The People v. Chronister

8 Citing cases

  1. The People v. Walker

    192 N.E.2d 833 (Ill. 1963)

    In our opinion only the first of these contentions need be considered. It is clear from a reading of the decisions of this court construing the confidence game statute that one of the factors essential to a conviction thereunder is proof of knowledge by defendant that the check was worthless. ( Pierce v. People, 81 Ill. 98; People v. Burley, 357 Ill. 584; People v. Chronister, 379 Ill. 617.) The cases cited by the State, People v. Massie, 311 Ill. 319; People v. Shaw, 300 Ill. 451; People v. Mutchler, 309 Ill. 207, all involve factual situations establishing defendant's awareness of the falsity of the documents he was using or statements he was making. The State would have us infer such knowledge from defendant's denial at the police station that he cashed the check.

  2. The People v. Livermore

    60 N.E.2d 413 (Ill. 1945)   Cited 4 times

    " In the more recent case of People v. Chronister, 379 Ill. 617, we said: "The court also permitted the testimony of the witnesses above mentioned relating to the giving of checks by the defendant after July 30th, the date of the alleged crime. The competency of such evidence in general was thoroughly analyzed by this court in People v. Hobbs, 297 Ill. 399, where it was said that as a general rule evidence of a subsequent crime without proof of crimes of a like character previous to the offense is not admissible in evidence.

  3. People v. Prather

    485 N.E.2d 430 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)   Cited 9 times

    However, where an erroneous instruction is given, the giving of a correct instruction on behalf of defendant will not cure the error. ( People v. Chronister (1942), 379 Ill. 617, 621, 41 N.E.2d 750, 752.) This is because it cannot be determined whether the jury followed the correct or the erroneous instruction.

  4. People v. Mitchell

    95 Ill. App. 3d 779 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)   Cited 11 times
    Holding that the clock for a defendant's speedy-trial rights stopped when the state's original criminal action terminated in a manner "analogous to a finding of no probable cause," and that the clock started over when a grand jury issued an indictment based on the same arrest

    Defendant appears not to be apprised of this rule. He cites this court to some general language contained in People v. Chronister (1942), 379 Ill. 617, 622-23, 41 N.E.2d 750, for the proposition that evidence of subsequent crimes is never admissible because it is contrary to the presumption of innocence. The supreme court later narrowed this holding with clarifying language in People v. Lehman (1955), 5 Ill.2d 337, 343, 125 N.E.2d 506.

  5. People v. Hill

    371 N.E.2d 1257 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978)   Cited 8 times
    Affirming defendant's multiple convictions for unlawful delivery where defendant delivered separate packets of a controlled substance to different individuals

    Defendant agrees that proof of prior similar offenses is admissible to show identity, modus operandi, knowledge, motive, intent, accident or absence of mistake if they are issues in the case, but that such evidence is inadmissible to simply show propensity to commit the offenses charged. ( People v. Cole (1963), 29 Ill.2d 501, 194 N.E.2d 269.) He cites People v. Chronister (1942), 379 Ill. 617, 41 N.E.2d 750, which holds that in a prosecution for forgery evidence of a subsequent forgery is not admissible for the purpose of proving knowledge and intent at the time of the first forgery. • 1 Defendant's authorities do not focus upon the actual question.

  6. People v. Campbell

    328 N.E.2d 608 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975)   Cited 35 times
    Holding that exclusion of evidence that the defendant had returned stolen funds to the victim was not prejudicial where the defendant presented substantially the same evidence during his testimony

    The State's evidence proves that the defendant also cashed that check and failed to deliver the funds to the East Side Levee and Sanitary District. Since it was the first check that was the basis for the charge in the instant case, the defendant argues that it was prejudicial error for the State to introduce evidence concerning the second $420 check. • 8, 9 As a general rule proof of an offense subsequent to the date of the alleged crime is contrary to the presumption of innocence and is not admissible. ( People v. Chronister, 379 Ill. 617, 41 N.E.2d 750.) Evidence of subsequent crimes is admissible, however, where it tends to establish motive or intent, absence of mistake or the existence of a common scheme or design. ( People v. McDonald, 23 Ill. App.3d 86, 318 N.E.2d 489; People v. Nelson, 17 Ill. App.3d 224, 308 N.E.2d 122.)

  7. People v. Hill

    240 N.E.2d 801 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968)   Cited 7 times

    People v. Priola, 395 Ill. 269, 70 N.E.2d 46 (1946). [7] Defendant concedes that similar offenses which occurred prior to the alleged crimes may be introduced into evidence to show intent, but argues that offenses which occurred subsequent to the alleged crime are inadmissible, citing People v. Chronister, 379 Ill. 617, 41 N.E.2d 750 (1942); People v. Moshiek, 323 Ill. 11, 153 N.E. 720 (1926), which so held. The rationale of those cases was that proof of offenses subsequent to the alleged crime was contrary to the presumption of innocence, and could not establish a guilty intent on a prior occasion. However, in People v. Lehman, 5 Ill.2d 337, 125 N.E.2d 506 (1955), the court allowed evidence of other armed robberies committed subsequent to the offense charged.

  8. People v. Marks

    211 N.E.2d 548 (Ill. App. Ct. 1965)   Cited 7 times

    The three checks were passed by a Mrs. Nelson at the direction of the defendants and were cashed in a period of minutes in three different taverns in close proximity to each other. Defendants contend the admission of the two checks not charged in the indictment was evidence of subsequent offenses of forgery and not admissible for the purpose of proving guilt. The People v. Chronister, 379 Ill. 617, 623, 41 N.E.2d 750. The checks here used were not in fact subsequent offenses but were all part of the same transaction and were admissible to show intent of the defendant in committing the forgery. People v. Bailey, supra; People v. Church, 366 Ill. 149, 7 N.E.2d 894; People v. Dunham, 344 Ill. 268, 176 N.E. 325.