Opinion
G062574
09-13-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DEONTA MARK BELL, Defendant and Appellant.
Savannah Montanez, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Kristin A. Ramirez and Steve Oetting, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County No. 16NF0608, Andre Manssourian, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
Savannah Montanez, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Kristin
A. Ramirez and Steve Oetting, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
GOETHALS, ACTING P. J.
Deonta Mark Bell moved the trial court to suppress evidence obtained during an allegedly unlawful police stop. The trial court denied his motion, and Bell pleaded guilty to five misdemeanor charges. On appeal, Bell contends the trial court should have granted his motion. The Attorney General agrees. Specifically, the parties agree police officers unlawfully detained Bell in a parked vehicle although they lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The parties also agree the subsequent search of Bell's person was unlawful because the illegal detention rendered his consent involuntary. We accept the concession; we therefore reverse the trial court's ruling.
FACTS
The essential facts are not contested. An anonymous person reported to 911 that a "suspicious" vehicle was parked on the street outside her residence in the city of Fullerton for approximately three days. The person reported individuals were coming and going from the vehicle. Two police officers drove to the residence. The first police officer observed a gray van parked outside the address mentioned in the report. That officer testified the gray van matched the caller's description. Both officers testified Bell was seated in the van's front passenger seat, and his uncle was seated in the backseat.
The first officer to arrive parked, got out of his vehicle, and approached the van. He used a spotlight and handheld flashlight to illuminate the van's interior. He observed two occupants inside. He then knocked on the driver's side window and attempted to open the locked driver's side door. One of the men opened the door to speak with the police officer. The police officer noticed Bell was not wearing shoes; he also saw a baseball bat between the seats.
When a second police officer arrived, the officers assumed positions on either side of the van. One of the officers asked Bell to exit the van. Bell complied and consented to be searched. The police officer found a Wells Fargo credit card and driver's license belonging to someone else in Bell's rear pants pocket. The police officer later spoke with the owner of the credit card and license who confirmed the items were missing.
Bell was charged with multiple felony and misdemeanor counts for possessing the stolen cards. He moved to suppress the evidence, alleging he had been unlawfully detained and searched.
The police officers testified at the suppression hearing. One officer testified he was aware of the Fullerton parking ordinance preventing people from leaving a car parked in the same location for 72 hours (Fullerton Mun. Code, § 8.44.180), but he did not know how long the van had been parked on the street or when the anonymous report was made. He confirmed that the anonymous report lacked specific details such as the van's make, model, year, or license plate number, or a description of its occupants. The report did not indicate whether the occupants were engaged in illegal activity. The officer testified he did not contact the anonymous reporter to obtain more information even though he had her phone number. He did not conduct any independent investigation. He based his contact with Bell solely on the information provided in the anonymous report.
Bell asserted this encounter was an illegal nonconsensual detention because no reasonable person would feel free to leave after a police officer shined a light in the van, knocked on the window, and tried to open the door. He argued the police officers did not have reasonable suspicion for the detention because the anonymous report provided only a vague description of the van and its occupants; it therefore lacked specific and articulable facts which might support a detention. Bell further argued his consent to the police officer's request to search was the result of his submission to authority.
The prosecution argued the encounter was consensual because it involved only a brief, casual conversation before Bell agreed to the search. Alternatively, if it was a detention, the police officers had reasonable suspicion to detain Bell because the anonymous report was reliable since the gray van's presence at the location corroborated the facts in the anonymous report. The prosecutor argued Bell's bare feet indicated he had been staying in the van for some time. And finally, the People claimed Bell's consent was offered freely, specifically stating the search was not a Terry frisk. (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1 (Terry).)
The trial court denied Bell's motion, finding Bell consented to both the encounter and the search. Bell subsequently pleaded guilty to (1) misdemeanor identity theft (Pen. Code, § 530.5, subd. (a)); (2) misdemeanor access card acquisition (§ 484e, subd. (d)); (3) misdemeanor identity theft (§ 530.5, subd. (c)(1)); (4) misdemeanor receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)); and (5) misdemeanor obstructing a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)). Bell was sentenced to 280 days in jail and one year of informal probation.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
Bell appeals from the trial court's denial of his suppression motion.
DISCUSSION
On appeal Bell raises the following three issues: (1) was he lawfully detained; (2) did the police officers have reasonable suspicion to detain him; and (3) was the search of his pants pocket lawful? The Attorney General concedes all three issues in Bell's favor. We accept this concession and reverse the judgment.
Our standard of review for suppression motions is well settled. We defer to a trial court's "factual findings if supported by substantial evidence," and "independently assess the legal question of whether the challenged search or seizure satisfies the Fourth Amendment." (People v. Brown (2015) 61 Cal.4th 968, 975.)
For Fourth Amendment purposes, a consensual encounter becomes a detention when a police officer restrains a person's freedom of movement '""by means of physical force or show of authority."'" (Brendlin v. California (2007) 551 U.S. 249, 254.) The court measures a police officer's '"coercive effect"' by asking whether a reasonable person under the totality of the circumstances would feel free to depart from the encounter. (Brown, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 977.) Among other factors, the court considers whether the person submitted to the police officer's show of authority. (Ibid.)
Here a police officer parked behind Bell's vehicle, illuminated the interior with a spotlight and flashlight, approached the vehicle, knocked on the window, and attempted to open the locked vehicle door. The Attorney General concedes that no reasonable person would feel free to terminate such an encounter with a police officer and leave the area. The van's passengers submitted to the police officer's show of authority by unlocking the door, engaging with the officers' inquiries, and complying with their requests.
Since we find that Bell was detained, we must determine whether the police officer had a reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in illegal activity when the detention occurred. An investigatory detention is unlawful where an officer lacks reasonable suspicion that the detainee was engaged in criminal activity. (Brown, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 981.) A police officer's reasonable suspicion must be based on specific and articulable facts known to the officer and considered in the totality of the circumstances. (Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 21.)
An anonymous report to the police must have sufficient indicia of reliability for a police officer to justify conducting an investigatory stop. (Florida v. J.L. (2000) 529 U.S. 266, 270.) An anonymous report may be considered reliable if it contains specific information and is corroborated, both in identifying the subject at issue and in its "knowledge of concealed criminal activity." (Id. at p. 272.)
The anonymous report in this case did not contain information sufficient to satisfy that standard. The first officer on the scene admitted he did not take any steps to test the report's reliability or seek specific information about the van's occupants. There is no evidence suggesting the anonymous reporter or the police officer observed any illegal activity. The detention was therefore unlawful.
Finally, we must determine whether the search of Bell's pants pocket was lawful. Where the prosecution relies on the defendant's consent to justify a warrantless search, the prosecutor bears the burden of proving the consent was voluntary. (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th. 327, 341.) "Consent that is the product of an illegal detention is not voluntary and is ineffective to justify a search or seizure." (Ibid.)
Here the Attorney General concedes Bell was unlawfully detained at the time he proffered consent. His consent was therefore not voluntary, and the search was unlawful.
DISPOSITION
We reverse the trial court's judgment. On remand, we direct the trial court to vacate the order denying Bell's suppression motion and enter an order granting Bell's motion.
WE CONCUR: MOTOIKE, J. GOODING, J.