Opinion
No. 99-3835
June 12, 2000
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on I.T.O. Corporation's motion for change of venue, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). For the reasons discussed below, this case is transferred to the Southern District of Illinois.
Background
Plaintiffs, The Continental Insurance Company ("Continental") and Newco Steel Trading, Inc. ("Newco"), commenced this maritime cargo action against Defendants, I.T.O. Corporation ("ITO"), Phoenix Towing Company ("Phoenix") and Huffman Towing Company ("Huffman"), seeking approximately $230,000.00 plus interest and costs for alleged damage to a load of steel coils in a December 21, 1998 barge incident in Sauget, Illinois. Plaintiffs allege that ITO'S negligent and unseaworthy stowage practices, alternatively, Huffman and/or Phoenix's negligence, as the owner and operator of barge CBL-333, respectively, caused the losses sustained by Plaintiffs.
On October 30, 1998, ITO finished loading Newco's cargo of steel coils onto the barge in New Orleans, Louisiana. From the time ITO loaded the cargo until December 21, 1998, Huffman and/or Phoenix were in control of the barge, towing it up the Mississippi River towards St. Louis, Missouri. On December 21, 1998, at Mile 178.2 upper Mississippi River on the left descending bank in Sauget, Illinois, the barge capsized and sank, spilling the cargo of steel coils into the river. At the time of the incident, several employees of Cahokia Marine Service ("Cahokia"), including Ricardo R. Ruiz, were unloading the shipment of steel coils.
Three lawsuits were filed as a result of the incident. On December 17, 1999, Huffman and Phoenix commenced an action against Cahokia and ITO in the Southern District of Illinois, seeking to recover $155,025.29 for the cost of raising the barge and its cargo and $190,000.00 for the value of the barge. On December 20, 1999, Mr. Ruiz commenced a personal injury action in Illinois state court against Huffman. Huffman removed that action to the Southern District of Illinois. The two Southern District of Illinois cases were consolidated on February 2, 2000. The third suit is the above captioned action. As with this action, the other suits also involve several cross-claims for indemnity and contribution against Cahokia, Huffman, Phoenix and ITO.
Four days after Plaintiffs served Defendants, ITO filed a motion for change of venue, seeking for this Court to transfer this case to the Southern District of Illinois. While neither Huffman nor Phoenix oppose ITO'S motion for change of venue, Plaintiffs do.
Discussion
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), a district court may transfer a civil action to any other district where the action may have been brought "for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice." In exercising its discretion over a motion to transfer, a district court "must consider `all relevant factors to determine whether or not on balance the litigation would more conveniently proceed and the interests of justice be better served by transfer to a different forum.'" However, "unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, . . . the plaintiff's choice of forum is not to be disturbed."
Peteet v. Dow Chemical Co., 868 F.2d 1428, 1436 (5th Cir. 1989) (quoting 15 C. Wright, A. Miller E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3847, at 370 (1986)).
In re McDonnell Douglas Corp., 647 F.2d 515, 517 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981) (citing Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947)).
In addition to the factors articulated in § 1404(a), district courts consider case-specific and public interest factors in determining motions for transfer. Case-specific factors include (1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) the availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses; (3) the cost of attendance for willing witnesses; (4) all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy', expeditious and inexpensive. Public interest factors include (1) the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; (2) the local interest in having localized controversies decided at home; (3) the familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the case; (4) the avoidance of unnecessary problems of conflict of laws of the application of foreign law.
Syndicate 420 at Lloyd's London v. Early American Ins. Co., 796 F.2d 821, 831 (5th Cir. 1986).
See id.
Considering all of the relevant factors, it is clear that on balance the litigation would proceed more conveniently and the interests of justice would be better served if the this matter were transferred to the Southern District of Illinois. The Southern District of Illinois is a more convenient forum for the parties and witnesses, and the factors articulated by the Fifth Circuit, in Syndicate, weigh heavily in favor of transfer.
The Southern District of Illinois is a more convenient forum for the parties. Huffman and Phoenix are Missouri corporations with principal places of business in Clayton, Missouri, located across the Mississippi River from East St. Louis, Illinois, where the Southern District of Illinois sits. Cahokia is a Missouri corporation and operates a barge unloading facility in the Southern District of Illinois.
With respect to the Plaintiffs, the Eastern District of Louisiana is no more or less convenient for them. Continental is a New York corporation with its principal place of business in New York, and Newco is a Texas corporation with its principal place of business in Texas. Neither plaintiff claims to conduct any business in the state of Louisiana.
Finally, ITO, the only party with any relationship to the State of Louisiana, is the party moving for a change of venue. Accordingly, it is clear that the Southern District of Illinois is a more convenient forum for the parties.
The Southern District of Illinois is also a more convenient forum for the witnesses. The bulk of the witnesses, including those involved in unloading the barge and those present when it capsized and sank, reside in or near the Southern District of Illinois. ITO claims that the only witnesses located in the Eastern District of Louisiana are either employed or retained by ITO. ITO avers that it will make those witnesses available for deposition in the event of transfer.
In addition to the issue of proximity to the forum, transfer and possible consolidation of this case with the other cases pending in the Southern District of Illinois will reduce the need for multiple depositions of the same witnesses. Therefore, transferring this case to the Southern District of Illinois serves to eliminate the duplication of time, expense and inconvenience to witnesses.
Moreover, the case-specific and public interest factors articulated by the Fifth Circuit, in Syndicate, weigh heavily in favor of transfer. Access to sources of proof is easier in the forum where the accident giving rise to the claims occurred. Most of the witnesses are amenable to compulsory service in the Southern District of Illinois, except for those employed by ITO, who avers that those witnesses shall be made available. In addition, it is much less expensive for the witnesses, the bulk of whom reside in or near the Southern District of Illinois, to attend proceedings in that district. Moreover, transfer of this case to the Southern District of Illinois where it may possibly be consolidated with the two actions pending there will significantly decrease duplicative discovery and litigation efforts, thereby enabling an easier, more expeditious and inexpensive resolution of the matters arising from the December 21, 1998 barge incident. Finally, none of the public interest factors weigh in favor of retention of jurisdiction over this matter. Therefore, on balance and with due respect to plaintiffs' choice of forum, it is clear that this case should be transferred to the Southern District of Illinois.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that ITO's motion for change of venue is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is TRANSFERRED to the Southern District of Illinois.