Thus, it is historically the fact that the Massachusetts rule that the language in an insurance policy must be "construed in the sense that the insured will reasonably understand" developed in association with the rule that ambiguity is to be resolved against the insurer. Also relevant is Middlesex Ins. Co. v. American Emp. Ins. Co., ___ Mass.App. ___, 400 N.E.2d 882 (Mass.App. 1980), which focused on the effect a provision would have in sharply limiting coverage otherwise available under a policy. The issue was construction and enfprceability of a clause within a garage liability policy purporting to exclude coverage for damage to premises wherein the garage was located.

Despite National's unsupported contention to the contrary, the critical, but undefined, term "professional services" in National's CGL policy is ambiguous and requires our construction because it is "reasonably susceptible to varying readings." Middlesex Ins. Co. v. American Employers Ins. Co., 9 Mass. App. Ct. 855, 856 (1980). See also Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Offices Unlimited, Inc., 419 Mass. 462, 466 (1995).

Ober v. National Cas. Co., 318 Mass. 27, 30 (1945). Middlesex Ins. Co. v. American Employers Ins. Co., 9 Mass. App. Ct. 855, 856 (1980). It must be shown that reasonably intelligent persons would differ as to which one of two or more meanings is the proper one.

" Id. Moreover, when the terms of an insurance policy are ambiguous, any doubt "as to the intended meaning of the words must be resolved against the insurance company that employed them and in favor of the insured." Sullivan at 444 (quoting County of Barnstable v. American Financial Corp., 51 Mass. App. Ct. at 215, quoting from August A. Busch Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 339 Mass. 239, 243 (1959)); Middlesex Ins. Co. v. American Employment Ins. Co., 9 Mass. App. Ct. 855, 856 (1980) (concluding that any ambiguous insurance policy provision "must be construed against the insurer, the author of the policy"); Biathrow v. Continental Casualty Co., 371 Mass. 249, 251 (1976) (ruling that ambiguities in an insurance policy, as matter of law "are to be resolved against the insurer and the construction more favorable to the insured is to be adopted"). Furthermore, when interpreting the insurance policy, "exclusions from coverage are to be strictly construed so as not to diminish the protection purchased by the insured . . ." Middlesex Ins. Co., 9 Mass. App. Ct. at 856; see also Bates v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 6 Mass. App. Ct. 823 (1978).

An ambiguity exists within the policy when the language in an insurance contract is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning. Middlesex Ins. Co. v. American Employers Ins. Co., 9 Mass. App. Ct. 855, 856, 400 N.E.2d 882, 883 (1980) (rescript). However, "difficulty in comprehension does not equate with ambiguity," and an ambiguity is not "created simply because a controversy exists between the parties, each favoring an interpretation contrary to the other."

See Rezendes v. Prudential Ins. Co., 285 Mass. 505, 511 (1934); Joseph E. Bennett Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 344 Mass. 99, 103-104 (1962); Hakim v. Massachusetts Insurers' Insolvency Fund, 424 Mass. 275, 281-282 (1997); Bates v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 6 Mass. App. Ct. 823, 824 (1978). Courts construe any ambiguity in an exclusionary clause against the insurer. See Vappi Co. v. Aetna Cas. Sur. Co., 348 Mass. 427, 431 (1965); Hakim v. Massachusetts Insurers' Insolvency Fund, supra at 282; Middlesex Ins. Co. v. American Employers Ins. Co. 9 Mass. App. Ct. 855, 856 (1980). Because Utica Mutual sought to enforce an exclusion from coverage and because it committed a breach of its contractual duty to defend, it carried the burden of proof of noncoverage.

See, e.g., Vappi Co. v. Aetna Cas. Sur. Co., 348 Mass. 427, 431 (1965). See also Ratner v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 359 Mass. 375, 381 (1971); Morin v. Massachusetts Blue Cross, Inc., 365 Mass. 379, 390 (1974); Middlesex Ins. Co. v. American Employers Ins. Co., 9 Mass. App. Ct. 855, 856 (1970). The wrongs to which the policy language extends are those which cause "property damage."

"[E]xclusions from coverage are to be strictly construed so as not to diminish the protection purchased by the insured . . ." See Middlesex Ins. Co. v. American Employment Ins. Co., 9 Mass. App. Ct. 855, 856 (1980) (rescript); see also Bates v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 6 Mass. App. Ct. 823, 824 (1978). The policies in issue here cover liability for injury to property "resulting from an occurrence."