, at most, unnecessary surplusage which does not constitute a fatal defect, and ought to be so treated. People v. Adams, 46 Ill.2d 200, 204; People v. Figgers, 23 Ill.2d 516; People v. Crawford, 23 Ill.2d 605. DAVIS and RYAN, JJ., join in this dissent.
In view of the fact of the court's prompt action and the fact that the testimony was not adduced by action of the State, we feel that the court was not in error in denying the motions for a mistrial. People v. Crawford, 23 Ill.2d 605; People v. Burage, 23 Ill.2d 280. The defendant next contends that the trial court erred in giving the following instruction to the jury, on the defendant's defense of an alibi: "The court instructs the jury that before a defendant can avail himself of the defense of an alibi, the proof must cover the whole of the time of the commission of the crime, so as to render it impossible or highly improbable, that the defendant could have committed the act; and unless the proof in a case covers the whole time, so as to render the commission of the crime by a defendant impossible or highly improbable, then that defense is not available to such defendant."
be regarded as surplusage." People v. Figgers, 23 Ill.2d 516, 519 (1962); People v. Crawford, 23 Ill.2d 605, 607 (1962). If the essential elements of an offense
While the conversation is privileged, it is important to look at how the trial court cured any conflict. Both People v. Crawford, 23 Ill.2d 605 (1962), and People v. Burage, 23 Ill.2d 280 (1961), are instructive on this issue. In Crawford, a jury found the defendant guilty of burglary.
The completeness doctrine permits an opposing party to introduce the remainder of an utterance or writing, or so much as is required of the statement or writing, to explain, qualify, or otherwise shed light on the meaning of the evidence already received. ( Lawson v. G.D. Searle Co. (1976), 64 Ill.2d 543; People v. Provo (1951), 409 Ill. 63.) The mere mention of a conversation or statement does not entitle the opponent to bring out its content ( People v. Crawford (1962), 23 Ill.2d 605); the admission of any prior statement under the completeness rule is subject to the proscriptions of relevance and materiality ( People v. Andersch (1982), 107 Ill. App.3d 810, 811). That is, the remainder of the conversation or statement to be admitted must concern "`what was said on the same subject at the same time. [Citations.]'" (Emphasis in original.
In reliance upon Rogers, we therefore hold that the testimony of Investigators Doyle and Dignan, regarding Garfield's out-of-court identification of the persons who shot him, is admissible to corroborate Garfield's in-court identification. • 5 We also note, as the trial court so held, that the testimony of the police investigators was admissible as Garfield Johnson's spontaneous utterances. ( People v. Crawford (1962), 23 Ill.2d 605, 179 N.E.2d 667; see People v. Olmos (1978), 67 Ill. App.3d 281, 384 N.E.2d 853; People v. Buckley (1976), 43 Ill. App.3d 53, 356 N.E.2d 1113.) The statements related to the circumstances of an occurrence that was sufficiently startling and that would produce a spontaneous and unreflecting statement due to an absence of time to fabricate.
• 3 Nor was this statement admissible as part of the res gestae, as it was not spontaneous and not given to the police until 36 hours after the offense. People v. Crawford (1962), 23 Ill.2d 605; People v. Smith (1965), 55 Ill. App.2d 480. • 4 Because none of the above mentioned exceptions are relevant in the instant case, it is clear that the sole purpose in introducing the out-of-court consistent statement was to bolster up or corroborate the in-court testimony of the witness; indeed in closing argument the State's Attorney asked the jury to compare the two statements and their consistency.