Where Congress enacts legislation containing words or phrases which have been judicially construed under other acts upon the same subject, it is presumed to know of such construction and to have adopted the construction of such words and phrases previously made. United States v. Hermanos y Compania, 209 U.S. 337; United States v. G. Falk Bro., 204 U.S. 143, 152; The Devonshire, 13 F. 39, 42. Acts of Congress should be construed in view of the history and circumstances surrounding their enactment.

Mere change in the phraseology works no change in the established interpretation thereof, unless it clearly appears that such was the intention of the legislature. Black on Interpretation, 161; Bradley v. State, 69 Ala. 318; Huddleston v. Askey, 56 Ala. 218; Posey v. Pressly, 60 Ala. 243, 249; McDonald v. Hovey, 110 U.S. 619, 628; Potter's Dwarris, 181, note 2; Yates's Case, 4 Johns. 318, 358; Dominick v. Michael, 4 Sandf. (13 N.Y.) 374, 409; The Devonshire, 13 F. 39; Reiche v. Smythe, 13 Wall. 162; Willis v. Eastern Trust Banking Co., 169 U.S. 295, 307; Commonwealth v. Hartnett, 3 Gray, 450; State v. Cornell, 75 F. 25. A discharge in bankruptcy, under the act of 1898, does not release a bankrupt from debts created by his positive fraud involving moral turpitude or intentional wrong.