Still, in light of the case law cited by the State, we examine its argument further. Citing the aforementioned Committee Comments and People v. Armes, 28 Ill. 2d 83, 86 (1963), the State argues that the only elements necessary to prove forgery are that a person made a false document capable of defrauding another, with the intent to defraud. We note that Armes pertained to a 1955 forgery statute, prior to the 1961 recodification.

Constitutional questions can be and are waived unless asserted at the trial, People v. Bruckman, 33 Ill.2d 150, 210 N.E.2d 537 (1965), and when the appellant failed to object to the comments at the time they occurred and failed to raise the objection in a written motion for a new trial they are deemed waived. People v. Serrano, 32 Ill.2d 84, 203 N.E.2d 885 (1965); People v. Donald, 29 Ill.2d 283, 194 N.E.2d 227 (1963); People v. Armes, 28 Ill.2d 83, 190 N.E.2d 812 (1963). The fact that the defendant was appearing pro se cannot be used as an excuse for failing to object, since counsel had been appointed to advise him.

The fact that defendant was appearing pro se cannot be used as an excuse for failing to object, particularly since counsel had been appointed and was available to advise him. ( People v. Richardson, 17 Ill.2d 253.) Constitutional questions can be and are waived unless asserted at the trial ( People v. Bruckman, 33 Ill.2d 150), and when no objections are made to questions or comments at the time they occurred nor raised in a written motion for a new trial, they are deemed waived. ( People v. Serrano, 32 Ill.2d 84; People v. Donald, 29 Ill.2d 283; People v. Armes, 28 Ill.2d 83.) In any event, the remarks here complained of were provoked by defendant's own actions in persisting in a line of questioning to which an objection had been sustained.

The petitioner, John H. Armes, was convicted of forgery after a jury trial in the circuit court of Franklin County and sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of 7 to 14 years. This court, on writ of error, affirmed his conviction in 28 Ill.2d 83. Petitioner now appeals to this court from an order of the trial court denying his petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, chap. 38, par. 122-1 et seq.) He contends that the delay between the return of an indictment against him and commencement of his trial on September 26, 1960, deprived him of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. It is the State's contention that the doctrines of res judicata or waiver preclude the petitioner from properly raising this issue here. The petitioner did not move for discharge on the ground that he had been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial prior to trial, at trial, nor in his post-trial motions.

It is sufficient answer to these contentions that since no objections were made to the questions or comments at the time they occurred nor challenges made to their propriety in the written motion for a new trial, they are deemed waived. People v. Donald, 29 Ill.2d 283, 287; People v. Armes, 28 Ill.2d 83, 87. The judgment of the criminal court of Cook County is affirmed.

However, points not raised in defendant's motion for a new trial are waived and generally will not be considered on appeal. People v. Pickett (1973), 54 Ill.2d 280, 282; People v. Armes (1963), 28 Ill.2d 83, 87; People v. Zielinski (1957), 10 Ill.2d 473, 478. "The purpose of this rule is apparent.

The State argues that the defendant has waived this issue by failing to object to the closing arguments and by failing to raise the issue in the post-trial motion for a new trial. ( People v. Moore (1973), 55 Ill.2d 570, 304 N.E.2d 622; People v. Armes (1963), 28 Ill.2d 83, 190 N.E.2d 812.) The defendant argues that the remarks are so prejudicial that they constitute plain error, noticeable by this court under Supreme Court Rule 615(a).

In the instant case defendant not only exposed himself to the girl, he held his penis, swung it and smiled while attempting to corner her against a building. Such conduct on the part of defendant is sufficient to allow an inference to be drawn that he had the intent to arouse or satisfy his sexual desires. The words "or other person" found in the complaint are immaterial and may therefor be disregarded as surplusage. ( People v. Armes (1963), 28 Ill.2d 83, 86; People v. Figgers (1962), 23 Ill.2d 516, 519.) The evidence brought out at the trial of this case was therefore not at variance with the complaint.

People v. Malmenato, 14 Ill.2d 52, 59, 150 N.E.2d 806 (1958); People v. Booher, 73 Ill. App.2d 226, 229, 218 N.E.2d 779 (1966). [11, 12] The defendant also complains that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the purpose of the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, as set forth in defendant's instruction number 8. Such alleged error need not be considered in that it was not set forth in defendant's written motion for new trial (People v. Armes, 28 Ill.2d 83, 87, 190 N.E.2d 812 (1963); People v. Hunter, 23 Ill.2d 177, 178, 177 N.E.2d 138 (1961); People v. Flynn, 8 Ill.2d 116, 118, 119, 133 N.E.2d 257 (1956)), and because the defendant failed to abstract all of the instructions which were tendered and given. People v. Bybee, 9 Ill.2d 214, 221, 137 N.E.2d 251 (1956); People v. Weil, 243 Ill. 208, 214, 90 N.E. 731 (1910).