Moreover, the circumstances under which this unobserved sinking occurred were such as to create a presumption as to cause under the familiar doctrine that "an unexplained sinking in calm waters imports unseaworthiness". See The Doyle, 3d Cir. 1939, 105 F.2d 113, 114. The evidence showed without dispute that the entire cargo of pig iron was loaded before 8 P.M.
Judicial admissions "may be disregarded in the interests of justice." The Doyle, 105 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1939) 105 F.2d 113 (citing Wigmore, Vol. 4, sec. 2590) (cited in Glick v. White Motor Co., 458 F.2d 1287, 1291 (3d Cir. 1972); Karoly v. Schwab, 516 B.R. 49, 55 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2014)). "Exceptional circumstances" warranting the opening of a judicial admission include "where an admitted fact is clearly untrue or a party was laboring under a mistake when the admission was made."
However, to be binding, judicial admissions must be unequivocal. Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261, 26 L.Ed. 539 (1880), The Doyle, 105 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1939), Rhoades, Inc. v. United Air Lines, Inc., supra. The scope of judicial admissions is restricted to matters of fact which otherwise would require evidentiary proof, and does not include counsel's statement of his conception of the legal theory of a case.
We note first that the jury did not reach the cause-of-death issue since they found no negligence on the part of O M Boat Co. In any event, assuming the death certificate was a judicial admission as to the cause of death, the district judge may, in a proper exercise of discretion, relieve a party of the adverse consequences of a judicial admission. See New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Waller, 4 Cir. 1963, 323 F.2d 20; The Doyle, 3 Cir. 1939, 105 F.2d 113; 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2590 (3d ed. 1940). There was a substantial question here whether the death certificate correctly recited the cause of death.
It is true that ordinarily an unexplained sinking of a vessel in calm water in clear weather raises a presumption of unseaworthiness which casts upon an owner the burden of showing seaworthiness at the time of delivery. The Doyle, 3 Cir., 105 F.2d 113; The Transit, 3 Cir., 250 F. 71; Commercial Corp. v. New York Barge Corp., 314 U.S. 104, 62 S.Ct. 156, 86 L.Ed. 89. The record evidence here, however, does not simply show an "unexplained sinking" in calm water in clear weather. The principal witness, Mr. C.J. Theus, a marine surveyor, testified that the lighter submerged because it had a hole in its side.
(quoting The Doyle, 105 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1939)).
COL 36. Plaintiffs argue that they should not be bound by the allegations in paragraphs 6, 9, 10, and 39 of the complaint because they “apparently did not fully appreciate that their honest belief as to their land's relationship to an entity know to them as the Donegal Storage Field would constitute binding legal conclusions as to the validity of the 1961 Lease.” (Pls. Proposed Conclusions of Law ¶ 33, ECF No. 174.) Plaintiffs argue that judicial admissions may be “ ‘disregarded in the interests of justice.’ ” (Id. ¶ 32 (quoting The Doyle, 105 F.2d 113, 117 (3d Cir.1939)).) Plaintiffs assert that the evidence of record demonstrates that the Masons' property is in part above the Donegal Storage Field protective area and not at all above the gas storage reservoir.
Judicial admissions may further be disregarded by the court "in the interest of justice." The Doyle, 105 F.2d 113, 117 (3d Cir. 1939). The question here is somewhat novel: is a former party's admission still binding on that party even though the objection was withdrawn and never amended or reasserted? Although this question has not been squarely addressed by the Third Circuit, West Run provides guidance.
Judicial admissions may further be disregarded by the court “in the interest of justice.” The Doyle, 105 F.2d 113, 117 (3d Cir.1939).The question here is somewhat novel: is a former party's admission still binding on that party even though the objection was withdrawn and never amended or reasserted? Although this question has not been squarely addressed by the Third Circuit, West Run provides guidance.
In some cases, unseaworthiness may be presumed, for example, when a vessel goes down in otherwise calm seas. See, e.g., The Doyle, 105 F.2d 113, 114 (3d Cir. 1939) ("An unexplained sinking in calm water imports unseaworthiness.") Not every sunken vessel, however, is presumed unseaworthy. The law recognizes that some accidents are attributable to "the perils of the sea," and are not properly chargeable to the condition of the vessel.