First, United was not “prevented from asserting [its claim] based, for example, on justified ignorance of the facts constituting a cause of action, personal disability, or because of ongoing settlement negotiations.” The Estate of Mantle v. Rothgeb, 2007 WL 4510326, at *5. United was not ignorant of the facts underlying its claim.

The circumstances alleged in the counterclaim must not only be related to those alleged in the complaint, or simply the result of the events alleged in the complaint, but there must exist a "common thread" connecting the events. Messinger v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 279 A.D.2d 344 (1st Dept. 2001)(citing Levy v. Kendricks, 170 AD2d 387 (1st Dept. 1991)); see also Estate of Mantle v. Rothgeb. 537 F.Supp.2d 533, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)("New York courts have generally required a tight nexus between claim and counterclaim before section 203(d) will save a counterclaim from an otherwise-applicable statute of limitations."). Here, the counterclaim is based on a letter sent to Wachovia bank after Corning learned that FRRM allegedly deposited checks issued to "Corning c/o Freight Revenue Recovery of Miami."

’ ” Estate of Mantle v. Rothgeb, 537 F.Supp.2d 533, 544 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (quoting First Fid. Bank N.A. N.J. v. Companhia de Navegacao Maritima Netumar, 637 F.Supp. 1182, 1185 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (quoting SCM Corp. v. Fisher Park Lane Co., 40 N.Y.2d 788, 390 N.Y.S.2d 398, 358 N.E.2d 1024, 1027 (1976))). This language, however, comes from cases distinguishing true recoupments from set-offs—that is, cases in which it is disputed whether the putative counterclaim truly arises “from the same transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences.”

Typically, “[t]he burden is on [d]efendants to show . . . that [p]laintiff's cause of action ‘accrued' outside New York.” Estate of Mantle v. Rothgeb, 537 F.Supp.2d 533, 541 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). Defendants have made no such showing.

Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, and pursuant to the Court's inherent authority to “manage [its] docket . . . with a view toward the efficient and expedient resolution of cases, ” Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 46 (2016), and “reconsider and modify its interlocutory orders, ” Estate of Mantle v. Rothgeb, 537 F.Supp.2d 533, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), the Court vacates its order invoking Rule 56(f) as to Zwick's first and second claims. Those claims are therefore reinstated.

A district court has the inherent authority to reconsider and modify its interlocutory orders. Estate of Mantle v. Rothgeb, 537 F.Supp.2d 533, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Gordon andBreach Science Publishers S.A. v. American Institute of Physics, 905 F.Supp. 169, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).

"New York courts have generally required a tight nexus between claim and counterclaim before section 203(d) will save a counterclaim from an otherwise-applicable statute of limitation." Macaluso v. U.S. Life Ins. Co., No. 03 Civ. 2337 (GEL), 2004 WL 1497606, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2004); see also Distribuidora de Discos Karen C. por A. v. Universal Music Grp., Inc., No. 13 Civ. 7706 (JPO), 2017 WL 1019697, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2017); Estate of Mantle v. Rothgeb, 537 F. Supp. 2d 533, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (Wood, J.). The claim and counterclaim must therefore share substantially overlapping facts in order for the counterclaim to fall within the ambit of CPLR 203(d).

That is, the exception may only apply where, unlike here, there is "a tight nexus between [the] claim and counterclaim." Greenspan v. Miron , 130 A.D.3d 1181, 1183, 13 N.Y.S.3d 659 (3d Dep't 2015) (citing Estate of Mantle v. Rothgeb , 537 F. Supp. 2d 533, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ); see alsoMopex, Inc. v. Am. Stock Exch., LLC , No. 2-CV-1656, 2002 WL 342522, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2002), amended , No. 2-CV-1656, 2002 WL 523417 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2002) ("[C]ounterclaims that ‘present a new theory’ or allege a new cause of action will be permitted as long as they relate to the same transactions or occurrences as the complaint.") (quoting Geller Media Mgmt., Inc. v. Chenault , No. 95-CV-8301, 1997 WL 362446, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 1997) (alterations omitted)). An action to recover damages for an injury to property must be commenced within three years.

However, section 203(d) requires a "tight nexus between claim and counterclaim" to "save a counterclaim from an otherwise-applicable statute of limitations." Estate of Mantle v. Rothgeb, 537 F. Supp. 2d 533, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting Macaluso v. U.S. Life Ins. Co., No. 03 Civ. 2337, 2004 WL 1497606, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2004)). "In order to fall within § 203(d), 'the counterclaim must seek a recovery-back predicated on some act or fact growing out of the matter constituting the cause or ground of the action brought.'" Id.

However, "[t]he statute permits a 'defendant to assert an otherwise untimely claim which arose out of the same transactions alleged in the complaint, but only as a shield for recoupment purposes, and does not permit a defendant to obtain affirmative relief.'" Estate of Mantle v. Rothgeb, 537 F. Supp. 2d 533, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting DeMille v. DeMille, 5 A.D.3d 428, 429 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2004)). As to Cohen Lans, therefore, the counterclaim may still be asserted "to the extent of the demand in the complaint notwithstanding that it was barred at the time."