(Citations and punctuation omitted.) The Hammer Corp. v. Wade, 278 Ga. App. 214, 218 (2), 628 S.E.2d 638 (2006). See also McLane, 269 Ga. at 609 (2), 503 S.E.2d 278 (exclusion of third party beneficiaries from the stranger doctrine has been expanded to cover those who benefit from the contract of others); Mabra, 316 Ga. App. at 65, 728 S.E.2d 737 ("Those who have a direct economic interest in or would benefit from a contract with which they are alleged to have interfered (even though not intended third-party beneficiaries of the contract) are not strangers to the contract[.
In interpreting a promissory note, we first decide whether the language is clear and unambiguous. Hammer Corp. v. Wade, 278 Ga. App. 214, 217 (1) ( 628 SE2d 638) (2006). If the language is unambiguous, we enforce the agreement according to its terms. Id. Section 7 does not state that the written notice of default provided by the Bank must include a demand for past due amounts or spell out Ram-Mar's right to cure within ten days.
4 G Properties, LLC, supra.The Hammer Corp. v. Wade, 278 Ga. App. 214, 217 (1) ( 628 SE2d 638) (2006). (Footnote omitted.)
See id.Hammer Corp. v. Wade, 278 Ga. App. 214, 217 (1) ( 628 SE2d 638) (2006). See id.
(Punctuation omitted.) Hammer Corp. v. Wade, 278 Ga. App. 214, 217 (1) ( 628 SE2d 638) (2006). See Krogh, supra at 37-38.
[L]anguage is unambiguous if it is capable of only one reasonable interpretation." Hammer Corp. v. Wade, 628 S.E.2d 638, 641 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (alteration in original) (citation and quotation marks omitted). When analyzing a disputed contract under the first step of Georgia's contract construction inquiry, if "the words in th[e] contract are plain and obvious, they must be given their literal meaning," and "unambiguous terms are taken in their plain, ordinary and popular sense as supplied by dictionaries."
Language is ambiguous if it admits more than one reasonable interpretation. See Hammer Corp. v. Wade, 628 S.E.2d 638, 641 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) ("[L]anguage is unambiguous if it is capable of only one reasonable interpretation." (alteration in original) (quoting Caswell v. Anderson, 527 S.E.2d 582, 584 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000))); St. Charles Foods, Inc. v. Am.'s Favorite Chicken Co., 198 F.3d 815, 820 (11th Cir. 1999) ("A contract term is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation."
Alea London Ltd. V. Am. Home Servs., Inc., 638 F.3d 768, 773-74 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation omitted). See Hammer Corp. v. Wade, 278 Ga. App. 214, 217 (2006); see also O.C.G.A. § 13-2-2. O.C.G.A. § 13-2-1.
See id. "If a contract contains no ambiguity, the court enforces the agreement according to its clear terms, and the contract alone is looked to for its meaning." Hammer Corp. v. Wade, 278 Ga.App. 214, 217, 628 S.E.2d 638 (2006). If the contract is ambiguous, the court applies the rules of contract construction to resolve the ambiguity.
In Georgia, "language is unambiguous if it is capable of only one reasonable interpretation." See Hammer Corp. v. Wade, 628 S.E.2d 638, 641 (Ga.Ct.App. 2006). Although the Plaintiff's contention that stacked payees are joint payees might arguably be one reasonable interpretation, the conclusion that they are alternative payees is certainly also reasonable, as demonstrated by the holdings of the several other state courts discussed previously.