The People v. Crawford

14 Citing cases

  1. People v. Lattimore

    2011 Ill. App. 93238 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011)   Cited 15 times

    “[I]mmaterial matters, or matters which may be omitted from an indictment without rendering it insufficient or doing damage to the material averments, may be regarded as surplusage.” People v. Figgers, 23 Ill.2d 516, 519, 179 N.E.2d 626 (1962); People v. Crawford, 23 Ill.2d 605, 607, 179 N.E.2d 667 (1962). If the essential elements of an offense are properly charged but the manner in which the offense is committed is incorrectly alleged, the error is one of form. People v. Nathan, 282 Ill.App.3d 608, 611, 218 Ill.Dec. 164, 668 N.E.2d 648 (1996); Simpkins, 48 Ill.2d at 111, 268 N.E.2d 386.

  2. People v. Patterson

    154 Ill. 2d 414 (Ill. 1992)   Cited 174 times
    In Patterson, a police officer, on direct examination by the State, testified that the defendant said he understood his Miranda warnings.

    The mere mention of a conversation or statement does not entitle the opponent to bring out its content. ( People v. Crawford (1962), 23 Ill.2d 605.) The remainder of the conversation or statement must concern "`what was said on the same subject at the same time.'"

  3. The People v. Simpkins

    48 Ill. 2d 106 (Ill. 1971)   Cited 27 times
    Upholding a mob action conviction, despite no proof of any injuries, where one group marched down the street to confront another group in a manner reasonably capable of inspiring fear of injury or harm

    The additional phrase was unnecessary and could be disregarded as surplusage without affecting the validity of the complaints. (See People v. Crawford (1962), 23 Ill.2d 605, 607; People v. Adams (1970), 46 Ill.2d 200.) The particular means by which each defendant participated in the creation of the disturbance was not critical, and the fact that none of the individual defendants had fired a revolver was immaterial.

  4. The People v. Abrams

    48 Ill. 2d 446 (Ill. 1971)   Cited 74 times
    In People v. Abrams (1971), 48 Ill.2d 446, it was held that a complaint which failed to charge either that the physical contact was of an insulting or provoking nature or caused bodily harm did not allege all the material facts constituting the offense of battery.

    The additional allegation of physical contact is, at most, unnecessary surplusage which does not constitute a fatal defect, and ought to be so treated. People v. Adams, 46 Ill.2d 200, 204; People v. Figgers, 23 Ill.2d 516; People v. Crawford, 23 Ill.2d 605. DAVIS and RYAN, JJ., join in this dissent.

  5. The People v. Naujokas

    25 Ill. 2d 32 (Ill. 1962)   Cited 67 times

    In view of the fact of the court's prompt action and the fact that the testimony was not adduced by action of the State, we feel that the court was not in error in denying the motions for a mistrial. People v. Crawford, 23 Ill.2d 605; People v. Burage, 23 Ill.2d 280. The defendant next contends that the trial court erred in giving the following instruction to the jury, on the defendant's defense of an alibi: "The court instructs the jury that before a defendant can avail himself of the defense of an alibi, the proof must cover the whole of the time of the commission of the crime, so as to render it impossible or highly improbable, that the defendant could have committed the act; and unless the proof in a case covers the whole time, so as to render the commission of the crime by a defendant impossible or highly improbable, then that defense is not available to such defendant."

  6. People v. Enoh

    2023 Ill. App. 3d 210513 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023)

    be regarded as surplusage." People v. Figgers, 23 Ill.2d 516, 519 (1962); People v. Crawford, 23 Ill.2d 605, 607 (1962). If the essential elements of an offense

  7. People v. Murry

    305 Ill. App. 3d 311 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999)   Cited 8 times
    Applying the subjective analysis test and finding no waiver because the disclosure was inadvertent

    While the conversation is privileged, it is important to look at how the trial court cured any conflict. Both People v. Crawford, 23 Ill.2d 605 (1962), and People v. Burage, 23 Ill.2d 280 (1961), are instructive on this issue. In Crawford, a jury found the defendant guilty of burglary.

  8. People v. Cowper

    145 Ill. App. 3d 1074 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)   Cited 12 times
    In Cowper, the defendant was charged with residential burglary after being apprehended while the offense was apparently in progress.

    The completeness doctrine permits an opposing party to introduce the remainder of an utterance or writing, or so much as is required of the statement or writing, to explain, qualify, or otherwise shed light on the meaning of the evidence already received. ( Lawson v. G.D. Searle Co. (1976), 64 Ill.2d 543; People v. Provo (1951), 409 Ill. 63.) The mere mention of a conversation or statement does not entitle the opponent to bring out its content ( People v. Crawford (1962), 23 Ill.2d 605); the admission of any prior statement under the completeness rule is subject to the proscriptions of relevance and materiality ( People v. Andersch (1982), 107 Ill. App.3d 810, 811). That is, the remainder of the conversation or statement to be admitted must concern "`what was said on the same subject at the same time. [Citations.]'" (Emphasis in original.

  9. People v. Miller

    101 Ill. App. 3d 1029 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)   Cited 29 times

    In reliance upon Rogers, we therefore hold that the testimony of Investigators Doyle and Dignan, regarding Garfield's out-of-court identification of the persons who shot him, is admissible to corroborate Garfield's in-court identification. • 5 We also note, as the trial court so held, that the testimony of the police investigators was admissible as Garfield Johnson's spontaneous utterances. ( People v. Crawford (1962), 23 Ill.2d 605, 179 N.E.2d 667; see People v. Olmos (1978), 67 Ill. App.3d 281, 384 N.E.2d 853; People v. Buckley (1976), 43 Ill. App.3d 53, 356 N.E.2d 1113.) The statements related to the circumstances of an occurrence that was sufficiently startling and that would produce a spontaneous and unreflecting statement due to an absence of time to fabricate.

  10. People v. Buckley

    356 N.E.2d 1113 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976)   Cited 27 times
    In People v. Buckley (1976), 43 Ill. App.3d 53, 356 N.E.2d 1113, this court found that the sole purpose in introducing the out-of-court consistent statements was to bolster up or corroborate the in-court testimony of the witness and found that this improper bolstering so prejudiced the defendant there that he was deprived of a fair trial.

    • 3 Nor was this statement admissible as part of the res gestae, as it was not spontaneous and not given to the police until 36 hours after the offense. People v. Crawford (1962), 23 Ill.2d 605; People v. Smith (1965), 55 Ill. App.2d 480. • 4 Because none of the above mentioned exceptions are relevant in the instant case, it is clear that the sole purpose in introducing the out-of-court consistent statement was to bolster up or corroborate the in-court testimony of the witness; indeed in closing argument the State's Attorney asked the jury to compare the two statements and their consistency.