Cases citing each of the factors listed above include: (a) prior disciplinary offenses: Matter of Walton, 251 N.W.2d 762 (N.D. 1977), People v. Vernon, 660 P.2d 879 (Colo. 1982); (b) dishonest or selfish motive: In re: James H. Dineen, SJC-535 (Maine 1980); (c) pattern of misconduct: The Florida Bar v. Mavrides, 442 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 1983); State v. Dixon, 233 Kan. 465, 664 P.2d 286 (1983); (d) multiple offenses: State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Warzya, 624 P.2d 1068 (Okla. 1981), Ballard v. State Bar of California, 35 Cal. 3d 274, 673 P.2d 226, 197 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1983); (e) bad faith obstruction of disciplinary proceedings In re Brody, 65 Ill. 2d 152, 357 N.E.2d 498 (1976), Committee on Prof. Ethics v. Brodsky, 318 N.W.2d 180 (lowa 1982); (f) lack of candor during the disciplinary process: In re Stillo, 68 Ill. 2d 49, 368 N.E.2d 897 (1977), Weir v. State Bar, 23 Cal. 3d 564, 591 P.2d 19, 152 Cal. Rptr 921 (1979); (g) refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct: Greenbaum v. State Bar, 18 Cal. 3d 893 544 P.2d 921 126 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1976), H. Parker Stanley v. Bd. of Professional Responsibility, 640 S.W.2d 210 (Tenn. 1982); (h) vulnerability of victim: People v. Lanza, 613 P.2d 337 (Colo.

Cases citing each of the factors listed above include: (a) prior disciplinary offenses: Matter of Walton, 251 N.W.2d 762 (N.D. 1977), People v. Vernon, 660 P.2d 879 (Colo. 1982); (b) dishonest or selfish motive: In re: James H. Dineen, SJC-535 (Maine 1980); (c) pattern of misconduct: The Florida Bar v. Mavrides, 442 So.2d 220 (Fla. 1983); State v. Dixon, 233 Kan. 465, 664 P.2d 286 (1983); (d) multiple offenses: State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Warzya, 624 P.2d 1068 (Okla. 1981), Ballard v. State Bar of California, 35 Cal.3d 274, 673 P.2d 226, 197 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1983); (e) bad faith obstruction of disciplinary proceedings: In re Brody, 65 Ill.2d 152, 65 Ill.2d 152, 2 Ill.Dec. 331, 357 N.E.2d 498 (1976), Committee on Prol. Ethics v. Brodsky. 318 N.W.2d 180 (Iowa 1982); (f) lack of candor during the disciplinary process: In re Stillo, 68 Ill.2d 49, 68 Ill.2d 49, 11 Ill.Dec. 289, 368 N.E.2d 897 (1977), Weir v. State Bar, 23 Cal.3d 564, 591 P.2d 19, 152 Cal.Rptr. 921 (1979); (g) refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct; Greenbaum v. State Bar, 18 Cal.3d 893, 544 P.2d 921, 126 Cal.Rptr. 785 (1976), H. Parker Stanley v. Bd. of Professional Responsibility, 640 S.W.2d 210 (Tenn. 1982): (h) vulnerability of victim: People v. Lanza, 200 Colo. 241, 613 P.2d 337 (Colo.

(Laing's prior proceedings involved eleven violations, resulting in a sixty-day suspension, and two violations, resulting in a private reprimand.) Cf. Florida Bar v. Inglis, 660 So.2d 697 (Fla. 1995) (disbarment appropriate for multiple violations of varied nature); Florida Bar v. Williams, 604 So.2d 447 (Fla. 1992) (same); Florida Bar v. Mavrides, 442 So.2d 220 (Fla. 1983) (same). Robert Scott Laing is hereby suspended for ninety-one days from the practice of law in Florida.

In addition, the referee recommended that the respondent be on probation for a period of two years. The Florida Bar seeks disbarment on the authority of The Florida Bar v. Mavrides, 442 So.2d 220 (Fla. 1983), where we found that the cumulative effect of an attorney's misconduct demonstrated an unfitness to practice law, and thus warranted disbarment. We agree with The Florida Bar that the respondent's misconduct warrants a tougher discipline than the referee's recommended ninety-day suspension.

Most importantly, the referee found that MacPherson acted without any dishonest or selfish motives. This recommendation and finding of mitigating circumstances distinguishes this cause from The Florida Bar v. Mavrides, 442 So.2d 220 (Fla. 1983), and The Florida Bar v. Montgomery, 412 So.2d 346 (Fla. 1982). We find the referee's recommendation is reasonable under these circumstances.